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abstract.   As Aristotle recognized in The Politics, the household is an indispensable 
building block of social, economic, and political life. A liberal society grants its citizens far wider 
berth to arrange their households than to choose their familial and marital relationships. Legal 
commentators, however, have devoted far more attention to the family and to marriage than to 
the household as such. To unpack the household, this Article applies transaction cost economics 
and sociological theory to interactions among household participants. It explores questions such 
as the structure of ownership of dwelling units, the scope of household production, and the 
governance of activities around the hearth. Drawing on a wide variety of historical and statistical 
sources, the Article contrasts conventional family-based households with arrangements in, 
among others, medieval English castles, Benedictine monasteries, and Israeli kibbutzim. 
 A household is likely to involve several participants and as many as three distinct 
relationships—that among occupants, that among owners, and that between these two groups 
(the landlord-tenant relationship). Individuals, when structuring these home relationships, 
typically pursue a strategy of consorting with intimates. This facilitates informal coordination 
and greatly reduces the transaction costs of domestic interactions. Utopian critics, however, have 
sought to enlarge the scale of households, and some legal advocates have urged household 
members to write formal contracts and take disputes into court. These commentators fail to 
appreciate the great advantages, in the home setting, of informally associating with a few 
trustworthy intimates.  
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Lawyers and legal scholars understandably tend to focus on domains of life 
where law is central. There is much to be learned, however, from domains 
where people deliberately structure their affairs to minimize formalities such as 
written contracts and legal entanglements. Just as studying conditions of 
anarchy helps illuminate the effects of government, so studying domains that 
people intentionally keep casual can shed light on the merits of more legalized 
arrangements. 
This Article analyzes one of the most important human institutions in 
which informality traditionally has prevailed: the household. Although the 
household lies at the core of everyday life, economists and legal scholars have 
yet to give it the attention it deserves.1 The members of a household (that is, its 
owners and occupants) together manage a real estate enterprise that makes use 
of inputs of land, capital, and labor in order to provide shelter, meals, and 
other services. Members of an intimate household, through their repeated 
interactions, typically generate a set of norms to govern their behavior, 
including their duties to supply household inputs and their rights to share in 
household outputs. The chief goals of this Article are to provide a structure for 
thinking about the household, to systematize and augment what is already 
known, and to stimulate legal scholars and other analysts to devote more 
attention to the structuring of the home.2 
It is important at the outset to distinguish the household from both 
marriage and the family, two closely related (and much more studied) social 
molecules with which it commonly is conflated. As just suggested, a 
 
1.  Most scholars who have analyzed households have focused exclusively on marital or 
premarital households, a tip-off that their main interest is the marital relationship. See, e.g., 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies To Remedy the Gender 
Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89 (1993). The leading law review analysis of intimate communities of all 
kinds, Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001), 
deals only with relations among co-owners and attempts no systematic analysis of the 
household as such. Works close in spirit to the present one include MARGARET G. REID, 
ECONOMICS OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION (1934), Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: 
Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1 
(1980), David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 15 (1996), and Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and 
Households, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 581, 588-89 (1985). Pollak distinguishes families from 
households but makes limited use of the distinction. For my own preliminary thoughts on 
the subject, see Robert C. Ellickson, Norms of the Household, in NORMS AND THE LAW 59 
(John N. Drobak ed., 2006). 
2.  Much of the analysis to be offered here could be applied to other forms of real estate co-
owned and co-occupied by intimates, such as family farms and mom-and-pop retail outlets. 
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“household” is a set of institutional arrangements, formal or informal, that 
governs relations among the owners and occupants of a dwelling space where 
occupants usually sleep and share meals.3 By this definition, a studio apartment 
with a single owner-occupant is a household, and so is a kibbutz where 
hundreds of members dine communally. A study of the household thus is an 
investigation into the allocation of property rights in a specific physical setting. 
“Marriage,” by contrast, denotes a legal relationship between two people 
that is not specific to any one location. Of course, when marital partners 
cohabit a home they jointly own, their household relationships are deeply 
intertwined with their marital relationship. The domain of their marital 
relationship, however, differs significantly from the domain of their household 
relationship. Much of marital property law addresses entitlements to assets 
other than the marital home—to children, financial accounts, and the spouses’ 
human capital, for example. In that sense, a marital relationship is broader and 
more multifaceted than a household relationship. Conversely, marital law is 
unlikely to directly govern some important household relationships. First, 
when marriage partners cohabit, other kinfolk and non-kinfolk commonly are 
present in their home. In the United States in 2004, for example, married 
couples were the sole occupants of less than 39% of multiperson households.4 
Second, a married couple need not cohabit. Indeed, in the United States 
roughly 7% of married persons do not live with their spouses.5 Third, marriage 
 
3.  In this Article a “household” thus is distinguished from the dwelling unit occupied (the 
“house” or “apartment”) and also is regarded as an institution that potentially has 
participants in addition to those who regularly reside there. The U.S. Census Bureau, by 
contrast, equates a household with its occupants: “A ‘household’ comprises all persons who 
occupy a ‘housing unit,’ that is, a house, an apartment or other group of rooms, or a single 
room that constitutes ‘separate living quarters.’” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 
1999]. The Bureau in turn defines a “housing unit” as a room or rooms lived in by persons 
who do not live and eat with any other occupants of the same structure (and thus, by 
implication, who do often live and eat with one another). Id. at 718. The Bureau defines a 
“family” as a set of persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption who live together in the 
same housing unit. Id. at 6. It uses “group quarters” to describe the residences of persons in 
dormitories, jails, nursing homes, military barracks, and the like. Id. (On group quarters, see 
infra note 90 and text accompanying notes 116-118.) The Bureau’s definitions do not include 
a term that encompasses both the owners and occupants of a dwelling unit. In this Article, 
these participants occasionally are collectively referred to as “members.” 
4.  Calculated from data presented in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2006, at 51 tbl.53 (2005) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006]. This is 
the percentage of multiperson households that included a married couple but no child of 
that couple under age eighteen. 
5.  In 1998, 110.6 million married Americans were living with their spouses, but 7.3 million 
were not. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 60 tbl.69. 
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partners who cohabit are not necessarily also the co-owners of their dwelling 
unit; others may join them as co-owners, they may lease their dwelling from 
others, or their home may be owned by only one partner. Marital law, in sum, 
fails to cover significant household relationships. To emphasize the 
institutional distinction between marriage and the household, much of the 
discussion to come features relationships within nonmarital households. 
“Family” denotes a kinship relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, 
but not necessarily a household relationship. Family members, even more 
obviously than spouses, need neither cohabit nor co-own, and cohabitants and 
co-owners need not be kin. In the United States, the number of multiperson 
households in which none of the occupants shared family ties increased almost 
sixfold between 1970 and 2004.6 These nonfamilial households, which 
contained 12.3 million people in 1998,7 appear in a wide variety of 
incarnations—for example, university students or young professionals living 
together as roommates, unmarried heterosexual partners,8 gay and lesbian 
couples,9 welfare recipients or recent immigrants clustering to economize on 
rent,10 and idealists teaming up in a commune. 
The household is eminently worthy of study as an institution distinct from 
marriage and the family. Even in industrialized nations, households are still the 
sites of a large fraction of economic and social activity. In 1985, according to a 
leading study, American women, irrespective of their marital and employment 
status, were spending an average of 30.9 hours a week on housework, while 
men were spending 15.7 hours.11 In the United States, recent estimates of the 
 
6.  These households increased in number from 1.1 million in 1970, id. at 60 tbl.70, to 6.2 
million in 2004, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006, supra note 4, at 51 tbl.53. 
7.  Calculated from data presented in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 61 tbl.72. 
See also infra text accompanying notes 95-99, 115-122. 
8.  In 2000, self-identified unmarried cohabiting opposite-sex partners headed 4.9 million 
households. TAVI SIMMONS & MARTIN O’CONNELL, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-
PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 2 tbl.1 (2003). See generally LYNNE M. CASPER & SUZANNE 
M. BIANCHI, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 39-66 (2002) (discussing 
cohabitation arrangements). 
9.  The Census Bureau tallied 594,391 self-identified same-sex partner households in 2000. 
SIMMONS & O’CONNELL, supra note 8, at 2 tbl.1. See generally M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, 
MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 142-51 (2001) 
(discussing economic studies of cohabitation and the formation of families among same-sex 
couples). 
10.  See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE 
WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 54-56 (1997). 
11.  JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS AMERICANS 
USE THEIR TIME 100, 105 (1997) (reporting data from time diaries). Other studies, however, 
report fewer hours for both sexes. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Influence of Marvin v. Marvin 
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value of within-household production (most of it unpaid) have run from 24% 
to 60% of GDP—that is, to several trillions of dollars per year.12 
The norms that govern household affairs, moreover, have had Promethean 
influence. The rules that our ancestors developed to resolve problems arising 
around their hearths provided templates for achieving mutually advantageous 
solutions in settings outside the home.13 Even today it is typically within the 
household that children first learn how to recognize and deal with problems 
posed by common property and collective enterprise. Study of the household 
therefore promises to shed light on the origins of more complex institutions. 
While legal scholars and institutional economists have largely neglected the 
household as such, numerous demographers, sociologists, and social historians 
have examined the institution. Aristotle devoted the first book of The Politics to 
analysis of the household, which he envisioned as the basic building block of 
political life.14 Plato, Thomas More, Charles Fourier, B.F. Skinner, and other 
utopian thinkers have imagined new institutional arrangements for providing 
housing and meals. There have been incessant experiments with 
unconventional households, such as monasteries, kibbutzim, and, more 
recently, co-housing developments that enable nuclear households to engage in 
congregate dining several times a week. 
Basic questions about the nature of household institutions abound. Why 
are the occupants (and also, for that matter, the owners) of a dwelling unit so 
often related by kinship? Why has the average number of occupants per 
household fallen, particularly during the twentieth century? More 
fundamentally (and to redirect questions Ronald Coase famously asked in 
another context), why don’t all adults live alone? Or, conversely, all in one 
huge household?15 How do household members obtain the rules that govern 
 
on Housework During Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311, 1340 (2001) (reporting data 
from 1988). Men’s and women’s hours of housework became less unequal between 1965 and 
1985, primarily because women’s hours fell. ROBINSON & GODBEY, supra, at 105. 
12.  See EUSTON QUAH, ECONOMICS AND HOME PRODUCTION: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 80-
89 (1993) (reviewing the literature). Most estimates fall in the lower part of the range 
mentioned in the text. See also infra note 236. 
13.  On this evolution, see MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 41-148 (1972), which 
discusses the “domestic mode of production” in preliterate societies. 
14.  Aristotle saw the household (oikos) as the basic component of, first, the village, and, beyond 
that, the city (polis). ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 9-10 (Ernest Barker trans., R.F. Stalley rev. 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 335-322 B.C.E.). Although oikos is the etymological root 
of “economics,” until recent decades few economists have paid more than passing attention 
to home economics. 
15.  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388, 394-95 (1937) (discussing the 
boundaries of a business enterprise). 
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their relationships, and what sorts of rules are they likely to favor? This Article 
offers tentative answers to these questions. Although cultural variables also 
unquestionably affect how individuals set up households, the focus here is on 
the influence of economic considerations.16 The overarching thesis is that 
individuals, across cultures and historical eras, have tended to structure their 
households, even ones sustained by love and affection, with a close eye to 
reducing the transaction costs of their domestic interactions.17 
Part I begins by unpacking the three distinct relationships—co-occupancy, 
co-ownership, and landlord-tenant—that may exist within a household. It then 
introduces the notion of the “liberal household,” that is, the sort of institution 
likely to emerge when background principles of law and norms generally 
support individual rights of self-determination. Part II offers reasons why 
individuals in a liberal society, when they form household relationships, are 
likely to choose to consort with intimates. This strategy, among its other 
virtues, enables household participants to coordinate informally and relatively 
cheaply. Part III, the empirical heart of the Article, marshals demographic 
evidence about household forms and demonstrates the wide popularity, in each 
of the three basic household relationships, of the strategy of consorting with 
intimates. Although much of the proffered evidence pertains to contemporary 
conditions in the United States, some attention is paid here and elsewhere in 
the Article to households in other nations and other time periods. Part IV raises 
the issue of the optimality of the process of household formation and reviews 
utopians’ proposals for radical transformation of conventional household 
forms. Parts V and VI bring the theory of business enterprise to bear on the 
issue of the ownership of a household and on the determinants of the number 
of participants in household relationships.18 Like participants in a business 
 
16.  Sociologists have adduced statistical evidence that both economic and cultural variables 
affect the nature of household institutions within the United States. See, e.g., Evelyn Nakano 
Glenn, Split Household, Small Producer and Dual Wage Earner: An Analysis of Chinese-
American Family Strategies, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 35 (1983); Marta Tienda & Ronald Angel, 
Headship and Household Composition Among Blacks, Hispanics, and Other Whites, 61 SOC. 
FORCES 508 (1982). There is a massive literature on cultural differences in household 
institutions, including iconic works such as E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN 
THE UNITED STATES (rev. & abr. ed. 1948). Also see infra note 84 and the sources on 
households in other nations cited infra notes 93, 99, 105-109, 113-114. On the effects of 
varying cultural beliefs on the evolution of medieval trading institutions among the 
Maghribis and Genoese, see AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN 
ECONOMY 269-301 (2006). 
17.  On the pervasive influence of love and unconditional giving in many household 
relationships, see infra notes 66, 166, 206, 304. 
18.  Cf. MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 83-139 (2000) (analyzing “the family as firm”). 
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firm, members of a household typically confer ownership on providers of at-
risk capital, not on occupants who labor within the home. Particularly when 
some or all of the owners of a dwelling are absentees, this may give rise to the 
separation of ownership from control—a homespun version of a problem much 
analyzed in the business context.19 Part VII investigates alternative processes of 
internal household governance, including law, norms, and contracts. A central 
claim is that, in a liberal society, while law provides essential background rules 
that enable household formation, small-bore private law rules have little 
relevance to everyday domestic affairs. Instead of looking to the legal system, 
intimate co-occupants and co-owners are able to coordinate mainly by means 
of gift exchange, a process that gives rise to household-specific norms. Indeed, 
even a tenant and an absentee landlord are likely to strive to avoid 
involvements with the legal system. Part VIII identifies avenues for further 
research. 
i. household formation and dissolution in a liberal 
society 
A. Three Distinct Relationships That May Exist Within a Household 
When a recluse solely owns and occupies a dwelling unit, interpersonal 
conflicts within that household are avoided. Difficulties can arise, however, 
when two or more co-occupants face the task of managing a shared domestic 
space. Indeed, the seeds of conflict in such circumstances are so fertile that 
writers of novels, dramas, and television comedies commonly favor story lines 
that feature the cohabitants of households.20 
Besides the occupancy dimension, however, there is an ownership 
dimension to household organization. This can introduce two additional 
sources of relational complexity: there may be multiple owners of the occupied 
real estate, and some or all of them may not be occupants. In short, the 
members of a household may need to manage as many as three conceptually 
distinct relationships—that among co-occupants, that among co-owners, and 
 
19.  The classic analysis is ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
20.  It is notable that many leading television series have been set in multi-occupant households. 
While many of these have featured married couples, see, e.g., I Love Lucy (CBS television 
broadcast 1951-1957); The Cosby Show (NBC television broadcast 1984-1992); The Sopranos 
(HBO television broadcast 1999-present), in some, the principal housemates have not been 
related, see, e.g., The Odd Couple (ABC television broadcast 1970-1975); Three’s Company 
(ABC television broadcast 1977-1984); Friends (NBC television broadcast 1994-2004). 
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that between owners and occupants (more familiarly, landlords and tenants). 
Figure 1 portrays these three spheres of interaction. (As noted, overlapping 
marital and familial relationships commonly complicate the picture even 
further.) A study of the household that fails to recognize these distinctions 
risks muddying its portrayal of domestic life. The U.S. Census Bureau, for 
example, treats a household’s occupants as its only members.21 By contrast, 
Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, in their influential article on the “liberal 
commons,” treat co-owners as the only relevant “commoners.”22 A household 
has both occupants and owners, however, and it is essential to consider the 
roles of each.23 
Figure 1.  














 To highlight the distinctions just offered, it is useful to introduce a 
hypothetical household of greater than usual complexity. Because the 
relationships within it are rich enough to provide weekly comedy fare, I will 
refer to it as the “Sitcom Household.” This household has five occupants: Dad, 
 
21.  See supra note 3. 
22.  Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 552-53, 609-10. 
23.  Leading works on families, households, and domestic communities typically fail to 
distinguish between the roles of occupants and owners. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A 
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed. 1991); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE 
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998); BENJAMIN 
ZABLOCKI, ALIENATION AND CHARISMA: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN COMMUNES 
45-46 (1980) (discussing “members” of communes). 
Owner A Owner B
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a widower; Granny, Dad’s widowed octogenarian mother; Maureen, Dad’s 
thirty-five-year-old divorced daughter; Chip, Maureen’s seven-year-old son; 
and Nadia, a twenty-two-year-old from abroad whom Maureen has hired to 
serve as a live-in nanny for Chip. They reside together in a large single-family 
dwelling, with Nadia in guest quarters situated over the house’s attached 
garage. These five occupants provide virtually all household labor and consume 
virtually all household services. The ownership of the Sitcom House, however, 
complicates the structure of relations within it. Dad owns the house in equal 
shares with his sister, Aunt Audrey. After Dad’s wife died a decade ago, Aunt 
Audrey and he acquired the house, each providing half of the down payment 
and taking title as tenants in common. Aunt Audrey resided in the Sitcom 
House for several years, but a few months ago she married, and she now lives 
elsewhere with her new husband. 
The Sitcom Household illustrates the often distinct governance structures 
of marriages, families, and households. Aunt Audrey, the co-owner with Dad, 
is the only member of the dramatis personae with an ongoing marriage, but 
her marriage is not nested within the Sitcom Household because she doesn’t 
reside there and her husband is in no way involved. Family relationships 
abound, but one resident (Nadia the nanny) isn’t a family member. Some 
family members (Granny, Maureen, and Chip), meanwhile, are occupants but 
not owners, and Aunt Audrey is an owner but not an occupant. This household 
illustrates the three distinct types of internal relationships, each with its own 
potential for cooperation or strife: the relationship among the five co-
occupants, who must govern their commons; the relationship between the two 
co-owners, who must govern their joint investment; and the relationship 
between the co-owner group and co-occupant group, both of whom must 
govern their landlord-tenant relationship. Note that only one of the members, 
Dad, is enmeshed in all of these relationships and that he is involved on both 
ends of the landlord-tenant relationship. 
B. Foundational Liberal Rights That Enable Individuals To Fashion Their Own 
Households 
People can be thrust into household relationships that they would never 
voluntarily choose. A totalitarian state might dictate the combinations of 
participants in all household relationships and also closely regulate the internal 
practices of households. In Utopia, Thomas More envisioned a highly 
regimented system of this sort.24 For many decades after it had abolished 
 
24.  THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1989) (1516); see infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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private property in land, the Soviet Union assigned families and individuals to 
specific dwelling units. In some situations, Soviet authorities compelled 
unacquainted persons or families to share an abode (the much-reviled 
komunalkas).25 Slave-owners similarly were able to dictate where their slaves 
resided. In many societies, parents still arrange their children’s marriages and 
thus, in practice, at least one of each child’s housemates. 
In a liberal state, by contrast, laws and norms support a laissez-faire 
approach to household formation and dissolution. The core tenet of liberalism 
is that a competent adult presumptively can decide better than a state, master, 
parent, or other third party what arrangements best suit that individual. A 
liberal state therefore largely contents itself with establishing a set of 
background rules that grant individuals broad discretion to structure their own 
living arrangements.26 These background liberal laws typically grow out of, 
and are buttressed by, entrenched social norms. In this permissive 
environment, “liberal households”—the ones familiar to most readers—
emerge.27 
The key entitlements necessary for a robust system of decentralized 
household formation are largely the same as those that underpin a market 
economy: private ownership of the basic inputs of household production (i.e., 
land, labor, and capital); freedom of exit from any sort of household 
relationship; and freedom of contract. Ordinary individuals, who lack the time 
and interest to obtain detailed legal information, commonly subscribe to the 
simplified conceptions of basic liberal entitlements that are embedded in 
prevailing social norms. 
1. Private Property 
Members of a liberal household combine land, capital, and labor to 
generate a flow of domestic goods and services. A liberal system of household 
formation thus presupposes private property in all three of these basic inputs. 
An unalloyed private property regime of course can have harsh distributive 
consequences. Those who lack land, capital, and valued labor skills need 
 
25.  On komunalkas, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 650-58 (1998); and Michael Wines, 
Tight Space. No Privacy. Soviet Décor., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at A1. 
26.  See infra text accompanying notes 154-160 (noting some exceptions). 
27.  William Booth coined this useful phrase in WILLIAM JAMES BOOTH, HOUSEHOLDS: ON THE 
MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE ECONOMY 95-176 (1993). 
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assistance from others to have meaningful choices among household 
arrangements.28 
A system of private property in land provides havens where household 
members potentially may fashion their own domestic arrangements. In a 
society such as the United States, where the supply of private housing and 
building lots traditionally has been highly competitive, prospective household 
members can choose, subject to their budget constraints, among a wide range 
of locations, dwelling types, and tenure arrangements.29 Conversely, in a 
society where a few government agencies or private firms control housing 
supply, or where land use regulations severely limit housing options, there is 
less freedom in household formation. One of the fundamental entitlements of a 
private landowner is the right to exclude.30 This liberal entitlement makes the 
owners of dwelling units the gatekeepers who control the identities of both 
occupants and additional owners.31 Maureen can neither arrange for her lover 
 
28.  On a given night in the United States, roughly one person out of 2000 is among the 
unsheltered homeless, that is, sleeps in a space not designed for residential use. See Robert 
C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and 
Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192 nn.132-33, 1193 n.134 (1996). In the United 
States, as in other liberal societies, the administrators of a multitude of private and public 
transfer programs strive, with mixed success, to augment the choices of the destitute. See id. 
at 1189-91 (describing trends in aid to the homeless). 
29.  In most metropolitan markets, for example, the ownership of rental housing is not 
concentrated enough to confer monopoly power on owners. According to a National Multi 
Housing Council survey, the top fifty owners of apartments in the United States had an 
ownership interest in 2.96 million units in 2005, about 8% of the national stock of rental 
housing. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006, supra note 4, at 626 tbl.945; Mark Obrinsky, 2005 
NMHC 50: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, in NAT’L MULTI HOUSING 
COUNCIL, NMHC 50, at 10, 10 (2005), available at http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ 
servefile.cfm?FileID=4574; see also infra text accompanying notes 123-132. 
30.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998); see 
also Lior Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Right To Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1835 (2006) (discussing varieties of exclusion strategies). On why rights to exclude from 
land should belong to the landowner and not to owners of personal property located on that 
land, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 390-91 (2001). A private landowner’s other key entitlements 
are the right to control land uses and the power to transfer. 
31.  When occupants formally lease their dwelling unit from a landlord, ownership relations 
may become multilayered. The prime tenants (those whose names appear on the lease) have 
in rem entitlements in a block of time and, depending on the lease provisions, commonly 
also have the power to transfer some or all of that block to a third party. See Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 820-33 
(2001). A prime tenant who makes a partial transfer to a third party is simultaneously a 
tenant of the prime landlord and also a sub-landlord of that third party. 
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to move in without the approval of Dad and Aunt Audrey, nor can she compel 
them to allow her to become the third co-owner of the Sitcom House.32 
The right to accumulate private capital is the second core liberal property 
right. Without legal protection against confiscation by either a government or a 
private taker, an individual would have little incentive to accumulate enduring 
assets. In many settings, the protection of savings leads to the establishment of 
intermediary financial institutions, some of which can then serve as specialized 
mortgage lenders. This right to accumulate private capital enabled Dad and 
Aunt Audrey to come up with the down payment and financing they needed to 
purchase the Sitcom House. Partly because holdings of private capital are 
protected, about 80% of Americans, at some time in their lives, are able to 
become homeowners.33 
Ownership of one’s own person and labor is the last of the three basic 
liberal property rights. Because self-ownership entails the right to physically 
control the location and activities of one’s own body, it is the entitlement most 
indispensable to the liberal ideal of self-determination. A household occupant 
commonly provides work around the home in exchange for receiving domestic 
services, such as meals and lodging, and in some instances wages. The Sitcom 
Household’s au pair, Nadia, is voluntarily trading her labor for a compensation 
package of this sort. In a nonliberal regime, by contrast, a slave-owner or the 
state might own Nadia’s human capital and have the power to decide, among 
other things, where she would live.34 As a historical matter, most slaves—
whether chattel or debt—have resided in or near their masters’ households. 
Henry Maine is renowned for his sweeping observation that “progressive 
societies” have moved away from defining rights and duties as immutable 
outgrowths of family and marital status and toward entitling individuals to 
 
32.  The owners of a dwelling typically are entitled to exclude, for example, a sick and lonely 
outsider. Ambient norms, however, constrain exclusion decisions. See ROBERT FROST, The 
Death of the Hired Man, in COLLECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 49, 53 (1939) (“‘Home is the 
place where, when you have to go there, / They have to take you in.’”). And there also are 
some closely cabined exceptions to the legal right of a landowner to exclude. See Robert C. 
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382-85 (1993). 
33.  See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2005, at 36 (2005) (reporting that, in 2004, roughly 80% of U.S. household heads 
over age forty-five were homeowners, with the percentage peaking at 82.6% for those 
between the ages of sixty-five and seventy-four).  
34.  A slave who lacks the formal entitlement to trade labor for either monetary or in-kind 
compensation nevertheless may have some bargaining leverage in practice. See YORAM 
BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 109-10, 113 (2d ed. 1997). 
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define these rights and duties by contract.35 As Maine recognized, the key legal 
developments that gave rise to this trend were changes in property rights, 
namely legal conferrals of greater self-ownership rights on slaves, wives, and 
adult children who formerly had been under the thumbs of family heads.36 
2. Freedom of Exit: Of Households “At-Will” 
Individuals’ entry and exit decisions combine to determine the membership 
rosters of both the owners and occupants of a particular household. As noted, a 
landowner’s entitlement to exclude entails a plenary power to veto proposed 
entries. But a household’s owner typically has scant authority to keep an adult 
participant in place. A liberal legal regime, consistent with its overarching 
principle of self-determination, generally grants a legally competent person 
robust unilateral rights to exit from a household relationship.37 A co-occupant’s 
right of exit consists of her privilege to physically remove both her person and 
her personal belongings from the previously shared abode. If Nadia wants to 
terminate her employment contract with Maureen, no one can force her to stay. 
Even if Nadia had previously promised Maureen that she would serve as a 
nanny for a certain period, Maureen could not obtain an injunction ordering 
Nadia to perform those personal services.38 Laws against slavery and 
 
35.  HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 168-70 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1861). Most 
commentators agree with Maine that there has been a broad historical trend toward freeing 
individuals from immutable blood and marriage obligations. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, 
THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 11-13, 41-46 (1981); CAROLE SHAMMAS, A 
HISTORY OF HOUSEHOLD GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (2002) (documenting the enhancement, 
especially between 1840 and 1880, of the rights of wives, children, and domestic workers). 
36.  Well into the nineteenth century, upon marrying, a woman typically ceded to her husband 
most of her powers to contract and own property. This compelled deprivation of a wife’s 
ownership of her own labor was distinctly illiberal. On the coverture system and its 
breakdown, see, for example, Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck, The Gains from Self-Ownership 
and the Expansion of Women’s Rights, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1079 (2002); and Reva B. Siegel, 
Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-
1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994). 
37.  This power of exit helps establish a threat point that influences the distribution of shares of 
household surplus. See infra text accompanying notes 57-63. The classic analysis of exit as a 
means of control is ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-25 (1970). Dagan and Heller place 
protection of the right of exit at the center of their vision of a normatively attractive regime 
that they call the “liberal commons.” Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 567-77. 
38.  The canonical precedent is Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.), which denied 
the remedy of specific performance of a contract to perform as an opera singer. See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1979); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific 
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kidnapping also would bar Maureen from forcing Nadia to remain against her 
will. 
The vocabulary of law and economics helps clarify the nature of an 
occupant’s exit entitlements in a liberal society.39 Because Nadia cannot waive 
her exit option by contract, her entitlement to leave the household is 
immutable. On the other hand, if Nadia had promised Maureen to stay for a 
full year and then had broken that promise, a court might order her to pay 
damages to Maureen. The rule that an occupant can costlessly exit from a 
household thus is merely a default. Those who want Nadia to remain a 
cohabitant cannot obtain property rule protection of that desire, but they can 
contract with her to obtain liability rule protection of it. 
A liberal state is also likely to grant a co-owner, as a default, unilateral 
power to exit from a co-ownership relationship. Unless Aunt Audrey had 
contracted otherwise, she would have two ways of forcing the end of her 
arrangement with Dad. First, she could sell her ownership interest to a third 
party.40 Second, she could unilaterally trigger judicial termination of the 
arrangement.41 This is not to say that exit by a co-owner is utterly 
unconstrained. A judge adjudicating a partition action may order, as part of the 
final accounting, a cross-payment to correct disproportions in the co-owners’ 
prior sharing of benefits and burdens. In some instances, this cross-payment 
provides a dose of liability rule protection to abandoned co-owners. American 
law also entitles co-owners to contract with one another to waive, for a limited 
 
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 297 (1979) (stating the case against specific performance of a 
personal services contract). 
39.  This now-conventional terminology derives from Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps 
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989), and 
from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
40.  The default rule is that a co-owner in either joint tenancy with right of survivorship or 
tenancy in common can transfer all or a portion of an undivided interest to another. 
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.7, at 201 (3d ed. 
2000). But cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 601, 620 (implicitly endorsing the statutory 
conferral on the remaining co-owners, as least as a default, of a right of first refusal). 
41.  In response to a petition for partition, a judge divides up the common asset (either in kind 
or in monetary value) according to shares of ownership. On the American law of partition, 
see STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 40, §§ 5.11-.13, at 214-24. On rights of partition in 
other nations, see Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 618-20. Cf. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31 (1914) 
(entitling any partner to unilaterally dissolve a partnership); Henry Hansmann et al., Law 
and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1341-43, 1391, 1394-96 (2006) (discussing 
investor exit from a business enterprise). See generally Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (1995) (discussing various exit systems, although not exit from co-
ownership of real property). 
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time period, their entitlements to exit unilaterally by either sale or partition.42 
Thus, a co-owner’s rights to terminate a relationship are less immutable than a 
co-occupant’s rights. In addition, even in the absence of an express contract, 
norms typically constrain a person involved in an intimate co-ownership 
relationship from selling to another without the prior consent of the other 
owners. Without Dad’s consent, for example, Aunt Audrey would hesitate to 
sell her share of the Sitcom House to the leader of the local motorcycle gang. 
(Now there’s the germ of a plot for a half-hour of comedy!) 
Finally, participants in a landlord-tenant (owner-occupant) relationship 
commonly also can end the relationship unilaterally without much delay.43 
When a residential tenancy is month-to-month, the landlord and tenant each 
are free to terminate after providing a month or so of notice to the other. When 
a residential tenancy is at-will, either party can exit even more swiftly. At least 
as a legal matter, Granny can move out without prior notice, thus terminating 
her implicit tenancy-at-will with Dad and Aunt Audrey. Correspondingly, 
however, those owners can peremptorily order Granny to leave the house. 
When a landlord and residential tenant have entered into a lease for a term 
of years, their respective exit rights are more complex.44 Both parties are 
entitled unilaterally to end the relationship at the end of the term. In addition, 
in the event of a material breach of the terms of the lease, the party not in 
breach typically is entitled to rescind the arrangement at an earlier date. When 
the term of a residential lease has not yet ended and neither party is in breach, 
however, the tenant typically has more robust exit rights than the landlord. 
Just as a liberal society immutably entitles an occupant to run out on other 
occupants, it also immutably entitles a tenant to abandon a leasehold, although 
at the risk of liability for damages to the landlord. Maureen can’t force Nadia, 
by dint of their labor contract, to work as the au pair, and Dad and Aunt 
 
42.  The right of a co-owner to partition or transfer his interest generally can be waived for a 
period of between five and fifteen years in a civil law jurisdiction and for a “reasonable 
period” in a common law jurisdiction, where the legal issue typically is seen as whether the 
waiver is a permissible restraint on alienation. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 40, 
§ 5.11, at 214; Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 616 & n.258. Dagan and Heller, the authors of 
the leading article on exit from co-ownership, discuss a variety of other possible limitations 
on exit, such as mandatory cooling-off periods. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 596-601. 
43.  See generally STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 40, §§ 6.73-.79, at 389-96 (surveying the 
rules governing termination of interests in leases). 
44.  A participant in a landlord-tenant relationship may be able to exit from it by transferring his 
interest to a third party. Although default liberal principles generally support free 
alienability, a lease may contain provisions that limit transfer rights. See id. §§ 6.67-.72, at 
379-88. Partly because an abusive occupant can inflict massive damage on a dwelling unit, 
lease provisions are more likely to constrain transfer of the tenant’s interest than the 
landlord’s interest. 
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Audrey, by dint of an express lease, can’t force Nadia to dwell in the room over 
the garage. A residential landlord, by contrast, has no right to unilaterally 
rescind a term-of-years lease. If Nadia were to have negotiated for rights to 
occupy the guest quarters of the Sitcom House for a specific term and if she 
were not in material breach of that lease, her occupancy rights would be 
protected by a property rule, not simply a liability rule.45 In the United States, 
the practical effects of this asymmetry between a tenant’s and a landlord’s exit 
rights are modest. Only in unusual contexts, such as in a cooperative apartment 
building or a jurisdiction that has rent controls or otherwise severely limits 
eviction rights, are residential tenants likely to have possessory rights that 
extend beyond a year or two.46 
In sum, in a liberal society, the risk of exit by other participants typically 
looms over individuals enmeshed in all three types of household relationships. 
Of course, practical constraints such as social norms and the transaction costs 
of arranging a successor relationship commonly deter exit from a household 
relationship. As a legal matter, however, co-occupancy relationships among 
competent adults typically are at-will, and many co-ownership and landlord-
tenant relationships are as well. Household ties thus tend to be far more fragile 
than either marital or family ties.47 In contrast to divorce proceedings, which 
typically drag on for a year or more, and blood ties, which can never be 
sundered, many household relationships can dissolve in a twinkling. 
 
45.  This asymmetry makes normative sense. A landlord’s (and, for that matter, a co-owner’s) 
duties are virtually never personal but instead delegable to others. If the law were to compel 
Dad and Aunt Audrey to lease the guest room to Nadia, it would not be forcing them to be 
personally present at the Sitcom House or at any other particular location. By contrast, if 
Nadia were personally required either to serve as a nanny for Chip or to inhabit the guest 
room, she would not be able to delegate those duties. Enforcement of those duties therefore 
would confine her movement. Even normally competent people occasionally enter into 
short-sighted or rash contracts. For paternalist reasons, a liberal society thus is unlikely to 
specifically enforce a promise by someone such as Nadia to be physically present in a 
particular household, just as it would not permit her to sell herself into slavery or 
indentured servitude. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39; infra text accompanying 
notes 158-160. 
46.  Unlike most American states and municipalities, however, many nations impose rent 
controls, good-faith eviction requirements, and other potent restrictions on a landlord’s 
power to terminate a residential tenancy. See, e.g., Richard Arnott, Rent Control: The 
International Experience, 1 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 203, 206-09 (1988) (mentioning rent 
control regimes in various nations). 
47.  On the implications of the permanence of parental ties, see ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: 
WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (2004). 
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3. Freedom of Contract48 
Liberal law also grants participants in a household relationship wide berth 
to tailor their internal arrangements according to their own tastes, at least 
when the interests of outsiders and helpless insiders such as children are not 
jeopardized.49 Self-determination, the core liberal principle, is enhanced when 
people can both shape their own affairs and rely on the promises of others.50 
Individual endowments of the entitlements just canvassed—land, capital, and 
labor—provide starting points for bargaining. In the United States today, 
people have notably more freedom to shape their household relationships than 
their marital relationships. The state forbids certain marital couplings and 
typically requires a waiting period before both entry into marriage and exit 
from it.51 By contrast, especially when the welfare of children is not at stake, a 
liberal state generally enables a competent adult to enter into all three types of 
basic household relationships with whomever he chooses. A gay or lesbian 
couple unable to marry typically can cohabit and co-own without legal 
impediment. Want to organize a counterculture commune? The background 
rules of a capitalist state generally pose no obstacle. There are, of course, some 
constraints on the creation of household clusters. For example, ambient social 
norms may deter an unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couple from 
“living in sin,” and zoning regulations may restrict the number and 
composition of a household’s co-occupants. In a liberal society, however, those 
 
48.  This phrase is potentially misleading because household members often coordinate by 
means of informal norms, not express contracts. See infra text accompanying notes 300-316. 
49.  See infra text accompanying notes 154-160. 
50.  See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 596 (endorsing freedom of contract among co-
owners as long as exit is available and third-party interests are not jeopardized); Kenneth L. 
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 686-89 (1980) (arguing that, as 
a constitutional matter, a government must have a substantial justification for interfering 
with co-occupants’ arrangements). But cf. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of 
Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. 
L. REV. 463 (1983) (asserting that the structuring of intimate relationships can have broad 
social effects). 
51.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman 
is valid or recognized in California.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 5 (McKinney 1999) (barring 
marriages between close relatives); id. § 6 (forbidding bigamy); id. § 15a (prohibiting 
marriages in which either party is under age fourteen); id. §§ 13, 13b (requiring persons 
intending to marry to obtain a license and, in the absence of a court order, then to wait at 
least twenty-four hours); id. § 170 (specifying permissible grounds for divorce, many of 
which require the parties to wait at least one year). But see, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the denial of a marriage license to a 
same-sex couple violated equal protection principles embodied in the state constitution). 
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who want to create a highly exotic household arrangement usually can find a 
place to do it.52 
C. Household Surplus and Its Distribution Among Members 
The participants in each of the three relationships in a complex 
household—co-occupancy, co-ownership, and landlord-tenant—can arrange 
for mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services, including ones that 
take advantage of their affective ties. Gains that arise from this internal 
household trade can be termed “household surplus.”53 In a liberal environment 
that honors freedom of contract, individuals can be expected to choose 
household forms and associates with an eye toward maximizing shared gains of 
this sort.54 The magnitude of the surplus available within household 
relationships depends in part on the participants’ ability to develop and 
enforce—by norm, contract, or otherwise—substantive and procedural rules to 
deter opportunistic behavior.55 Although participants have an interest in 
maximizing their total shareable surplus, they inevitably fall short—often far 
short—of that ideal as a result of both transaction costs and inherent human 
incapacities.56 
How do the participants in a household relationship divide surplus among 
themselves? The prevailing conception holds that, when labor is self-owned 
and occupants are free to exit, each adult occupant of a household has the 
leverage to obtain a share of the domestic pie.57 In game-theoretic terms, a 
 
52.  See infra notes 173, 356. 
53.  This is an extension of the notion of “marital surplus” employed in, for example, Elizabeth 
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1270-80 
(1998), and Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for 
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 529-31 (1998). 
54.  See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract, 113 YALE L.J. 
541, 552-54 (2003) (discussing why parties to a contract tend to seek to maximize their joint 
gains). 
55.  See infra Part VII. 
56.  Transaction costs include search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and 
policing and enforcement costs. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 
(1988). On human limitations, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
57.  See Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Fall 1996, at 139; Shelly J. Lundberg et al., Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their 
Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 463 (1997); 
Wax, supra note 53; see also Mary Clare Lennon & Sarah Rosenfield, Relative Fairness and the 
Division of Housework: The Importance of Options, 100 AM. J. SOC. 506 (1994) (articulating an 
analogous approach within sociology). But cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 128-29 
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household participant’s utility level in the event of exit establishes that 
member’s “threat point.”58 (Although the following discussion assumes that a 
disgruntled participant’s most potent threat is exit, in some instances it may be 
another course of action within the relationship, such as violence, nagging, 
withdrawal from sexual relations, or “burnt toast.”59) Others in the relevant 
household relationship, to deter exit by a valued member, must allocate to that 
person enough surplus to make it more advantageous for that person to remain 
than to depart. If Dad wants Aunt Audrey to continue as a co-owner of the 
Sitcom House, he must make her investment pay off. If the other four co-
occupants want Granny to remain an occupant, their rules governing use of the 
common spaces cannot be too harsh on her. Conversely, if Granny herself 
wants to remain in residence, she has to make her presence a net boon for Dad 
and Aunt Audrey, the (implicit) landlords who have the power to terminate her 
stay. 
When a household member’s opportunities to prosper on the outside 
improve, the risk that he or she will exit rises. Recognizing this reality, the 
other participants in the relevant relationship may prospectively allocate a 
larger share of the relationship’s surplus to that person. In colonial Andover, 
Massachusetts, for example, as young men had increasingly better 
opportunities to the west, many fathers granted their youngest sons more land 
to dissuade them from migrating.60 Even in present times, it is widely believed 
that a husband is likely to obtain a majority of the surplus from a marriage 
because he usually has greater opportunities to remarry after divorce, a reality 
that may make his threat of exit from a marital home more credible than his 
wife’s.61 
 
(1971) (asserting that persons in “the original position” can be thought of as “heads of 
families”). For a review of the debate between Rawls and his feminist critics over his 
unwillingness to apply his principles of justice to internal family affairs, see Susan Moller 
Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2004). 
58.  Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 57, at 146-49. 
59.  The source of the quoted phrase is Theodore C. Bergstrom, Economics in a Family Way, 34 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1903, 1926 (1996). For an analysis of the dynamics of these sorts of 
strategic options within marriage, see Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres 
Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1993). 
60.  Pollak, supra note 1, at 603-04 (drawing this example from PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR 
GENERATIONS (1970)). 
61.  See, e.g., PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 
53-56, 309-10 (1983); Wax, supra note 53, at 547-51. But cf. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. 
Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 126, 136-37, 146-47, 154-60 (2000) (stressing that an ex-wife is more likely than 
an ex-husband to be awarded child support and custody rights to children). 
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Changes in law and social norms can alter threat points by influencing 
available opportunities and the transaction costs of exit. Enhancement of 
women’s employment opportunities outside the home thus serves to boost 
their power within the home.62 Legal reforms that make it easier for a spouse to 
divorce, a co-owner to partition real estate, or a landlord to evict a tenant all 
facilitate exit from a household relationship. These reforms thus strengthen the 
bargaining positions of household participants best positioned to ally 
themselves with fresh partners.63 
ii. the predominant strategy of consorting with 
intimates 
A person considering how to structure household relations in a liberal 
society faces a potentially intimidating number of choices. A graduate student 
who moves to a new university community, for instance, must decide whether 
to live alone or with others, what particular dwelling to inhabit, whether to buy 
or to rent that dwelling, and, if to buy, whether to bring in other co-owners. Of 
the three potential household relationships, co-occupancy is typically the most 
multi-stranded. Many co-occupants spend as many as half of their waking 
hours at home and are apt not only to engage in conventional forms of 
household production but also to socialize a great deal with one another. Both 
co-ownership and landlord-tenant relationships, by contrast, tend to be less 
intense, but even they commonly involve both significant sums of money and 
interactions protracted over months or years.64 
Household relationships are rife with possibilities for opportunists. A bad 
occupant can abuse common spaces, pilfer personal property, neglect 
household duties, and evade duties to landlords. A bad owner may shirk on 
management and maintenance duties to the detriment of both tenants and 
other owners, and also wrongly siphon off assets. Yet in all phases of life, 
people tend to be more considerate of the interests of others than cynics 
anticipate. Experimental studies suggest that the majority of people prefer to 
 
62.  See Steven L. Nock, When Married Spouses Are Equal, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 48, 49-50 
(2001). 
63.  There is mounting evidence that the advent of no-fault divorce raised divorce rates. See 
BRINIG, supra note 18, at 153-58. 
64.  “Most intuitive notions of the ‘strength’ of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied by the 
following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount 
of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services 
which characterize the tie.” Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 
1360, 1361 (1973). 
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reciprocate favors even in one-shot interactions with perfect strangers.65 Ex 
ante, an individual entering into a household relationship nevertheless would 
want to improve on those odds.66 
One strategy would be to rely, in the event of trouble, on the legal system 
to impose sanctions on a domestic malefactor. This strategy would favor the 
negotiation of written contracts, documents likely to be helpful in the event of 
litigation or threats thereof. At the other end of the spectrum is the option of 
structuring household relationships in a fashion likely to bring into play 
informal deterrents to domestic opportunism. Even in the absence of legal 
constraints, a participant in a household relationship may act in a cooperative 
manner to avoid, for example, pangs of guilt, retribution by others in the 
relationship, or the sting of negative gossip and ostracism diffusely 
administered by friends and neighbors.67 As the data presented in the next Part 
demonstrate, most people in contemporary liberal societies opt to take 
advantage of these informal social controls. 
The essence of this household-formation strategy is, when feasible, to 
consort with intimates. Consorting with intimates, of course, is likely to be a 
source of great enjoyment in itself. But it can be expected also to have a great 
instrumental advantage: a colossal reduction of the transaction costs that 
household members have to incur to achieve mutually advantageous outcomes. 
From the start, intimates are more likely than those who are socially distant to 
behave cooperatively as opposed to opportunistically.68 Intimacy thus 
 
65.  See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1641, 1663-72 (2003) (reviewing studies); see also Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On 
Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE 
L.J. 273 (2004) (describing sharing among relative strangers). 
66.  Some commentators stress the limitations of rational-actor perspectives on domestic 
relations, asserting that they are descriptively incomplete and may have negative expressive 
consequences. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS 
OF MARRIAGE 15-22, 33-86 (1999); see also BRINIG, supra note 18, at 83-84 (highlighting the 
role of love in family relations). But see, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic 
Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 492-93 (2005) (asserting that intimates are routinely 
involved in the exchange of economic assets). See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage 
Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 111-22 (1998) (assessing objections 
to viewing interactions among intimates as exchange relationships). 
67.  See infra text accompanying notes 297-321. 
68.  A person behaves cooperatively when he takes into account the effects of his behavior on the 
welfare of all affected. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-11 (1984) 
(implicitly adopting this definition); infra notes 275-280 and accompanying text. Many 
studies indicate that cooperative behavior becomes more likely as social distance narrows. 
See, e.g., Nancy R. Buchan et al., Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A Cross-Cultural 
Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange, 108 AM. J. SOC. 168 (2002); Michael 
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facilitates the spontaneous trading of services—in many household situations, a 
method of coordination far more efficient than formal bilateral contracting. In 
addition, intimates’ early successes with this sort of gift exchange are likely to 
lead to a deepening of mutual trust and to even greater levels of cooperation 
thereafter.69 
How does a person recognize a prospective intimate, especially when the 
candidate in question is not kin? Some key positive attributes, generally in 
order of decreasing importance, are the prospect of continuing future 
interactions, the number of participants involved (the fewer the better), and 
homogeneity of tastes.70 
A. Favoring Those with Whom One Will Have Continuing Relations 
The prospect of future interactions is well known to be conducive to trust 
and cooperation.71 This is a major reason why, as the next Part documents, a 
large majority of household relationships are based on kinship. Robert Pollak, 
a pioneering analyst of marriage and the family, identifies four features of 
family ties that tend to foster cooperative behavior.72 First, biologists 
 
W. Macy & John Skvoretz, The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between Strangers: A 
Computational Model, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 638 (1998). 
69.  Trust is conventionally defined as the expectation that another person will act cooperatively, 
instead of opportunistically, when both options are available. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1735, 1745-46 (2001). On how a past history of successful gift exchange can deepen 
trust, see Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational 
Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 575-78 (1999); and Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust 
in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 577-82, 591, 603-06. See 
also Theodore Caplow, Christmas Gifts and Kin Networks, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 383, 391-92 
(1982) (discussing how the giving of Christmas gifts solidifies familial relationships). See 
generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 91-116 (1990) (defining 
“trust” and giving various examples of its importance in human interactions). 
70.  Other attributes, such as a sense of group identity, also may be helpful. General discussions 
of conditions that foster cooperative behavior can be found in David Sally, Conversation and 
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58 (1995), and in the sources cited in Blair & Stout, supra note 69, at 
1759-80. 
71.  See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 68, at 124-29; Claudia Keser & Frans van Winden, Conditional 
Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods, 102 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 23, 31-33 
(2000). When participants in a relationship expect that it will have a long future, they also 
are more likely to invest resources into strengthening the relationship. 
72.  Pollak, supra note 1, at 585-88; see also Haddock & Polsby, supra note 1, at 19-20, 24, 33-35. 
Pollak also notes some disadvantages of kinship-based households. The multifaceted nature 
of kinship ties poses risks that conflict will be imported into the household from an external 
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hypothesize the existence of an evolved altruism toward kin—especially toward 
persons whose gene pool one shares.73 Kinship altruism motivates a person to 
act cooperatively without external prodding, thereby enabling kinfolk who co-
occupy to arrange for productive activities that otherwise would be extremely 
difficult to monitor—for example, infant care or the cultivation of a delicate 
crop such as raspberries.74 These self-executing first-party systems commonly 
are the most cheaply administered of all social controls. Second, Pollak notes 
that expulsion from a kinship network is particularly costly, presumably 
because that network is irreplaceable. Kinfolk thus are likely to be particularly 
well positioned to informally punish opportunistic acts, a significant second-
party deterrent. Third and relatedly, information about a relative’s past actions 
and character tends to be unusually complete, a reality that reduces the 
transaction costs of informal interactions. Fourth, in most societies ambient 
social norms support loyalty to kin. An opportunistic act at the expense of 
kinfolk thus is particularly likely to provoke neighbors to inflict diffuse third-
party sanctions, such as negative gossip. In sum, the ex ante strategy of 
consorting with kin brilliantly harnesses the capabilities of the various informal 
systems of social control.75 
Should appropriate kinfolk not be available, the next best option may be to 
associate with persons who share either preexisting friendships or—even 
better—the prospect of an enduring association multi-stranded enough to 
 
strand of the kinship relationship—for example, a sibling rivalry. Members who are added 
to a household mainly for kinship reasons are not likely to possess the labor skills the 
household most needs and also may make the household expand beyond its most efficient 
size. Pollack, supra note 1, at 587-88. 
73.  Kinship altruism tends to be strongest among those with the closest genetic ties. See, e.g., 
DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF MIND 220-46 (2d ed. 
2004); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 88-108 (2d ed. 1989). Household 
relationships thus are more likely to involve closely related kin (e.g., parents and children) 
than more distantly related ones (second cousins). 
74.  See Robert McC. Netting, Smallholders, Householders, Freeholders: Why the Family Farm 
Works Well Worldwide, in THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY: RECONSIDERING THE DOMESTIC 
MODE OF PRODUCTION 221 (Richard R. Wilk ed., 1989); Pollak, supra note 1, at 591-93. But 
cf. B. Douglas Bernheim & Oded Stark, Altruism Within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice 
Guys Finish Last?, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1034 (1988) (offering caveats about the helpfulness of 
altruism in these contexts). 
75.  This of course does not mean that the strategy guarantees cooperative outcomes. As Tolstoy 
reminds us in the first sentence of Anna Karenina, not all families are happy. See, e.g., In re 
Marriage of Owen, 797 P.2d 226, 228 (Mont. 1990) (mentioning an eviction notice that 
parents who owned a house had delivered to a son who was occupying it); Esteves v. 
Esteves, 775 A.2d 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (involving a suit by parents against 
their son over the division of proceeds from the sale of a house that the three had owned as 
tenants in common). 
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provide a wide variety of future sanctioning opportunities.76 Suppose an 
incoming second-year law student, Earl, were seeking a housemate to share 
occupancy of a rental apartment during the upcoming academic year. All else 
equal, could Earl place more trust in Felix, a distant acquaintance from college 
who has no interest in eventually attending law school, or in Sandra, a law 
school classmate Earl currently knows even less well? During their college 
years, Earl may have learned something about Felix’s character (including the 
internalized norms that constrain Felix)—an advantage as far as it goes.77 In 
promoting cooperative interactions, however, past contacts are likely to be less 
helpful than a prospect of continuing social ties. Suppose Earl were to doubt 
whether Felix and he would still be friends once their joint living arrangement 
had ended. If so, especially toward the end of their cohabitation, Felix might 
become less trustworthy because he would be less concerned about how either 
Earl or members of their circle of common acquaintances would treat him in 
the future. If Earl were to conclude that Sandra and he actually had better 
prospects of being enmeshed in an enduring friendship and network of friends, 
the strategy of consorting with intimates would tilt Earl toward living with 
Sandra. 
B. Limiting the Number of Persons in the Relationship 
For several reasons, as the number of persons in a household relationship 
increases, participants in that relationship are likely to become more 
opportunistic.78 First, rising numbers commonly make it more costly to obtain 
the information needed to deter opportunism. A person who lives with just one 
co-occupant, upon discovering at breakfast that the refrigerator’s container of 
orange juice is unexpectedly empty, immediately knows who the culprit is. A 
person with four other housemates, by contrast, would have to engage in more 
extensive detective work. Second, the larger the group, the greater the tendency 
to free-ride with respect to making contributions that would benefit the whole 
group. In the case of the empty orange juice container, if there were only two 
 
76.  Individuals are likely to care more about how intimates, as opposed to relative strangers, 
regard them. This makes esteem sanctions among intimates especially potent. See Richard 
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 386-
90 (1997). 
77.  See Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 
131 (2000). 
78.  See Robert Axelrod & Douglas Dion, The Further Evolution of Cooperation, 242 SCIENCE 1385, 
1389 (1988); Per Molander, The Prevalence of Free Riding, 36 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 756, 766-68 
(1992). But cf. Sally, supra note 70, at 77 (reporting that cooperation in experimental 
multiperson games seems not to depend much on the number of players). 
ELLICKSON – PRE-OP 11/6/2006  5:37:59 PM 
the yale law journal  116:226   2006 
252 
 
co-occupants, all of the benefits of informal punishment of the excessive 
imbiber would accrue to the enforcer. If there were a total of five housemates, 
by contrast, significant benefits would be externalized to others. Although 
there also are advantages in associating with more co-occupants or co-owners, 
the disadvantages typically outweigh them. Of the Americans residing in non-
family households, the number living in twosomes is over twenty times the 
number living in fivesomes.79 
C. Favoring Homogeneity of Tastes and Stakes 
Most people prefer to consort with those who share their attitudes and 
orientations.80 When co-occupants have homogeneous tastes, they can more 
readily agree on what television shows to watch, what magazines to subscribe 
to, how to stock the refrigerator, and what friends to invite to dinner. When 
co-owners have similar discount rates and architectural tastes, they can more 
easily decide on what capital improvements to make. A landlord and tenant get 
along better when they share sensibilities about standards of housekeeping and 
levels of noise. As a result, to the extent that tastes vary according to attributes 
such as social class, age, gender, and ethnicity, participants in a household 
relationship can be expected to show a tendency to cluster accordingly.81 This is 
especially true in the case of co-occupants, whose interactions are the most 
multi-stranded. 
While homogeneity in tastes is advantageous, homogeneity in skills is 
disadvantageous.82 More potential gains from internal trade are available when 
the parties in a household relationship possess complementary talents. A great 
cook can benefit from living with a great electrician. A landlord who lacks 
home-repair skills may favor a tenant who has them. 
Homogeneity—indeed equality—of stakes and power in a household 
relationship also is likely to be advantageous.83 Equality offers both 
consumption and transactional advantages. Equality is the most prominent 
 
79.  See infra p. 256 tbl.2. See generally infra text accompanying notes 90-132, 228-253. 
80.  PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 69-70 (1964). 
81.  Cf. BECKER, supra note 23, at 108-34 (discussing “assortative mating” that tends to bring 
together partners of like quality); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 115 Q.J. ECON. 
811, 814 (2000) (offering experimental evidence than individuals are more trustworthy when 
they deal with persons of the same race and nationality). 
82.  See BECKER, supra note 23, at 30-53, 57-64. 
83.  On various conceptions of equality within marriage, see Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, 
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 91-94 (2004); and Wax, supra note 53, at 533-
37. 
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(i.e., focal) of available arrangements.84 Perhaps partly for this reason, many 
adults in a liberal society prefer to interact as equals.85 Sociologists and 
economists also assert that equality among participants tends to foster 
cooperative behavior, partly because it reduces decision-making costs.86 In part 
to avoid hassles about how to share rent and utility costs, graduate students 
who co-occupy are likely to prefer to rent a dwelling unit whose bedrooms are 
roughly equal in quality. Residents of many intentional communities are 
ideologically committed to egalitarian distributions of both occupancy and 
ownership rights.87 When co-owners’ endowments of capital permit, they are 
likely to prefer to own in equal shares, and, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, judges will presume that they do.88 Although the landlord-tenant 
relationship is inherently asymmetrical in many respects, lawmakers commonly 
attempt to establish certain symbolic equalities between the two parties. For 
example, state statutes typically set, for both landlords and tenants, the same 
minimum period for notice to terminate a month-to-month tenancy.89 
 
84.  See generally Richard H. McAdams, Cultural Contingency and Economic Function: Bridge-
Building from the Law & Economics Side, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 221, 223-25 (2004) (discussing 
how cultural influences can make certain equilibria particularly salient). 
85.  Egalitarianism has primal roots. See CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST: THE 
EVOLUTION OF EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR (1999); see also Margaret A. McKean, Success on the 
Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource 
Management, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 247, 262-72 (1992) (discussing the extent of 
egalitarianism among co-owners of common property resources); cf. B. Douglas Bernheim 
& Sergei Severinov, Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle, 111 J. 
POL. ECON. 733, 733-34 (2003) (reporting that in the United States, about two-thirds of 
parents’ wills bestow equal bequests on surviving children). 
86.  See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 11-36 (1976) (sociologist of law); HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 39-44 (1996) (law-and-economics scholar). 
87.  See CHRIS SCOTTHANSON & KELLY SCOTTHANSON, THE COHOUSING HANDBOOK 168 (rev. 
ed. 2005). But see ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 290-320 (reporting the typical reality of a status 
hierarchy, headed by a charismatic leader). 
88.  On the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership of shares, see, for example, Bryan v. 
Looker, 640 N.E.2d 590 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 5.2, 
at 179-80; and id. § 5.13, at 221-22. Traditionally, co-owners in joint tenancy had to own in 
equal shares (the so-called unity of interest). See id. § 5.3, at 183; see also TONI IHARA ET AL., 
LIVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 3/9, 6/17-/18 (12th ed. 2004) 
(offering a form contract providing for equal ownership of a home). 
89.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946 (West 1998) (thirty days); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.57(3) (West 
2004) (fifteen days). 
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iii. a historical overview of household forms  
Most adults in a liberal society indeed prefer to consort with intimates 
when they enter into a co-occupancy, co-ownership, or landlord-tenant 
relationship. This Part marshals statistics to support this basic proposition. 
A. Occupants of Households: The Predominance of Small, Kin-Based Clusters 
1. Number of Occupants 
Veteran observers of households—that is, all of us—will not be startled by 
the fact that the occupants of most households in the United States can be 
counted on the fingers of one hand. As Table 1 indicates, 91% of the Americans 
living in housing units in 1999 were living in households with five or fewer 
occupants.90 
As a nation becomes more prosperous, its households generally become 
smaller.91 The average number of occupants in an American home fell from 5.8 
in 1790, to 4.8 in 1900, to 2.6 in 2004.92 Although households do tend to be 
somewhat larger in less developed countries, the American pattern is hardly 
 
90.  According to the Census Bureau, in 1999 there were 1.3 million households with seven or 
more occupants, and together they included a population of 10,219,000. This figure is 
calculated from data presented in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR 
THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at 62 (2003) [hereinafter AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999]. It 
is important to note, however, that during the 1990s the Census Bureau placed all 
households occupied by ten or more unrelated persons in the “group quarters” category. Id. 
app. A, at A-9. In 2000, when the Bureau was no longer classifying these households in this 
fashion, it tallied a total of 7.8 million people living in a group quarters of some sort. About 
half of these individuals were in institutions formally authorized to provide supervised care 
or custody, and about another quarter were residents of college dormitories. See U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing Summary File 1: Technical 
Documentation 6-84 to -88 (Mar. 2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf1.pdf 
(indexing data for matrix PCT17). For more on the group quarters population, see supra 
note 3; and infra text accompanying notes 116-118. 
91.  Peter Laslett, an eminent historian of the household, found that the average household size 
in England remained relatively constant from 1600 to 1900, at about 4.75. Peter Laslett, 
Mean Household Size in England Since the Sixteenth Century, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN 
PAST TIME 125, 138 (Peter Laslett & Richard Wall eds., 1972). By 1961, however, the number 
had dropped to 3.04. Id. 
92.  The figures for 1790 and 1900 are from 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 41 (bicentennial ed. 1975); 
the figure for 2004 is from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006, supra note 4, at 51. These sources 
also reveal that the percentage of American dwelling units housing seven or more persons 
fell from 36% in 1790, to 20% in 1900, to 1% in 2004. 
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exceptional. In 2005, average household size was 2.0 in Sweden, 2.5 in Japan, 
3.3 in China, 3.5 in Brazil, 5.2 in India, and 10.0 in Senegal.93 
Table 1.  
occupants of u.s. housing units, 199994  
no. of occupants % of occupied housing units 
% of occupants 
of housing units 
1 person 26.2 10.2 
2 persons 32.9 25.8 
3 persons 16.2 19.0 
4 persons 14.8 23.2 
5 persons 6.5 12.7 
6 persons 2.2 5.2 
7 persons or more 1.3 3.9 
2. Family vs. Non-family Households 
The co-occupants of households typically are kinfolk. In 1998, 85% of the 
U.S. population resided in multiperson family households, that is, households 
in which there was a householder and at least one other occupant related to the 
householder by birth, adoption, or marriage.95 In that same year, another 10% 
 
93.  United Nations, Human Settlements Data Bank, http://hq.unhabitat.org/programmes/guo/ 
guo_hsdb4.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2006); see also SHLOMO ANGEL, HOUSING POLICY 
MATTERS: A GLOBAL ANALYSIS 351 (2000) (reporting World Bank data for 1990); infra notes 
235-247 and accompanying text. In both Sweden and Japan, as in the United States, average 
household size has fallen by roughly half during the past century or two. See Orvar Löfgren, 
Family and Household: Images and Realities: Cultural Change in Swedish Society, in 
HOUSEHOLDS: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE DOMESTIC GROUP 446, 466 
(Robert McC. Netting et al. eds., 1984) (reporting that in 1890, Sweden’s average 
household size was 4.56); Chie Nakane, An Interpretation of the Size and Structure of the 
Household in Japan over Three Centuries, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME, supra note 
91, at 517, 531 (estimating the average household size in preindustrial Japan at 4.9). 
94.  Calculated from data presented in AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at 62. 
Columns may not total 100% due to rounding. 
95.  Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this paragraph are drawn from STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 60-62. The Census Bureau defines a householder as an 
occupant whose name either appears on the deed or lease to the dwelling unit, or, when 
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of the U.S. population—that is, two-thirds of those not residing in a family 
household—lived alone.96 The Introduction made passing reference to the 
remaining 5%, that is, the 12.3 million people residing in multi-occupant non-
family households. Table 2 indicates the size distribution of these clusters of 
unrelated co-occupants. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that 
housemates who lack kinship ties generally form smaller groupings than 
kinfolk do. In 1998, multi-occupant non-family households had 2.4 residents 
on average, while family households had 3.2. As Table 2 demonstrates, among 
the Americans living in non-family settings in 1998, three times as many were 
in singles than in doubles, and four times as many were in doubles than in 
triples. Only one non-family household in 1000 had six or more occupants.97 
Table 2. 
u.s. non-family households, 199898 
no. of occupants % of non-family households 
% of occupants 
of non-family 
households 
1 person 83.19 68.18 
2 persons 13.41 21.98 
3 persons 2.18 5.37 
4 persons 0.85 2.78 
5 persons 0.24 0.98 
6 persons 0.12 0.57 
7-9 persons 0.02 0.15 
 
 
there is an oral lease, is responsible for paying rent. AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, 
supra note 90, app. A, at A-8. 
96.  See infra note 240 (citing sources on trends toward living alone). 
97.  In 1940, 2.8% of non-family households contained four or more members. JAMES A. SWEET 
& LARRY L. BUMPASS, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS 349 (1987). As Table 2 
indicates, by 1998 the figure had fallen to 1.2%. 
98.  Calculated from data reported in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 61 tbl.72. 
Columns may not total 100% due to rounding. The third column assumes (conservatively) 
that households of seven to nine occupants contain an average of eight occupants each. 
ELLICKSON – PRE-OP 11/6/2006  5:37:59 PM 
unpacking the household 
257 
 
Again, the pattern in the United States is unexceptional. From 
Mesopotamia to Europe, since the beginning of recorded history and indeed in 
all societies in all historical periods, most occupants of households typically 
have been related by marriage or blood.99 
3. Varieties of Larger Households 
Although small nuclear family households predominate, more complex 
forms also exist. 
Family households that include unrelated members. In the late nineteenth 
century, perhaps as many as one-fifth of U.S. households included at least one 
boarder or live-in servant unrelated to the household’s head.100 Today no more 
than 5% of U.S. households do.101 
Extended family households. Extended family households are thought to have 
been predominant during the early historical periods of the ancient Near East, 
at least in rural areas.102 The conventional image, fostered by Homer’s Odyssey, 
is that of an enterprise of dozens of persons hierarchically governed by a 
paterfamilias who resides with several of his married adult children and their 
families.103 Partly on account of polygamy and (especially) slavery, households 
then might have included scores or hundreds of occupants.104 As cities and 
markets developed, however, there was a trend toward downsizing to the 
nuclear family household. The oikos of the Classical period in Greece, for 
instance, was a more compact institution than the Homeric household that had 
 
99.  On patterns in the ancient Near East, see, for example, sources cited in Robert C. Ellickson 
& Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 321, 354-57 (1995). On Europe, see, for example, DAVID HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL 
HOUSEHOLDS (1985); and HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME, supra note 91. On Ghana, 
see Jack Goody, The Evolution of the Family, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME, supra 
note 91, at 103. On Asia and the Arab world, see sources cited infra notes 113-114. 
100.  See, e.g., Edward T. Pryor, Jr., Rhode Island Family Structure: 1875 and 1960, in HOUSEHOLD 
AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME, supra note 91, at 571, 586 (reporting that the portion of Rhode 
Island households that included one or more nonrelatives declined from 24% to 2% between 
1875 and 1960). 
101.  AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at 62-64 (indicating that 1% of 
households include lodgers and 4% include unrelated adults who are neither co-owners nor 
co-renters). 
102.  See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 99, at 354-57. 
103.  See BOOTH, supra note 27, at 15-34. 
104.  See HERLIHY, supra note 99, at 58-59. 
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prevailed four centuries or so earlier.105 Xenophon, a canonical source on Greek 
life during the fourth century B.C.E., portrays a Classical household that has a 
single husband-wife team at its core.106 
After the fall of Rome, slavery went into decline and family farms managed 
by nuclear households came to the fore in northwestern Europe. In an 
influential challenge to the previously prevailing view that extended family 
households had been the norm in Europe prior to the nineteenth century, Peter 
Laslett adduced evidence that the nuclear household in fact had 
predominated.107 By medieval times, most English and French peasants were 
living in nuclear households whose number of occupants averaged on the order 
of six and seldom exceeded ten.108 In far eastern Europe, however, larger and 
more complex households generally remained the norm.109 
A century ago, an American couple commonly took into their home an 
elderly parent who had become a widow or widower.110 Extended family 
households of this sort are now exceptional. Three or more generations of the 
same family are present in only 3% of American households.111 In sharp 
contrast to the conventional image of rural life in ancient times, only 1% of 
U.S. households now include two or more married couples.112 Although the 
 
105.  On the Classical Greek household, see BOOTH, supra note 27, at 34-93; and CHERYL ANNE 
COX, HOUSEHOLD INTERESTS: PROPERTY, MARRIAGE STRATEGIES, AND FAMILY DYNAMICS IN 
ANCIENT ATHENS (1998). Cf. Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 99, at 355 (discussing 
Mesopotamia). 
106.  XENOPHON, OECONOMICUS 58-61, 137-59 (Sarah B. Pomeroy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
1994) (c. 362 B.C.E.). On the possibility that Xenophon was being more normative than 
descriptive, see COX, supra note 105, at 132-35. 
107.  Peter Laslett, Introduction: The History of the Family, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST 
TIME, supra note 91, at 1. Laslett later restricted the scope of this thesis to northwestern 
Europe. Peter Laslett, Family and Household as Work Group and Kin Group: Areas of 
Traditional Europe Compared, in FAMILY FORMS IN HISTORIC EUROPE 513 (Richard Wall et al. 
eds., 1983). See generally David I. Kertzer, Household History and Sociological Theory, 17 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 155 (1991) (reviewing historians’ debate over trends in household size). 
108.  See, e.g., BARBARA A. HANAWALT, THE TIES THAT BOUND: PEASANT FAMILIES IN MEDIEVAL 
ENGLAND 5, 103-04 (1986); HERLIHY, supra note 99, at 62-72. 
109.  See John Hajnal, Two Kinds of Pre-Industrial Household Formation System, in FAMILY FORMS IN 
HISTORIC EUROPE, supra note 107, at 65. 
110.  See Steven Ruggles, The Transformation of American Family Structure, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 103 
(1994); infra note 240. 
111.  AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at 62, 64. The Sitcom Household, which 
contains four generations of occupants, is thus an extreme outlier. 
112.  STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 60 tbl.70. See generally Ronald Angel & Marta 
Tienda, Determinants of Extended Household Structure: Cultural Pattern or Economic Need?, 87 
AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1982) (attributing these arrangements mostly to economic need); Burton 
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cultural traditions of many nations, such as Japan and South Korea, have 
supported the formation of multigenerational households, these patterns are 
fast eroding under rising tides of prosperity.113 In India, where a bride 
traditionally has moved into her husband’s extended family household, the 
average household size is 5.2; in the United States, the average size of an 
Indian-American household is 3.1.114 
Large non-family households. As mentioned, non-family households tend to 
be smaller than family households. Large numbers of non-kin, however, 
sometimes do co-occupy a residential complex that delivers common meals and 
other collective domestic services. At present over 50,000 people in the United 
States reside in housing units where seven to nine unrelated individuals sleep 
and eat their meals.115 
An additional 3.7 million persons voluntarily live in complexes that the 
Census Bureau calls “group quarters.”116 A resident of a group quarters may 
have a separate sleeping space but typically eats meals in a congregate dining 
 
Pasternak et al., On the Conditions Favoring Extended Family Households, in MARRIAGE, 
FAMILY, AND KINSHIP: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 125 (Melvin Ember 
& Carol R. Ember eds., 1983). 
113.  On Japanese traditions, see, for example, S. Philip Morgan & Kiyosi Hirosima, The 
Persistence of Extended Family Residence in Japan: Anachronism or Alternative Strategy?, 48 AM. 
SOC. REV. 269 (1983). In 1950, 80% of elderly Japanese were living with one of their 
children, but by 1990 only 50% were. Andrew Mason et al., Population Momentum and 
Population Aging in Asia and Near-East Countries 70 (2000), http://www2.eastwestcenter. 
org/research/popecon/aging_report.PDF. In South Korea, the fraction of elderly women 
living with their children fell from 78% in 1984 to 47% in 1994. Id. 
Sources on Chinese household and familial traditions include THE CHINESE FAMILY AND 
ITS RITUAL BEHAVIOR (Hsieh Jih-chang & Chuang Ying-chang eds., 1985), and Teemu 
Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory 
in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1622-56 (2000). Household forms in Egypt in 
1976 are described in Philippe Fargues, The Arab World: The Family as Fortress, in 2 A 
HISTORY OF THE FAMILY: THE IMPACT OF MODERNITY 339, 356-57 (André Burguière et al. 
eds., 1996), which reports that a majority of urban households, but not rural households, 
were nuclear. 
114.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: ASIANS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2004); supra 
text accompanying note 93. On Indian traditions, see THE EXTENDED FAMILY: WOMEN AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (Gail Minault ed., 1981). 
115.  See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 61 tbl.71. 
116.  U.S. Census Bureau, Total Population in Households and Group Quarters by Sex and 
Selected Age Groups for the United States, tbl.1 (Mar. 20, 2001), http://www.census.gov/ 
population/cen2000/grpqtr/grpqtr01.pdf [hereinafter Group Quarters Population]. This 
figure excludes 4.1 million “institutionalized” persons living under supervised care or 
custody in facilities such as orphanages, nursing homes, and penitentiaries. Id. For the 
Census Bureau’s technical definitions of “housing units” and “group quarters,” see 
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at A-9 to -10; and supra notes 3, 90. 
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facility. The voluntary group quarters category includes institutions such as 
dormitories, fraternities and sororities, military quarters, eldercare facilities, 
residential complexes of religious orders, and intentional communities. Non-
kin who cluster in large numbers may be able to exploit efficiencies of scale in 
the production of shelter, meals, social interactions, and other valued services, 
but at the sacrifice of individual autonomy and privacy.117 Not surprisingly, 
these arrangements disproportionately attract those who are single, childless, 
and relatively impecunious; while 5.4% of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-
nine years live in a voluntary group quarters, the percentage falls to 0.6% for 
those aged thirty to forty-nine years.118 
An intentional community can be defined as a self-governed association of 
ten or more residents, most of them unrelated, who live in strongly communal 
fashion (that is, as a matter of ideology, they not only share living spaces but 
also dine together for most of their meals).119 Some intentional communities, 
such as most back-to-nature communes and most Israeli kibbutzim, are 
secular. Others, such as those of Benedictine monks and Hutterites, are unified 
by common religious belief. Various fragments of evidence suggest that there 
were over 1000 intentional communities in the United States in 2005.120 
Although some of these had more than 100 co-occupants, the median 
community housed roughly two or three dozen.121 In 2005 the total population 
of strongly communal intentional communities in the United States probably 
 
117.  See infra text accompanying notes 228-247. 
118.  Calculated from Group Quarters Population, supra note 116. 
119.  Zablocki’s definition of a commune is more restrictive in some ways, but also more generous 
in that it only requires the presence of five or more adults. See ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 7. 
120.  ROBERT P. SUTTON, MODERN AMERICAN COMMUNES: A DICTIONARY (2005), profiles many 
of the most prominent. The Census Bureau does not attempt a tally. On the Bureau’s 
historic difficulties in enumerating communities of this sort, see ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 
72 n.†. A valuable source, doubtless incomplete, is Fellowship for Intentional Cmty., 
Community Directory, http://directory.ic.org/iclist/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 
IC List]. 
121.  On October 10, 2005, a random sample (IC Sample) of 122 intentional communities with six 
or more members was drawn from the entire IC List, supra note 120. The communities in 
this sample reported a median of eighteen adult residents, and 7% reported over 100 
(tabulations on file with author). See also infra note 343. The Order of Saint Benedict, on the 
information page that it posts at the Fellowship for Intentional Community website, see 
Fellowship for Intentional Cmty., Community List: Order of St. Benedict, 
http://directory.ic.org/records/?action=view&page=view&record_id=878 (last visited Sept. 
1, 2006), states that the average population of its communities (all of them single-sex) is 
forty. The typical Hutterite community is several times more populous, but because 
Hutterites have so many children, it is likely to include fewer adults. See Ellickson, supra 
note 32, at 1360. 
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was between 30,000 and 80,000. By comparison, in that same year 30 million 
Americans, perhaps to the dismay of Robert Putnam, were living alone.122 
B. Owners of Dwelling Units 
The owners of a dwelling unit conventionally are defined as the persons so 
identified in pertinent deeds and court decrees.123 There have been no 
comprehensive surveys of the ownership of all forms of residential structures in 
the United States. However, particularized surveys of the ownership of real 
estate in general, and of private rental housing in particular, have revealed a 
now-familiar pattern: on the order of 90% of private dwelling units of all types 
are owned either by one or two individuals. Co-owner groups thus tend to be 
even smaller than co-occupant groups.124 Moreover, when a twosome does co-
own, the individuals involved usually are intimates—most commonly marriage 
partners, self-identified unmarried partners, or other kinfolk such as the two 
siblings who hypothetically own the Sitcom House.125 
Studies of the grantees of all forms of land transfers, a somewhat overly 
broad category for present purposes, support these assertions. Carole 
Shammas and her co-authors sampled deeds recorded in Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, between 1890 and 1980. In 1890, almost all real estate was in the 
name of a single individual (typically the husband in the case of a married 
couple). By 1980, almost 70% of Bucks County deeds named a husband and 
wife as co-grantees (typically as joint tenants with right of survivorship).126 
 
122.  STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006, supra note 4, at 52 tbl.55; cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (decrying the 
atomization of American life). 
123.  This is the Census Bureau’s definition. See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 
90, app. A, at A-8, A-25. It is also the usual legal definition. See, e.g., STOEBUCK & 
WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 10.12, at 779-84 (discussing the key role of deeds and other 
documents in proof of marketability of title). 
124.  See supra p.255 tbl.1 (indicating that 40.9% of households have three or more occupants). 
125.  The National Association of Realtors (NAR) periodically mails out a questionnaire that asks 
a large sample of homebuyers nationwide to identify themselves. In 2005, 30% of 
respondents reported that they were single buyers; 61%, married couples; 7%, “unmarried 
couples”; and the remaining 2%, “other.” Stephanie Rosenbloom, For Men, A Fear of 
Commitment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, § 11 (Real Estate), at 1 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF 
REALTORS, PROFILE OF HOME BUYERS & SELLERS (2005)); Telephone Interview with Shauna 
Hightower, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors (Spring 2006). Although these findings support the 
conclusions above, the response rate to NAR’s 2005 survey was 5.4%, which makes it less 
credible than the sources mentioned later in the text. 
126.  CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 
172 (1987). 
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William Hines, in a study of deeds recorded in Iowa between 1954 and 1964, 
found that about 40% of the deeds named single grantees and another 56% 
named a husband and wife.127 
A more recent and far more comprehensive source is the Property Owners 
and Managers Survey (POMS) that the U.S. Census Bureau conducted in the 
mid-1990s to determine the identities of owners of private residential rental 
buildings.128 Because co-owners of rental housing don’t have to live together, 
one might expect that they would tend to be somewhat less intimate than 
owner-occupants. The Census Bureau nevertheless found that the co-
ownership of rental housing, even of mid-sized apartment buildings, is mostly 
a mom-and-pop sort of enterprise. 
About one-third of all residential rental units in the United States are 
single-family properties. At the time of the POMS, the landlords of 47% of 
these were single individuals, and the landlords of another 41% were pairs of 
individuals.129 Multifamily buildings predictably attract somewhat larger 
numbers of owners, including investors formally organized in some form of 
business association.130 Nonetheless, the POMS found that single individuals 
and pairs of individuals owned 59% of the units in the nation’s private 
multifamily rental structures.131 Even the owners of rental complexes with fifty 
 
127.  Computed from data presented in N. William Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, 
Fact, and Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REV. 582, 607, 617 (1966). (A caveat: Hines included in the 
single-grantee category not only individuals but also corporations, trusts, and estates.) See 
also Byron D. Cooper, Continuing Problems with Michigan’s Joint Tenancy “with Right of 
Survivorship,” 78 MICH. B.J. 966, 966 n.3 (1999) (reporting that, in a sample of 300 deeds to 
one or more individuals in 1989 in Wayne County, Michigan, 158 involved grants to single 
individuals, 114 to married couples in tenancy by the entirety, 24 to joint tenants, and 4 (all 
by operation of law) to tenants in common); sources cited in Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling 
with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant Possession Value Liability and a Call for Default 
Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 334, 398 n.204.  
128.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS SURVEY (POMS) (1995), 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/poms/poms.html [hereinafter POMS]. In this 
Article, all percentage figures derived from POMS data exclude from the denominator the 
number of units that the Census Bureau included in the “not reported” category. It is likely 
that the forms of ownership respondents declined to report were of greater than average 
complexity. As a result, the exclusion of the unreported category from the denominator 
probably biases upward the percentages reported here for the simpler forms of ownership 
and biases downward those reported for the more complex forms. 
129.  See id. tbl.97. Four percent of the single-family rental properties were owned by three or 
more participants either in cotenancy or in partnership. See id. For-profit corporations 
owned another 4%. See id. tbl.96. 
130.  See infra text accompanying notes 248-252. 
131.  POMS, supra note 128, tbl.97. The survey found that one or two individuals owned 88% of 
the units in three- to four-unit multifamily buildings, 67% in ten- to nineteen-unit 
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or more units are more likely to be organized as a limited or general 
partnership (41%) than as a for-profit corporation or real estate investment 
trust (24%).132 Co-owners, like co-occupants, plainly see advantages in limiting 
the number of people with whom they consort. 
C. Residential Landlord-Tenant Relationships 
Because the landlord-tenant relationship may be highly fractious, an 
occupant can benefit greatly from having an intimate landlord. Most 
Americans, perhaps surprisingly, succeed in this quest. The principal ploy is to 
live in either a self-owned dwelling or one that is owned by other co-occupants. 
In 2003, 68% of occupied U.S. dwelling units had at least one owner-occupant, 
up from slightly less than half during the period 1900 to 1940.133 And of the 
dwellings that have at least one owner-occupant, in a remarkable 96%, all of 
the owners reside there.134 In this respect, the Sitcom House, which is partly 
owned by an absentee, Aunt Audrey, is a distinct outlier. 
The desire for this arrangement—homeownership—runs deep. When 
asked by pollsters in 1999 which items on a list of two dozen constituted part 
of “the good life,” Americans included “a home you own” more often (88%) 
than any other item, including “a happy marriage” (76%) and “a lot of money” 
(57%).135 The pattern in the United States again is not exceptional. In most 
Western European nations, the majority of dwellings are owner-occupied.136 
 
buildings, and 25% in fifty-plus-unit buildings. See id. These percentages include owners of 
beneficial interests held either in cotenancy or partnership, and also fiduciary ownership by 
the trustees of an estate. The figures exclude, however, ownership by a corporation with 
only one or two shareholders. 
George Sternlieb’s classic studies of slum tenements provide a basis for comparison. In 
1964, when Sternlieb first studied Newark, just over 50% of the tenements were owned 
either by individuals or husband-wife pairs, and under 20% by corporations. GEORGE 
STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 122, 253 (1969). (Sternlieb also found that 
approximately 40% of the tenements were owned by a landlord who owned no other rental 
property. Id. at 122.) By 1972, of the slum properties not owned by the City of Newark, 
almost two-thirds were owned by individuals or husband-wife pairs. See GEORGE STERNLIEB 
& ROBERT W. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 
REVISITED 56 (1973). 
132.  POMS, supra note 128, tbl.96. 
133.  STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006, supra note 4, at 630 tbl.952; James W. Hughes, Economic 
Shifts and the Changing Homeownership Trajectory, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 293 (1996). 
134.  AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at 76 tbl.2-13. 
135.  Karlyn Bowman, The Good Life, AM. ENTERPRISE, June 2000, at 60. 
136.  See U.N. ECON. COMM. EUR., BULLETIN OF HOUSING STATISTICS FOR EUROPE AND NORTH 
AMERICA 2004, tbl.A, http://www.unece.org/env/hs/prgm/hsstat/Bulletin_04.htm (last 
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The earliest historical records indicate that owner-occupancy of a house was 
common in ancient times as well.137 There have been exceptions, of course, 
notably the various communist collectivizations that shifted formal ownership 
of all land to the state, but these have mostly proved to be ephemeral.138 
A group of co-occupants unwilling or unable to acquire a dwelling unit, but 
nonetheless desirous of a trustworthy relationship, can seek to rent from a 
landlord with whom the group has close ties. According to one of the most 
intensive studies of landlord-tenant relations, an early 1970s Rand survey of 
residential rentals in and around Green Bay, Wisconsin, “[t]wenty percent of 
the single-family residences and an appreciable number of units in multiple 
dwellings were occupied by relatives of the landlord.”139 Tenants also can seek 
to rent an apartment in a small building owned by individuals who currently 
reside in another unit of the same building. In the United States, a building 
containing two to four dwelling units is indeed more likely than not to be 
owner-occupied.140 In part because repeat face-to-face interactions tend to abet 
cooperation, many tenants have reason to prefer living only steps away from 
their landlords.141 Not all tenants, of course, succeed in cozying up to their 
landlords in any one of these fashions: about one-quarter of co-occupant 
groups in the United States face the unlovely prospect of dealing with a 
landlord at arm’s length.142  
 
visited Oct. 9, 2006) (indicating that the rate of homeownership in Western Europe ranges 
from a low of 39.9% in Sweden to a high of 80% in Ireland). 
137.  Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 99, at 337 n.80, 338. 
138.  On the privatization of apartments in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Bloc after 
1989, see sources cited in Heller, supra note 25, at 647-50. 
139.  RAND CORP., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE HOUSING ASSISTANCE SUPPLY EXPERIMENT 53 
(1974). 
140.  This fact can be deduced from the following Census data: owners inhabit one out of five 
dwelling units in residential structures that contain two to four units. STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT: 1999, supra note 3, at 729 tbl.1212. Assuming that owners occupy a maximum of 
one unit per structure, if these structures were to contain 2.5 units on average, a conservative 
assumption, it would follow that 50% (one-fifth of 2.5) of the structures would be owner-
occupied. If these structures were to contain 3.0 units on average, 60% (one-fifth of 3.0) of 
them would be owner-occupied. 
141.  The residency of an owner in a multifamily structure with two to four units is associated 
with better building maintenance, particularly of common areas. See Frank W. Porell, One 
Man’s Ceiling Is Another Man’s Floor: Landlord/Manager Residency and Housing Condition, 61 
LAND ECON. 106 (1985). 
142.  Given that 68% of homes are owner-occupied, see supra text accompanying note 133, and 
that a significant minority of tenants rent from either family members or friends, this is the 
approximate fraction that remains. 
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iv. are the household forms that endure necessarily best? 
Many utopian thinkers, from Plato on, have placed reform of the 
household at or near the top of their agendas. Critics have two basic grounds 
for questioning the worthiness of a liberal society’s conventional household 
institutions.143 The first is that the actual process of household formation in a 
given liberal society may well be too beset with imperfections to produce sound 
outcomes. More radically, a critic may challenge the normative soundness of 
liberalism itself. The lackluster histories, in a wide variety of cultures, of 
experiments with collectivized living, however, suggest that conventional 
household institutions do have significant intrinsic merits. 
A. Utopian Designs of Unconventional Households 
For millennia, drastic reform of the conventional household has been a 
central theme of the utopian canon. Visionaries have imagined settlements 
where dozens or even hundreds of unrelated adults dine together and reside in 
collectively governed housing.144 In The Republic, Plato proposes that the 
governing class of Guardians share dwellings, storehouses, wives, and a 
modest food allotment.145 Thomas More’s Utopia depicts a fictional island 
where each city row-house is occupied by ten to sixteen adults—assigned to it 
by central authorities—who take their meals in yet larger groups in common 
dining halls.146 In the nineteenth century, Friedrich Engels, Charles Fourier, 
Robert Owen, and other utopian socialists sharply criticized conventional 
 
143.  For guarded discussions of the inferences that can be drawn from the survivorship of an 
ownership form, see HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 22-23; and Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark 
J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
127 (1999). 
144.  On utopian thought, see generally KRISHAN KUMAR, UTOPIA AND ANTI-UTOPIA IN MODERN 
TIMES (1987); and FRANK E. MANUEL & FRITZIE P. MANUEL, UTOPIAN THOUGHT IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD (1979). Human psychology evolved during an era when people lived 
communally as hunter-gatherers. See BOEHM, supra note 85; BUSS, supra note 73. Perhaps as 
a result, humans may be evolutionarily inclined to favor depictions of relatively complex 
domestic arrangements. Kinship ties typically are strong in hunter-gatherer bands, see 
ALEXANDRA MARYANSKI & JONATHAN H. TURNER, THE SOCIAL CAGE: HUMAN NATURE AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 81-89 (1992), but utopians rarely envision kinship as the glue of 
an intentional community. 
145.  PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. 3, at *416d-e, bk. 4, at *419-20c. 
146.  MORE, supra note 24, at 47, 55-60. More’s volume depicts even larger rural households that 
contain a minimum of forty adults. Id. at 44. More himself probably regarded Utopia’s 
scheme as unworkable. See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 169-75 (1998). 
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households, partly on the ground that they were venues for the oppression of 
women.147 
The United States has been particularly fertile ground for the imagining of 
alternative household forms. Two peaks of intellectual ferment were the 
Utopian Socialist era of 1824 to 1848 and the Woodstock era of 1965 to 1978. 
Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, one of the bestsellers of the late 
nineteenth century, envisions a future of nuclear family households whose 
occupants rent their dwellings from the state, eat meals cooked in public 
kitchens, and obtain household cleaning and nursing services from assigned 
members of a national industrial force.148 In Walden Two, B.F. Skinner depicts 
a community of nearly 1000 persons who share a common eating room and 
reside in personal rooms located within a complex of buildings governed by a 
six-person Board of Planners.149 
These visionaries rarely articulate their reasons for doubting the soundness 
of conventional household forms. There are, however, facially plausible reasons 
for doubt. 
B. Possible Imperfections, from a Liberal Perspective, in the Process of Household 
Formation 
1. Illiberal Background Conditions 
When a given society’s law and norms insufficiently protect the core 
entitlements of private property, freedom of exit, and freedom of contract, a 
committed liberal has reason to doubt the optimality of its conventional 
household institutions. Two vignettes from Russian history illustrate the 
perversities of household formation under illiberal conditions. As noted, the 
Soviet Union at times assigned several previously unacquainted families to 
share an urban housing unit.150 These komunalkas persisted not because they 
were popular with occupants (quite the contrary!), but rather because 
occupants lacked exit options due to the state’s monopolization of housing 
 
147.  See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 138-
39 (Eleanor Burke Leacock ed., Int’l Publishers 1972) (1884) (predicting that, after the 
demise of capitalism, “social industry” would supplant the role of the private household); 
Siegel, supra note 36, at 1094-96 (discussing Fourier and Owen); see also Siegel, supra note 
36, at 1198-1205 (describing the post-Civil War cooperative housekeeping movement, whose 
adherents aspired to create meta-households). 
148.  EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD 2000-1887 (The Modern Library 1951) (1887). 
149.  B.F. SKINNER, WALDEN TWO 18-20, 40-44, 48 (Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1976) (1948). 
150.  See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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supply and control over residency permits. Conditions in Russia prior to the 
1917 Revolution were more subtly illiberal. Residents of rural repartitional 
villages (miri) then commonly were mired in a rigid sociopolitical system that 
afforded them few choices and scant exit opportunities.151 
In addition, even a state whose basic aspirations do comport with liberal 
ideals inevitably falls short in practice. A liberal state must control intra-
household violence, for example, to ensure that domestic participants truly are 
free to exercise their powers of exit.152 No legal system, however, can detect and 
prevent all forms of private coercion. As a result, an occupant may remain in a 
suboptimal household solely out of fear that a decision to depart would 
provoke a violent response from an abandoned housemate. Moreover, exit is 
not completely costless even when there is no risk of violence. An occupant 
who leaves a household, for example, must incur moving expenses, the 
transaction costs of winding up intra-household claims, and the sacrifice of any 
household-specific human capital. And a risk-averse occupant may remain in a 
household solely as a result of fear that a seemingly better prospect would not 
pan out.153 Liberal critics of conventional practices thus have some normative 
basis for questioning prevailing household forms. 
2. A Liberal State’s Duties To Control Externalities and Protect Incompetents 
A liberal state has two basic rationales for regulating how individuals or 
groups use private property and enter into contracts: externalities and 
paternalism.154 In the absence of appropriate legal policies addressing these 
considerations, liberal critics may be skeptical of the worthiness of a civil 
society’s conventional institutions and practices. 
Many areas of liberal law address the complications posed by pervasive 
externalities. At a back-to-nature commune with scores of occupied dwellings, 
both members and neighbors may need governmental help to control 
 
151.  See Ellickson, supra note 32, at 1393-94. 
152.  Violations of occupants’ entitlements to bodily integrity are the events most likely to bring 
police officers to a household’s door. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to 
Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1993). 
153.  See generally Andreas Flache, Individual Risk Preferences and Collective Outcomes in the 
Evolution of Exchange Networks, 13 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 304 (2001) (modeling the effects of 
risk aversion on partner selection). 
154.  See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 39, at 88; see also BRINIG, supra note 18, at 8-10 (noting, 
in addition, the possibility of problems arising on account of incomplete information and, in 
contexts of bilateral monopoly, rent extraction). 
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occupants whose activities threaten the spread of disease.155 Similarly, when 
increased risks of fire and disease would result from substandard housing 
conditions, housing codes may force a landlord and tenant to agree on a higher 
level of quality than those two parties otherwise would choose. When co-
owners are numerous and when unilateral exit by one of them would be highly 
disruptive, the state may limit a co-owner’s right of partition.156 More 
controversially, liberal lawmakers may seek to forbid consensual household 
arrangements that offend public morals—for example, occupants who live in a 
polygamous fashion.157 
In addition, a liberal state properly adopts various paternalist policies to 
protect incompetent persons from entering into inadvisable household 
relationships. Members of a significant fraction of the population—notably 
children and the mentally disabled—are prevented from exercising powers of 
ownership and choosing their residences. Unable to protect themselves by exit, 
these individuals are potentially vulnerable to abuse by those who govern their 
living spaces. Liberal legal systems respond by attempting to prevent other 
household occupants from neglecting or abusing children, incompetent adults, 
or, for that matter, pets.158 Moreover, even legally competent individuals are 
susceptible at times to errant and impulsive decision-making.159 A liberal state 
responds, for example, by paternalistically making some entitlements 
immutable, including the entitlement of an occupant to decamp from a 
household.160 
 
155.  See People v. Wheeler, 106 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1973) (authorizing the county to abate a 
commune’s unsanitary conditions that posed risks of internal and external epidemics). 
156.  Most states deny condominium owners the power to partition common areas held in 
tenancy in common. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDO. ACT § 2-107(e) (1980). 
157.  See, e.g., State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 820 (Utah 2004) (upholding the conviction of a man 
who had been living with several women he regarded as wives, even though at no time was 
he ever formally married to more than one of them); see also IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH 
GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1996). 
158.  See Peter David Brandon, State Intervention in Imperfect Families: The Child, the State, and 
Imperfect Parenting Reconsidered from a Theory of Comparative Advantage, 13 RATIONALITY & 
SOC’Y 285 (2001). One conception is that the state tries to assure that the rules of a 
household that contains minor children, incompetent adults, or other helpless members are 
identical to the rules that would exist if those members were not lacking in capacity. See 
Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1988). 
159.  See generally Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (advocating selectively 
paternalistic regulation to counter human errors in decision-making). 
160.  See supra text accompanying notes 37-39; see also supra note 42 (discussing limitations on the 
waiver of partition rights). 
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3. Perverse Government Policies 
A liberal critic of conventional household institutions might contend that 
the state has not only mishandled these externality and paternalism issues, but 
also that it pursues other small-bore public law policies that distort individuals’ 
choices of household forms.161 Regulatory programs, for example, may 
unjustifiably limit household options. Draconian zoning ordinances can overly 
restrict owners’ choices about what to build and occupants’ choices about 
where and how to live. The law of intestate succession can confer co-ownership 
of a house on several surviving heirs who never would have chosen that 
arrangement on their own.162 A stiff rent-control program deprives landlords 
and tenants of freedom of contract, limits their ability to exit from the 
relationship, poorly matches tenants with units, and crimps housing 
production and maintenance.163 
Government spending and taxation programs similarly can distort the 
shape of household institutions. For instance, the rules that govern eligibility 
for welfare benefits or liability for income taxes may capriciously influence an 
individual’s choice of co-occupants.164 Many observers contend that the 
 
161.  A useful overview of pertinent policies is Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: 
Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 27-79 (1996). “Small-bore” denotes a legal rule 
whose scope and impact is insufficient to qualify it as a foundational or background rule, in 
the sense that those adjectives are employed supra Section I.B. This distinction admittedly is 
fuzzy. 
162.  Because most people strive to avoid owning with more than one or two others, these co-
owners might be expected either to buy one another out promptly or to agree to sell all their 
interests to a third party. Nonetheless, many observers contend that intestate succession 
contributed to the excessive fractionalization of ownership of many African-American farms 
in the rural South and to the eventual transfer of too many of these farms to non-black 
owners. See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 551, 603-09; Thomas W. Mitchell, From 
Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and 
Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 517-23 
(2001). 
163.  See, e.g., Arnott, supra note 46, at 209; Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The 
Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1027 (2003). 
164.  On the influence of various spending programs, see Ingrid Gould Ellen & Brendan 
O’Flaherty, Do Housing and Social Policies Make Households Too Small? Evidence from 
New York (Sept. 12, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Ellen and 
O’Flaherty assert that housing and income maintenance policies—particularly Section 8 
housing allowances, public housing, and food stamps—tend to reduce the average number 
of adult occupants in New York City households, and for no good reason. On the influence 
of taxation policy, see, for example, Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: 
Family, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); and 
Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145 (1998). On 
creditors’ rights policies, see, for example, Alison D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like Home: 
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Internal Revenue Code excessively subsidizes homeownership.165 Massive 
government support for subsidized housing projects can crowd out the private 
production of housing. By concentrating the supply of low- and moderate-
income housing in a few institutional providers, this policy can diminish less 
affluent tenants’ choices of landlords, locations, and building types. 
C. Is Liberalism Overly Destructive of Solidarity? 
The foregoing qualms about the optimality of existing household forms all 
were articulated from within the paradigm of liberal thought. But if liberalism 
itself is unsound, the household forms that evolve under liberal conditions 
plainly are not worthy of deference.166 Some critics of liberalism, such as 
Duncan Kennedy and William Simon, appear to regard robust rights of exit—a 
core principle of liberalism—as particularly corrosive.167 As Albert Hirschman 
famously observed, ease of exit from an association may reduce willingness to 
 
Homestead Exemption and Judicial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 
LAW & HIST. REV. 245 (2006). 
165.  See, e.g., Steven C. Bourassa & William G. Grigsby, Income Tax Concessions for Owner-
Occupied Housing, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 521 (2000); Henry Hansmann, Condominium 
and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 25, 39-56 (1991). Some policy analysts, however, defend favoritism toward 
homeowners on the ground that homeownership has positive social consequences. See, e.g., 
John C. Weicher, Comment on Steven C. Bourassa and William G. Grigsby’s “Income Tax 
Concessions for Owner-Occupied Housing,” 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 547 (2000). These social 
benefits are reviewed in Robert D. Dietz & Donald R. Haurin, The Social and Private Micro-
Level Consequences of Homeownership, 54 J. URB. ECON. 401 (2003). 
166.  Some feminist scholars contend that liberalism fails to recognize that individuals are not 
autonomous decision-makers but instead are socially interdependent. See, e.g., Linda C. 
McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992); see also sources cited in Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal 
Polity: On Martha Fineman’s The Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285, 1288 n.12, 1289 n.13 
(2005) (book review); cf. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 
(1993) (expressing concern about the effects of individualistic ethics on family institutions). 
A sensible liberal commentator should acknowledge, however, that individuals are 
constrained, often for the benefit of others, by internalized norms, altruistic feelings arising 
out of love and family ties, gift-exchange obligations, diffuse social pressures, legal rules, 
and other influences. Liberal principles favor individual self-determination not in a social 
vacuum but within the bounds of these constraints. See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 20-21 (1990). 
167.  See Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race 
and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85 (2002) (advocating the creation of limited equity 
housing cooperatives from which owner exit is constrained); William H. Simon, Social-
Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991) (same). The perceived value of stability in 
domestic arrangements similarly animates much social-conservative thinking—for example, 
its support of covenant marriage. 
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participate actively in its affairs, or, in his terms, to exercise voice and to 
commit oneself to loyalty.168 It thus is possible that untrammeled liberal rights 
to terminate household relationships impede the achievement of the deepest 
forms of domestic solidarity.169 
A liberal, however, has a number of responses. First, American law 
recognizes and responds to the concerns embedded in this critique. A 
competent occupant or owner who hungers for a particularly close-knit 
relationship is entitled to waive certain exit rights—for example, to agree to be 
liable to those abandoned in the event of departure.170 Second, the dynamics of 
household formation are better analyzed from an ex ante than an ex post 
perspective. People are far more likely to be willing to enter into a relationship 
when they know they can readily exit from it later. On balance, robust exit 
rights thus actually may help bring people together. Third, a participant’s 
power of exit can improve the quality of an ongoing household relationship in 
various ways. Some liberals assert that maintaining a relationship when ready 
exit from it is possible is the deepest expression of solidarity and 
commitment.171 In addition, a participant’s threat of exit helps deter other 
participants from denying that participant a satisfactory share of household 
surplus.172 A person who is unable to exit is vulnerable to exploitation, and 
exploited persons are likely to become malcontents whose presence poisons 
household interactions. Difficulties in exiting, for example, contribute to the 
bitterness of landlord-tenant relationships in rent-control jurisdictions and 
accounted for some of the misery of co-occupants’ lives in komunalkas. 
D. The Unpromising History of Experiments with Unconventional Household 
Forms 
For the reasons just canvassed, it is foolhardy to deem extant household 
institutions to be perfectly optimal. Utopians have imagined, however, that 
many individuals would prefer to be involved in household relationships that 
involve far more people than conventional households do. Each year in the 
United States, there are dozens of new attempts to create intentional 
 
168.  HIRSCHMAN, supra note 37, at 33-36, 76-77. 
169.  See Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 574-77, 596-602; Ellickson, supra note 32, at 1375-80. See 
generally Walzer, supra note 166 (asserting that these sorts of communitarian critiques, 
although eternally relevant, are substantively weak). 
170.  See supra text accompanying note 39. 
171.  See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 83, at 87; Karst, supra note 50, at 637-38. 
172.  See Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165, 171 (1998); supra text accompanying 
notes 57-63. 
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communities.173 The historical record, however, indicates that, at the end of the 
day, few individuals want to entangle themselves in highly complex household 
relationships.174 
An intentional community united by religious belief is likely to fare better 
than a secular community.175 The Hutterites (organized in 1528) and the 
monasteries and convents of the Order of Saint Benedict (established in 530) 
are examples of long-lived religious sects that have devised replicable forms of 
intentional community. Seeking to comply with the Biblical precept of living 
with “all things common,”176 both sects require the dozens of adult residents of 
each of their communities to dine together for virtually all meals. According to 
the sect’s own figures, perhaps 8000 Hutterites now live on eighty-nine 
different rural settlements in the United States, most of them in the northern 
Great Plains.177 The Order of Saint Benedict claims a total of 174 monasteries 
and convents in the United States,178 with an average membership of forty.179 
 
173.  For a historical overview of intentional communities, particularly in the United States, see 
ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 19-80. See also Ellickson, supra note 32, at 1357-62. The founders 
of intentional communities sometimes encounter zoning problems and other hurdles, but 
their legal advisors seldom regard these as insurmountable barriers. See SCOTTHANSON & 
SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 237-50; Rob Sandelin, Dealing with Government Agencies, 
http://www.ic.org/nica/Construction/build1b.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (offering legal 
advice to the founders of an intentional community of any form). As the text explains, a new 
intentional community’s problems tend to lie not on the supply side but on the demand 
side. 
174.  In the United States, the portion of the population involved in intentional communities has 
“never much exceeded one per one thousand.” ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 31. In addition, 
large non-family households are unusual. See supra p. 256 tbl.2. 
175.  ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 37, 151. John Noyes’s faith-based Oneida community, for 
example, endured from 1848 to 1881, when its members implemented a sweeping 
privatization program. See MAREN LOCKWOOD CARDEN, ONEIDA: UTOPIAN COMMUNITY TO 
MODERN CORPORATION, at xiii-xiv, 113-16 (1969). A prominent counterexample is 
Rajneeshpuram, whose rapid rise and rapid fall in central Oregon in 1981 to 1986 is depicted 
in JAMES S. GORDON, THE GOLDEN GURU: THE STRANGE JOURNEY OF BHAGWAN SHREE 
RAJNEESH 99-207 (1987). 
176.  Acts 2:44. See generally MARTIN HENGEL, PROPERTY AND RICHES IN THE EARLY CHURCH 8-9, 
31-34 (John Bowden trans., 1974) (describing the communal sharing of goods in early 
Christian societies). 
177.  Calculated from figures that the Hutterian Brethren themselves provided at Fellowship for 
Intentional Cmty., Communities Directory: Hutterian Brethren (Mar. 7, 2005), 
http://directory.ic.org/records/?action=view&page=view&record_id=570. The total 
population of Hutterite communities has been mounting, almost entirely on account of the 
sect’s extraordinarily high birth rates. See Ellickson, supra note 32, at 1360. For more 
extended discussion of Hutterite settlements, see id. at 1346-47, 1350-61. 
178.  Order of Saint Benedict, Geographic Search Form, http://www.osb.org/geog/ 
searchform.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (search for “U.S.A.”). 
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In contrast to the communities formed by members of these religious sects, 
most secular experiments with strongly communal forms of living and dining 
implode within a handful of years.180 This was true during the Utopian 
Socialist era of 1824 to 1848, when Fourierism, Owenism, and the like inspired 
the creation of, among others, Brook Farm in Massachusetts, New Harmony in 
Indiana, and Oneida in New York.181 It also was true during the Woodstock era 
of 1965 to 1978, a period that gave rise to a large burst of experiments in 
collective living.182 
Most Israeli kibbutzim, which typically are secular, were founded prior to 
the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In general, kibbutzim have 
shown an impressive capacity to endure. By the mid-1980s, however, many 
kibbutzim had fallen into severe financial difficulty and were losing the 
allegiance of younger members, who had begun to cool on the collectivist 
ideal.183 In response to this crisis, many kibbutzim began to privatize 
previously collectivized functions.184 Originally committed to congregate 
dining at no charge, most kibbutzim have begun to charge fees for meals and to 
 
179.  Fellowship for Intentional Cmty., supra note 121. The Benedictines have had their ups and 
downs over the centuries. See 2 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 272-74 (2d ed. 2003) 
(recounting the Order’s major reversals in England and France after the Middle Ages). 
180.  A commune whose residents live in social isolation and share a common ideology is apt to 
endure longer than one that lacks these features. See Benjamin D. Zablocki & Rosabeth 
Moss Kanter, The Differentiation of Life-Styles, 2 ANN. REV. SOC. 269, 290-91 (1976). 
181.  Brook Farm was in operation in West Roxbury from 1841 to 1847. STERLING F. DELANO, 
BROOK FARM: THE DARK SIDE OF UTOPIA 40, 310 (2004). Robert Owen started his version of 
New Harmony in 1825, but gave up on it within a few years. On Oneida, see supra note 175. 
182.  See ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 148-51 (reporting that a newly established Woodstock-era 
commune had roughly a 30% chance of enduring for four years or more). 
183.  See Joshua Muravchik, Socialism’s Last Stand, COMMENTARY, Mar. 2002, at 47, 50-53. Prior to 
the mid-1980s, many kibbutzim had benefited from loans from kibbutz federations and 
special government-supported banks. The declining electoral fortunes of the Labor Party led 
to reductions in this outside support. On the repercussions, see Joel Brinkley, Debts Make 
Israelis Rethink an Ideal: The Kibbutz, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989, at A14. 
184.  The earliest kibbutz cooperative associations leased their lands from the Jewish National 
Fund, a charitable organization. The State of Israel, after its establishment in 1948, largely 
assumed the Fund’s role as lessor. In 2004, the Israeli Cabinet approved a new form, the 
“renewing kibbutz,” that over half of kibbutzim had adopted by early 2006. In a renewing 
kibbutz the state is empowered to transfer a specific housing unit by long-term lease to an 
individual member, with the kibbutz holding a right of first refusal in the event of a 
proposed further transfer. E-mail from Amnon Lehavi, Professor of Law, Radzyner Sch. of 
Law, Herzliya, Isr., to author (July 9, 2006, 11:43:17 EST) (on file with author); E-mail 
from Amnon Lehavi, Professor of Law, Radzyner Sch. of Law, Herzliya, Isr., to author (Feb. 
23, 2006, 08:07:34 EST) (on file with author). 
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permit members to have separate kitchens.185 Between 1991 and 1998, the 
percentage of kibbutzim that had cancelled the practice of regularly serving a 
communal evening meal rose from 9.2% to 57.8%.186 
In recent decades, co-housing has been a relatively active sector in the 
generally stagnant movement to create secular intentional communities. 
Pioneered in Denmark in the 1970s, the co-housing template offers a watered-
down, but potentially durable, form of communal life.187 A typical co-housing 
settlement consists of a few dozen dwelling units, each separately owned and 
occupied by either a single individual or members of a conventional 
household.188 As in a condominium development, these participants also share 
ownership of the community’s common areas. In co-housing, the most 
important shared asset is the “common house,” a facility designed to permit 
the preparation and serving of collective meals, the signal feature of the 
movement.189 Although few co-housing communities offer group meals on a 
daily basis, most do provide them at least twice a week.190 Attendance at these 
group meals typically is optional. Even staunch advocates of the co-housing 
model insist that each dwelling unit must come equipped with a separate 
kitchen, even though those facilities readily enable unit occupants to opt out of 
the collective meal.191 Despite the enthusiasm of its promoters, the co-housing 
 
185.  Muravchik, supra note 183, at 51; see also Karby Leggett, Pay-as-You-Go Kibbutzim, WALL ST. 
J., May 26, 2005, at B1. 
186.  Raymond Russell et al., Processes of Deinstitutionalization and Reinstitutionalization 
Among Israeli Kibbutzim, 1990-1998, at 12 (Aug. 12-16, 2000), http://research.haifa.ac.il/ 
~kibbutz/pdf/rusty2000.PDF. 
187.  See SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87; Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, 
Process, and Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary Common Interest Community, 15 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 3 (1999). 
188.  In a Hutterite community or traditional kibbutz, by contrast, a married couple typically was 
granted the exclusive right to occupy a sleeping quarters, but not the right to sell or rent 
those premises. 
189.  This “common house” is the principal physical feature that distinguishes a co-housing 
development from a subdivision governed by a conventional homeowners’ association. A 
conventional association may have a community room of some sort, but it is likely to be 
more modestly sized and equipped. 
190.  See supra note 120; infra note 191. 
191.  The FAQ section of the website of the Cohousing Association of the United States used to 
include the following: 
If I live in cohousing, will I have my own kitchen? 
You may well wonder why we have put this seemingly insignificant question 
[second to] the top of our list. Frankly, because it is the single question most 
frequently asked of cohousing enthusiasts. Yes, every cohousing community does 
have a common kitchen, but community meals are usually prepared and served in 
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concept does not seem to have tapped into a large unserved market. In the 
United States, from 1991 to 2005, co-housing represented less than one 
housing start in 10,000, and toward the end of that time period the number of 
newly opened projects had plateaued at about a half-dozen per year.192 
The near universality of private kitchens in both kibbutzim and co-housing 
communities indicates that communitarian practice has veered sharply away 
from the visions that Plato, Fourier, Skinner, and others contributed to the 
utopian canon. Contemporary critics of conventional living patterns generally 
have become less interested in reforming institutions within conventional 
households and more interested in improving social relations among 
neighboring households. Those who hunger for deeper social interactions, it is 
now thought, can satisfy their hunger beyond the walls of their dwellings. New 
Urbanists, a highly influential school of urban planners, feature conventional 
dwelling units in their communities, but seek to enhance contact among 
neighbors by, for example, including front porches and placing housing units 
close together.193 
Even skeptics of liberalism seem to be mainly interested in enhancing inter-
household, as opposed to intra-household, solidarity. Kennedy and Simon, for 
example, tout the potential of the limited equity housing cooperative.194 
Owner-occupants who buy units in one of these ventures must agree to sell 
back, on departure, their proprietary interest to the remaining co-owners at a 
below-market price. This heavy tax on exit can be expected to reduce owner-
 
the common house only two or three times each week. Can you imagine 25 or 
more households each trying to separately prepare 18 or 19 meals a week in one 
kitchen? That would be well nigh impossible. So yes, each residence has a fully 
equipped—and usually spanking new—private kitchen. Really. 
  Cohousing Ass’n of the U.S., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), 
http://www.cohousing.org/resources/faq.html#kitchen (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).  
192.  Muir Commons, the first newly constructed co-housing development in the United States, 
opened in 1991 in Davis, California. KATHRYN MCCAMANT ET AL., COHOUSING: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO HOUSING OURSELVES 208 (2d ed. 1994). By 2005 there were 
about eighty occupied developments, comprising among them some 2000 housing units. 
Cohousing Ass’n of the U.S., Cohousing Communities Directory, http://directory. 
cohousing.org/us_list/all_us.php (last visited June 20, 2006) [hereinafter Cohousing 
Community List]. Of the sixty-nine listed communities with reported completion dates, ten 
had been completed in 1991-1995, thirty-five in 1996-2000, and twenty-four in 2001-2005. 
Id. During 1991-2005, about 21 million new private housing units were produced in the 
United States. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2006, supra note 4, at 619. 
193.  See, e.g., PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS 65, 84 (1993); ANDRES 
DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION 205-07 (2000); Barbara B. Brown et al., Neighbors, 
Households, and Front Porches: New Urbanist Community Tool or Mere Nostalgia?, 30 ENV’T & 
BEHAV. 579 (1998) (reporting data on the use of front porches). 
194.  Kennedy, supra note 167; Simon, supra note 167, at 1361-66. 
ELLICKSON – PRE-OP 11/6/2006  5:37:59 PM 
the yale law journal  116:226   2006 
276 
 
occupant turnover, thereby possibly enhancing solidarity among the 
cooperative’s households.195 It is notable, however, that Kennedy and Simon 
join with the New Urbanists and co-housing advocates in accepting the 
conventional household as their basic social building block. Similarly, feminist 
critics such as Martha Fineman and Vicki Schultz, who aspire to radically 
transform conventional husband-wife relations, seem not to be troubled by the 
prospect of a future in which small, intimate households continue to 
predominate.196 
The central fact is that conventional households—small, typically family-
based, and commonly owner-occupied—have predominated in the face of 
competition in widely diverse eras and sociolegal environments. Although 
small-bore public law policies, path dependence, and nonliberal ideologies 
undoubtedly can affect the shape of prevailing household institutions, 
particularly the incidence of homeownership, their influence on the sizing and 
composition of occupant groups tends to be either minor or ephemeral. The 
conventional kinship-based household persists not because individuals lack 
imagination or spurn interfamily solidarity but rather because this traditional 
form has inherent advantages. Even a weakly communal blueprint for dwelling 
and dining, such as co-housing, tends to founder on that most mundane of 
shoals: transaction costs. As the next three Parts demonstrate, transaction costs 
powerfully influence all features of household institutions, in particular the 
structuring of ownership, the numbers of participants, and participants’ 
systems of internal governance.  
 
195.  Demand for these communities is tepid. The owners of many former limited equity housing 
co-ops, including all four in the 4500-unit Co-op Village complex on Manhattan’s Lower 
East Side, have voted to eliminate their resale-price ceilings. See Nadine Brozan, For Co-op 
Complexes, Complex Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at J1; see also Kennedy, supra note 167, 
at 97 (“The private housing market does not generate a limited equity [cooperative housing] 
sector.”). 
196.  Fineman urges the abolition of marriage as a legal category but proposes the conferral of 
special legal protections on participants in certain caregiver relationships, such as mother-
child pairs, whose members in practice are highly likely to co-reside in a small household. 
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 8-9, 228-36 (1995). Schultz favors converting 
much currently unpaid household work performed by insiders to paid work performed by 
outsiders. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1900-02 (2000). Her 
discussions of ideal domestic relationships, however, typically assume the continued 
prevalence of small households headed by intimate partners. See, e.g., id. at 1957 n.305. But 
cf. id. at 1939 (suggesting, in passing, the desirability of creating more households that are 
not centered on a nuclear family). 
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v. choosing which of a household’s participants should 
serve as its owners  
The owners of a house—typically the grantees named in the most recent 
deed197—almost always are the people who provided the equity capital, i.e., the 
funds used to defray the portion of the purchase price not financed by means of 
debt capital provided by mortgage lenders. After initially acquiring title, these 
same grantees typically provide any additional infusions of equity, perhaps to 
cover deficits incurred in ownership operations or to finance improvements to 
the premises.198 What are the powers of a household’s owners? Why, among 
all the various parties involved in household operations, are contributors of 
equity capital (as opposed to, say, providers of labor) designated as owners? 
Transaction cost considerations lie at the heart of the story. 
A. Basic Concepts in the Theory of the Ownership of Enterprise 
According to the theory of the firm, the owners of an enterprise have two 
key entitlements: the power to make residual control decisions and the right to 
receive residual financial flows.199 These entitlements tend to be bundled 
together in a household, just as they are in a nondomestic enterprise. 
1. Residual Control Decisions 
When Dad and Aunt Audrey acquired the Sitcom House, they assumed 
broad powers to decide the use of the premises, the people who could enter it, 
and the circumstances under which it might be transferred to another.200 The 
owners of a household, however, commonly choose to trade or give away some 
of the sticks in the bundle of entitlements that they initially acquired. Although 
Nadia is not one of the owners of the Sitcom House, her agreement with Dad 
might explicitly entitle her both to dwell in the guestroom over the garage and 
to paint its interior in a color of her choice. Granny, through a process of gift 
 
197.  See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
198.  The donee of a dwelling conveyed as a gift (or the devisee of an inherited dwelling) initially 
invests nothing but typically does make later monetary infusions. When an owner has been 
exceptionally passive, the doctrine of adverse possession may confer title on a house’s long-
time occupants, including ones who previously had not contributed capital. Once adverse 
possessors obtain title, however, they are likely to become capital providers. 
199.  See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 289-
90 (1992) (lucidly explaining these notions). 
200.  See supra notes 30-32, 40 and accompanying text. 
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exchange with Dad and Aunt Audrey, might have acquired implicit rights to 
live rent-free in the Sitcom House. Young Chip might even charm Dad into 
ceding him control over whom to invite to an adult dinner party. 
Owners’ residual control powers are the ones that they originally acquired 
but have not yet traded or given away. If, as is almost certain, Dad and Aunt 
Audrey’s express and implicit obligations to the various occupants are partial, 
they retain the power to decide many issues. Has the time arrived to charge 
Maureen rent or to ask her to find another home for Chip and herself? Can 
Nadia invite her lover to move in with her? Should a swimming pool be built 
in the back yard? If Aunt Audrey wants to withdraw her capital and Dad is 
willing to move to a smaller nest, has the time come to put the Sitcom House 
up for sale? 
The owners of a household (in their roles as owners, as distinguished from 
other possible roles such as occupants or family members) are primarily 
interested in controlling household behavior that affects the value of their 
residual financial claims. For example, because Dad and Aunt Audrey incur 
opportunity costs when they cede space to an occupant, they are likely to want 
to assure themselves an adequate reciprocal flow of compensating benefits 
from that occupant. If they concluded that Granny, given her level of 
contributions to them as owners, already controlled enough space within the 
house, they would resist her attempts to take over the dining room table as a 
site for her jigsaw puzzles. Granny’s choice of home reading material, by 
contrast, would not normally affect the value of the space that Dad and Aunt 
Audrey controlled. Their implicit lease with Granny thus would limit her use of 
the dining table, but not her choice of books. 
Or, suppose Maureen wants to bring a dog into the Sitcom House as a 
personal pet. Because the presence of the dog might negatively affect the 
residual value of the shared environment, Maureen certainly would have to 
obtain Dad’s (and possibly Aunt Audrey’s) approval. In this instance Dad and 
Maureen are enmeshed in three conceptually distinct relationships: 
father/daughter; co-occupant/co-occupant; and (implicit) landlord/tenant. 
The last of these relationships significantly boosts Dad’s power to influence 
Maureen’s dog decision. If Maureen herself were the sole owner of the Sitcom 
House, Dad’s control over her choice of pets would plummet. 
2. Residual Financial Flows 
Figure 2 portrays the financial flows to and from the main participants in a 
household’s economy. Entitlements to some of these flows may be governed by 
express contracts. For instance, a labor contract may establish the 
compensation owners are to pay a domestic worker; a lease, an occupant’s 
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rental obligation to owners; and a mortgage, the owners’ financial obligations 
to a secured lender. In most households, entitlements to many internal flows 
are protected by household-specific norms that the members generate through 
repeated informal interactions.201 
Figure 2.  
















As in a business firm, the residual financial flows in a household enterprise 
are the ones that remain unallocated after all existing commitments that govern 
inflows and outflows have been honored. The value of the owners’ equity in 
the household is the discounted present value of these residual flows. 
3. Ownership: The Amalgamation of Control and Financial Residuals 
The owners of a household, like the owners of any type of enterprise, 
typically have both the power to make residual control decisions and the right 
to receive residual financial flows. Scholars of business enterprise argue that 
the patrons of a firm benefit from the bundling of these two types of residual 
rights because this increases owners’ incentives for prudent management.202 
 
201.  See infra text accompanying notes 300-316. 
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To illustrate, suppose that the roof of the Sitcom House has begun to leak, 
an eventuality not governed by contract among the members, nor by norm, nor 
by housing code. If the owners of the household (Dad and Aunt Audrey) have 
residual control powers, they have the exclusive authority to decide whether 
and how to repair the roof, but also the burden of bearing the attendant costs. 
Reshingling the roof would be in the owners’ financial interest only if the cost 
of the project would be exceeded by the increase in the discounted future 
occupancy value of the household premises. Generally, one who bears the 
financial consequences of a decision is likely to deliberate more carefully than 
one who does not bear those consequences. Bestowing on the owner of a 
household both residual control powers and residual financial claims thus 
tends to improve the quality of household decisions. This proposition, 
however, does not pinpoint which of the various providers of inputs into 
household operations should serve as owners. 
B. Why Suppliers of a Household’s At-Risk Capital Tend To End Up Owning It 
1. The Various Patrons Who Might Own a Household 
Like any enterprise, a household is associated with a variety of “patrons” 
(to borrow a useful term from Henry Hansmann).203 Figure 2 identifies the 
four chief patrons involved in a typical household’s economy. Two of these 
patrons—owners and occupants (together, the “members”)—have been 
featured in the previous discussion. Owners contribute equity, either in cash 
(for instance, a down payment on a house) or in kind (for instance, a gift of 
previously acquired land). Occupants supply most household labor.204 Figure 2 
also indicates two other patrons who typically are sitting in the wings: 
mortgage lenders and outsiders. Lenders provide debt capital. Outsiders 
contract with owners or occupants to provide some goods and services—such 
as groceries and lawn-mowing—that are consumed within the household. 
The patrons of a household combine their various inputs of labor, capital, 
land, and personal property to generate a flow of goods and services that 
includes, by definition, shelter and meals for occupants.205 In a family 
 
203.  Hansmann uses “patron” to describe any party who transacts with a business firm. 
HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 12. Robert Pollak has privately indicated a preference for 
“stakeholder.” 
204.  A household’s internal rules also may require occupants to help defray operating expenses 
and to pay user fees. Maureen, for example, might be obligated to contribute to the cost of 
groceries and to pay for her long-distance telephone calls. 
205.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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household, the range of services is likely to be especially broad and may 
include, among others, emotional and medical care, child training, and 
entertainment. Household members typically distribute most of these outputs 
to occupants, either as gifts or as obligations owed under the household’s 
contracts, norms, and other rules.206 Housemates also may export some 
household products to outsiders,207 and may provide some household services 
to casual guests whom they have invited to share meals or accommodations. As 
noted, owners receive any residual outflows, whether cash or in kind. 
Those jointly involved in an enterprise have an interest in allocating 
ownership rights to the category of patrons that values ownership most 
highly.208 Conferring rights in this fashion reduces patrons’ total costs of 
 
206.  Love-infused households are sites of staggering amounts of altruistic gift-giving, especially 
between spouses, from parents to minor children, and from adult children to elderly 
parents. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Marketplace, 48 
ECONOMICA 1 (1981). Many long-term cohabiting couples also end up making gifts that pool 
their financial assets. See Kornhauser, supra note 164, at 84-91 (reviewing empirical studies). 
Because an outside observer cannot easily distinguish between an altruistic gift and a gift 
made with the expectation of reciprocation, empirical analysis of domestic property rights is 
inherently difficult. 
207.  Prior to the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of the conception that the home and 
workplace were “separate spheres,” most products were manufactured within households. 
See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 
1780-1835, at 35-39 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the shift of yarn-spinning from the home to the 
factory). Contemporary zoning ordinances, by contrast, commonly attempt to limit the 
operation of home businesses. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning 
Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (2001). Nonetheless, 
advances in telecommunications have helped enable a significant fraction of the workforce 
to work at home for either outside customers or outside employers. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, HOME-BASED WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 3 (2001), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-78.pdf (estimating that 4.8% of the workforce 
works exclusively at home). 
208.  Splitting ownership rights among two or more classes of patrons generally is inadvisable. 
For example, if suppliers of both labor and capital were to share ownership of a household, 
transaction costs would escalate because both the number and the heterogeneity of the 
decision-makers would increase. See supra text accompanying notes 78-89. But cf. 
MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 238-74 (1995) (arguing that a corporate employee with 
firm-specific human capital merits a share of corporate ownership). 
Passive investors in a small business enterprise sometimes are willing to reward, with a 
larger ownership share, a co-venturer willing to assume management duties. See, e.g., 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (involving an enterprise organized in this 
fashion). According to the traditional default rules of partnership law, however, when a 
partnership is dissolved, partners’ contributions of capital are paid back before profits are 
distributed. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 18(a), 40(b) (1914). By analogy, equity investors in a house 
conceivably might grant an ownership share to an occupant who has promised to perform 
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obtaining needed factors of production. In addition, patrons benefit from 
allocating ownership in a manner that reduces the transaction costs of 
governing the enterprise. The suppliers of some factors, if not granted the 
protection of ownership rights, might insist on being protected with 
contractual guarantees that the participants would find costly both to draft and 
to administer. The selection of a governance system for a household (or any 
other enterprise) thus is a positive-sum game. All patrons, including 
nonowners, can maximize household surplus by minimizing the sum of (1) 
deadweight losses arising from suboptimal governance decisions, and (2) the 
transaction costs of governance.209 
Of the various patrons, outsiders who trade with the household are the 
least plausible candidates to serve as owners. Because they rarely are 
knowledgeable about household conditions, they tend to be poorly qualified to 
make residual control decisions.210 A mortgage lender similarly is likely to be 
poorly informed and usually can adequately protect itself against opportunism 
on the part of other patrons by obtaining a senior mortgage on the household 
premises and by limiting the amount of the loan.211 Occupants, on the other 
 
future household labor. This sort of arrangement would be risky for capital providers, 
however, because the work might never be performed. When real estate is partitioned, there 
thus is a presumption that it is owned in shares proportionate to capital contributions. See, 
e.g., Sack v. Tomlin, 871 P.2d 298, 303 (Nev. 1994); Spector v. Giunta, 405 N.E.2d 327, 330 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978); see also IHARA ET AL., supra note 88, at 6/17, 6/22-/25 (offering form 
contracts that allocate ownership shares in proportion to equity contributions); cf. id. at 
10/16 (advising that, at the time of breakup, an occupant who had contributed labor to make 
physical improvements to a house should be awarded compensation for that labor, but not 
an ownership share). But see IHARA ET AL., supra note 88, at 6/21-/22 (discussing the 
possibility of a contract conferring a share of house ownership in part on labor contributed 
to improve the house).  
209.  In Hansmann’s terms, this is the “lowest-cost assignment of ownership.” HANSMANN, supra 
note 86, at 21-22. 
210.  In addition, unlike providers of at-risk capital, outsiders typically have simple means of 
protecting themselves from opportunistic acts by other patrons. For instance, a disgruntled 
outsider who provides an ephemeral service can withhold future services, and a provider of a 
durable good or permanent physical improvement can insist on being either protected by 
lien or paid in advance. 
211.  Like a bondholder of a business corporation, a mortgagee can use both covenants and 
security interests to protect itself against household practices that would jeopardize 
repayment of the mortgage loan. The residual claimants of an enterprise that is fully 
leveraged may be tempted, especially if they would not be personally liable for losses, to 
invest in overly risky projects. If these projects were to succeed, these owners would reap all 
the gains, but if the projects were to fail, the owners would bear none of the losses. On the 
agency costs of 100% debt financing in the corporate context, see HANSMANN, supra note 86, 
at 53-56; and ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 120 (1993), which notes 
that “we do not see 100 percent debt-financed firms.” Like a bondholder, a mortgage lender 
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hand, are facially plausible candidates to serve as the owners of a household 
insofar as they typically do have detailed knowledge of the enterprise. If 
occupants were to own a household, they conceivably could raise all the capital 
they needed by means of either loans (perhaps secured by junior mortgages) or 
retained earnings.212 
2. The Advantages of Conferring Ownership on Contributors of At-Risk 
Capital 
In practice, however, the patrons of households—even the patrons of the 
most idealistic intentional communities213—typically confer ownership (that is, 
rights to make residual control decisions and receive residual financial flows) 
on their suppliers of equity capital. The literature on the ownership of 
enterprise suggests four basic reasons for this result. In order of increasing 
complexity and weightiness, they are: 
Equity investors in households tend to be few in number and stable in identity. 
The providers of a household’s equity capital are likely to be less numerous 
than its occupants. The Sitcom Household, for instance, has four adult 
occupants, but only two suppliers of equity. Two people can make decisions 
more easily than can four. Although these particular numbers are no more than 
artifacts of a hypothetical case, ownership clusters in fact tend to be smaller 
than occupant clusters. As mentioned, about 90% of the private housing units 
in the United States are entirely owned by either one or two individuals (in the 
latter case, typically a married couple).214 By empowering a smaller number of 
equity contributors to govern, a multi-occupant household can reduce its 
decision-making costs without forgoing economies of scale in household 
production and consumption. 
 
desires to ensure that a borrower has an equity stake sufficiently large to deter the borrower 
from taking excessive risks with the mortgaged property. The loan-to-value ratio of a first 
mortgage thus rarely exceeds 80% (absent government or private mortgage insurance). See 
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 11.2, at 850 (4th ed. 
2001). In addition, the higher the total loan-to-value ratio, the more closely the most junior 
mortgage lender is likely to monitor the behavior of the mortgage borrower. 
212.  Scholars of business organization have analyzed the analogous possibility of a worker-
owned business firm that borrows all needed capital. See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 
75-77. And there indeed are some instances of enduring worker ownership. See, e.g., G. Mitu 
Gulati et al., When a Workers’ Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1417 (2002). 
213.  See infra notes 222-226 and accompanying text. 
214.  See supra notes 123-132 and accompanying text. Compare the figures on the sizes of co-
occupant clusters supra p. 255 tbl.1.  
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In addition, equity investors in a household tend to turn over less 
frequently than household occupants do.215 Even in an owner-occupied nuclear 
family household, peripheral occupants such as Nadia the au pair are likely to 
come and go, and so might some individual family members such as Granny. 
The list of occupants of a large, non-family household is likely to be even more 
unstable. To avoid the complexities of absentee ownership by former 
occupants, a departing occupant might be required to transfer his ownership 
interest either to a successor occupant or to sell it back to the remaining 
occupants.216 The negotiation of those transfers, however, would significantly 
increase the transaction costs of beginning or ending a period of occupancy in a 
particular dwelling. Unless scrupulously recorded on public records, a 
revolving door of occupant-owners also would confuse vendees, contractors, 
mortgage lenders, tax collectors, and other outsiders in need of assurance about 
the current state of title to a household premises. By adding to transaction 
costs, occupant ownership thus is likely to disadvantage all of a household’s 
patrons. 
Suppliers of capital tend to bear risks better than suppliers of labor do. A risk-
averse person is helped by the diversification of her combined holdings of 
human capital and financial capital. An occupant who has specialized and 
nontransferable skills in housework already is somewhat invested in the 
dwelling she occupies. Particularly if she has little financial capital, for reasons 
of diversification she may prefer not to have a share of the ownership of the 
residual financial claim in the same dwelling. Other less risk-averse patrons of 
the same household also likely would not want her to serve as an owner. For 
example, if Granny and Nadia were co-owners of the Sitcom House and 
neither had much in the way of savings, they might be overly cautious about 
taking on more household debt to finance the replacement of the leaking roof. 
If Aunt Audrey, another co-owner, had a larger and more diversified financial 
portfolio, she would be less wary of the downside risk of the roof project and 
 
215.  In 1999-2000, 31% of the residents of rental units, and 9% of residents of owner-occupied 
housing units, had moved to their present dwelling during the course of the past year. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 28 (2001). In 
1999, 7% of existing single-family dwellings, detached and attached, were sold to a new set 
of owners. (This figure is computed from data reported in id. at 599, 604.) The turnover 
rates of both investors and occupants, of course, are probably not entirely independent of 
their rights of ownership. 
216.  An occupant’s ownership rights conceivably could be usufructuary, that is, limited to the 
time period of personal occupation. The obvious drawback of that system, however, is that 
an occupant about to depart likely would adopt an overly shortsighted perspective on a 
management decision with long-term consequences, such as whether a roof should be 
replaced. 
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therefore annoyed by their excessive caution.217 This narrow point leads to a 
more general one. 
The interests of suppliers of capital tend to be more homogeneous than the interests 
of occupants. Hansmann stresses the transaction cost advantages to conferring 
ownership on persons whose interests are homogeneous.218 The interests of 
suppliers of equity capital to a household typically are more homogeneous than 
are the interests of the household’s occupants (whether in their capacities as 
consumers of domestic services, suppliers of domestic labor, or both). For 
example, Dad and Aunt Audrey, in their capacities as equity investors, have 
similar financial stakes in any roof repair project that might be undertaken.219 
This would reduce their decision-making costs. 
A roof repair project, by contrast, would affect occupants in different ways. 
The construction activity might inconvenience some occupants more than 
others. Moreover, the occupants of bedrooms that previously had been 
particularly vulnerable to roof leaks would obtain special benefits from the 
repair. If occupants, and not capital providers, controlled the decision over 
whether to replace the roof, these differences might cause fractiousness. 
In addition, homogeneity of ownership interests facilitates the calculation 
of shares of ownership. Capital contributions are especially easy to value. 
Although some account may have to be made of the time at which a 
contributor provided capital, figuring out the shares of a household’s equity 
capital is likely to require no more than simple mathematical calculations. This 
is not the case for labor inputs, for which difficult valuation problems loom. If 
labor were the residual claimant in the Sitcom Household, for example, the 
occupants might wrangle over the fractional interests that, say, Maureen and 
Granny should be accorded. According each occupant an equal share of 
ownership would greatly reduce these transaction costs, but it also would 
misalign incentives by failing to correlate ownership shares with work 
contributed. 
Because suppliers of at-risk capital are those most vulnerable to opportunism, they 
value rights of control more than others do. Suppliers of at-risk capital to a 
household are especially vulnerable to opportunism by other patrons. In a 
 
217.  Hansmann regards risk-bearing considerations as a relevant, but often exaggerated, 
influence on ownership forms. See HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 44-45, 57. 
218.  Id. passim. 
219.  Dad’s role as an occupant as well as a partial owner, however, could give rise to 
complications. If Dad were occupying the Sitcom House at a favorable (implicit) rent, he 
personally would reap more benefits from the repair than Aunt Audrey would. In addition, 
Dad’s particular interest in, for example, the bedroom he occupies conceivably might 
influence his evaluation of roof repair alternatives. 
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liberal society, a household worker who feels exploited can exit immediately 
with most of her human capital in tow.220 A supplier of debt capital can insist 
on the protection provided by a senior security interest, and outside suppliers 
of goods and services can insist on simultaneous bilateral exchange. A supplier 
of at-risk capital, by contrast, turns over a long-lived asset that opportunistic 
household managers could either expropriate or expose to unduly high risks, 
say, by skimping on maintenance or taking in pets with destructive tendencies. 
Oliver Williamson argues that transaction costs prevent nonowner providers of 
at-risk capital to business firms from negotiating contracts that adequately 
protect them from these sorts of risks.221 Similarly, the various patrons of a 
household enterprise are likely to recognize that the approach that would best 
minimize their overall costs would entail bestowing ownership on those among 
them who are equity investors. 
The founders of intentional communities, although not conventionally 
associated with capitalistic practices, typically have implicitly recognized the 
advantages of conferring ownership on providers of capital. Even during the 
height of the idealistic Woodstock era, the modal form of land ownership in a 
rural commune in the United States was ownership by one or a few members, 
with corporate ownership the next most common form.222 Contemporary 
advocates of co-housing urge that the new communities be organized, at least 
initially, as limited liability corporations, with shares allocated in proportion to 
investments made.223 Indeed, it is difficult to find a single instance of worker 
ownership of an intentional community. Ownership by a trust, however, is a 
 
220.  However, household-specific human capital, such as knowledge about how to deal with a 
particularly cranky oven or neighbor, is not portable. 
221.  Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984). 
222.  ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 64-65, provides a breakdown of the ownership forms present in 
the sample of rural and urban communes that he studied in 1965-1978. Zablocki found that, 
of the communes that didn’t rent their premises, the most prevalent form was 
“[o]wner[ship] by one or a few members,” followed by “[c]orporate ownership.” Id. at 64 
tbl.2-3. Zablocki does not indicate, however, whether the shares in corporate communes 
were owned solely by equity investors or by others as well. Id. A legal advisor to creators of 
contemporary intentional communities urges them to take title to land in the name of a 
nonprofit corporation, partnership, or limited liability corporation. See Rob Sandelin, Legal 
Issues for Communities: A Primer (1997), http://www.ic.org/nica/Legal/Legal1a.html; see 
also CARL J. GUARNERI, THE UTOPIAN ALTERNATIVE: FOURIERISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 159-61 (1991) (stating that many Fourierist phalanxes were organized as joint-
stock companies); KARL A. PETER, THE DYNAMICS OF HUTTERITE SOCIETY: AN ANALYTICAL 
APPROACH 178 (1987) (reporting that Hutterite communities usually hold their land in 
corporate form). 
223.  See SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 167-78, 269. After completion, the 
owners sometimes reorganize themselves into a condominium association (a form 
controlled by investors, not occupants). Id. at 170-71. 
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form that might serve occupants’ interests, provided that the trustees were so 
instructed.224 Real estate indeed has been held in trust form at some rural U.S. 
communes, including, apparently, Brook Farm during its early years.225 
Governance by trustees, however, may be in tension with the participatory 
democracy that communards tend to favor. In addition, as Williamson would 
predict and the history of Brook Farm indeed illustrates, the trustees of an 
intentional community are likely to have a devilish time raising capital.226 
In any cultural context, by contrast, investor ownership of dwellings offers 
decisive transaction cost advantages. Several millennia ago, the creators of 
conventional households began to refine this system of equity ownership, and 
it soon became predominant in the domestic sector.227 In subsequent historical 
periods the promoters of commercial enterprises could readily transplant the 
model to the field of business. 
vi. the mixed blessings of joining with others 
Although most adults strive to avoid unwieldy households, most also 
choose not to live and own alone. This Part addresses the factors that influence 
how many people join together in the various household relationships and, in 
the case of co-occupants, what activities they choose to undertake. 
A. Adding Co-Occupants 
Like the owners of a business firm, the members of a household can gain by 
assembling a team of optimal size and assigning to that team activities of 
 
224.  See ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 64-65 (arguing that the trust form best assures that the ideals 
of a community’s founders will be respected). 
225.  Brook Farm’s assets initially were vested in an unconventional association directed by four 
trustees, which borrowed capital from a separately organized joint-stock company. See 
DELANO, supra note 181, at 68-72, 97. Delano mentions that these trustees were elected 
annually, but does not identify who the electors were. See id. at 68; see also ZABLOCKI, supra 
note 23, at 64 (reporting that trusts owned the sites of 12% of the rural communes in his 
Woodstock-era sample). 
226.  Nathaniel Hawthorne, one of the original investors in the Brook Farm joint-stock company, 
eventually sued for the return of his investment. See DELANO, supra note 181, at 249-50, 263, 
361 n.27. Brook Farm’s organizers were perennially short of working capital. See id. at 96-97, 
184-85, 413 n.11. In 1845, the legal conversion of the community into a “phalanx,” structured 
as a more conventional corporation, prompted new infusions of equity. Id. at 207. 
227.  See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 99, at 337-38, 355-57 (citing sources on household 
organization in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel). 
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optimal scope.228 Boosting the number of household occupants, for example, 
may reduce the per capita costs of providing goods and services such as 
heating, informal social insurance, and food.229 On the other hand, adding 
occupants may give rise to countervailing inefficiencies of scale, such as greater 
difficulty in governing behavior within the home. In addition, as the number 
of housemates rises, an individual occupant is likely to suffer losses in personal 
autonomy and privacy. A person who lives alone has broad control over the 
music played, the food served, and the guests invited. Those who live with 
others, by contrast, must make compromises.230 And the more housemates one 
has, the less secure the information about one’s sexual partners, medical 
problems, and eccentric tastes. As a result of these countervailing 
considerations, over 90% of adult Americans residing in non-family 
households forgo the advantages of size and live either alone or with only one 
other adult.231 
Like managers of a firm, occupants of a household, whatever their number, 
repeatedly confront make-or-buy decisions.232 Instead of cooking their own 
meal on a given evening, for example, occupants can go out to a restaurant or 
arrange for a meal to be delivered to their home by an outside vendor.233 
Putting the transaction cost implications of the alternative choices to one side, 
housemates incur deadweight losses when they choose the more costly 
production alternative. Typically, this consideration weighs in favor of buying 
from outsiders because labor and capital are unlikely to be as specialized within 
a home as they are within the economy at large. Considerations of transaction 
costs, on the other hand, usually favor home production; dealing with 
outsiders tends to be more complex than dealing with insiders, and home 
 
228.  Economists have produced a deep literature on many of the relevant issues. See, e.g., REID, 
supra note 1; Reuben Gronau, Home Production—A Survey, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 273 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986).  
229.  See Edward P. Lazear & Robert T. Michael, Family Size and the Distribution of Real Per Capita 
Income, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 91, 97 (1980) (noting efficiencies of scale in food provision). 
230.  See Melinda Ligos, Wanted: Roommate, as Economic Necessity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, § 3 
(Business), at 8 (presenting a litany of complaints by owner-occupants who had taken in 
boarders). But cf. Penelope Green, 5 New Roommates Play ‘Getting To Know You,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2005, § 11 (Habitats), at 4 (describing how five single adults ages twenty-
three to thirty-six, most of them newcomers to the New York City area, had located each 
other on Craigslist, an online classified advertising site, and then co-occupied an apartment 
in midtown Manhattan mostly for social reasons). 
231.  See supra p. 256 tbl.2.  
232.  See REID, supra note 1, at 219-23 (presciently discussing this topic). 
233.  On patterns of domestic outsourcing, see Esther de Ruijter et al., Trust Problems in 
Household Outsourcing, 15 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 473 (2003), and sources cited therein. 
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production commonly enables savings in transportation costs, such as the 
hassle of group travel to a restaurant. Coase’s theory of the firm implies that, 
when choosing whether to make or buy, decision-makers strive to minimize 
the sum of the deadweight losses and transaction costs they incur.234 Because 
transaction costs tend to be lower in intimate households, Coasean theory thus 
anticipates that five co-occupying adults who were intimates would share 
home-cooked meals more frequently than another fivesome who were not. 
Intimates would dine together at home not only because they are apt to 
especially enjoy each other’s company but also because they can more 
efficiently coordinate home production. 
Particularly during the past century or two, the median number of 
household occupants has fallen sharply.235 In addition, even controlling for 
size, household occupants have been shifting away from internal production 
and toward acquiring goods and services through trade with outsiders. A few 
centuries ago, a household’s occupants were likely to grow much of their own 
food, make much of their own clothing, and erect their own dwellings. A 
twenty-first-century household in a developed nation, by contrast, is far less 
self-sufficient (“autarkic” is the fancy synonym).236 
Demographic and technological changes plainly have contributed to the 
downsizing of household economies. The leap in life expectancies during the 
twentieth century, for example, served to lower the average size of co-occupant 
groups. Particularly in a prosperous society, parents are far more likely to live 
with their minor children than with either their adult children or their own 
parents. As minor children make up an ever smaller share of the total 
population, average household size therefore drops.237 Technological 
innovations such as the motor vehicle and the telephone also tend to tip 
housemates away from internal production because they reduce the transaction 
 
234.  See Coase, supra note 15. 
235.  See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
236.  According to one estimate, between 1930 and 1985, the output of households in the United 
States fell from 73% to 28% of the output of the external market sector. John Devereux & 
Luis Locay, Specialization, Household Production, and the Measurement of Economic Growth, 82 
AM. ECON. REV. 399, 402 (1992). But see Oli Hawrylyshyn, The Value of Household Services: A 
Survey of Empirical Estimates, 22 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 101, 124-28 (1976) (asserting that 
home production’s share of the national economy decreased only modestly during the first 
three-quarters of the twentieth century). 
237.  On the influence of other demographic changes, such as urbanization, the rate of divorce, 
and average age at first marriage, see, for example, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S 
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 5-6 (2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf; and Lawrence L. Santi, Change in 
Structure and Size of American Households: 1970 to 1985, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 833 (1987). 
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costs of trading with outsiders more than they reduce the transaction costs of 
internal coordination.238 In addition, privacy and autonomy within a home are 
superior goods, that is, conditions that individuals who have become wealthier 
as a result of technological advances are apt to spend a greater fraction of their 
disposable income to attain.239 As the United States became more prosperous 
during the twentieth century, for example, the percentages of single adults ages 
twenty to twenty-nine living with their parents, and of single elderly persons 
living with their children, both fell sharply.240 
Changes in background legal conditions also can influence the size and 
scope of household enterprises. Households tend to be smaller in societies 
where norms and law provide effective support for the core liberal entitlements 
of private property, freedom of exit, and freedom of contract. Historically, the 
illiberal societies that have tolerated slavery have given rise to relatively large 
households; this is a natural consequence of empowering the master of a 
household to bring in and keep occupants against their will. Similarly, the 
emancipation, both legal and informal, of wives and adult children from the 
clutches of a paterfamilias has helped to open households’ exit doors. 
In addition, the establishment of the rule of liberal law and norms, 
especially over a wide territory, facilitates trade between household occupants 
and outside vendors. The more strongly these liberal conditions enroot 
themselves, the easier it is for occupants of households to negotiate and enforce 
 
238.  Technological innovations also promote specialization of labor. This disfavors home 
production because highly specialized skills typically are more valuable when sold in the 
external labor market than when applied around the house. See Luis Locay, Economic 
Development and the Division of Production Between Households and Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
965 (1990) (attributing the shift away from household production mainly to economies of 
scale in firm production). 
239.  RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 536 (1995). 
240.  See Michael J. Rosenfeld & Byung-Soo Kim, The Independence of Young Adults and the Rise of 
Interracial and Same-Sex Unions, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 541, 548-49 (2005) (reporting that in 
1940, about 70% of single adults in their twenties were living with their parents, compared 
to about 40% in 2000). In 1900, 72% of retired men over age sixty-five were living with 
either one of their children or another family member (not counting a wife). By 1990, this 
percentage had plummeted to 19.8%. DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT: AN 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1880-1990, at 108, 130 (1998). Costa investigates whether 
this change was driven more by increased demand (i.e., senior men’s preferences for greater 
privacy and autonomy) or by reduced supply (i.e., children’s diminished generosity toward 
elderly fathers). She concludes that seniors’ quest for privacy has been the main driving 
force. See id. at 114-30; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 285-86 (1995) 
(noting the desire of many seniors not to be a burden on their children); Ruggles, supra 
note 110 (discussing historical trends in living arrangements of the elderly). 
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contracts with outsiders.241 And as contracting of this sort spreads, social 
capital and trust deepen, further facilitating outside trade.242 By making “buy” 
options more attractive relative to “make” options, liberalizing trends thus tend 
to reduce both the number of household occupants and the scope of household 
production. 
Events in ancient Greece and medieval England illustrate these points. 
Although slavery remained well ensconced during Greece’s Classical period, 
the polis matured into a more effective governing institution. Many of the early 
Greek city-states succeeded in improving the local trading environment, for 
example, by bringing law and order to the surrounding territory and providing 
a public marketplace (the much-celebrated agora). By Aristotle’s time, 
Athenians were active shoppers and their households had fewer occupants and 
were less autarkic than the households of the Homeric era.243 
English noble households became gargantuan during the late Middle Ages. 
The average number of occupants in an earl’s household rose from around 35 in 
1250 to about 200 by the late 1400s, with some households then having as 
many as 500 residents.244 The occupants typically included the noble’s 
immediate family, friends and retainers who assisted in entertaining, and a 
multitude of hired servants. The resident staff produced many of the goods 
and services consumed on the premises, including communal meals, defense 
against marauders, religious ceremonies, arbitration of disputes, and 
education.245 According to Kate Mertes, noble households expanded in size 
during a period when England was politically unstable and lacked centralized 
control.246 After 1485, the King, Parliament, and royal courts gradually became 
 
241.  See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 
(1993) (stressing the importance, for economic development, of the presence of civic 
associations based on horizontal social ties); Pollak, supra note 1, at 593-94 (noting 
advantages of family production in low-trust environments). 
242.  See generally Joel Sobel, Can We Trust Social Capital?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 139 (2002) 
(reviewing literature on social capital). 
243.  See VIRGINIA J. HUNTER, POLICING ATHENS: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE ATTIC LAWSUITS, 420-
320 B.C., at 78 (1994) (noting the responsibility of slaves to do the “shopping”); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 103-106 (discussing the downsizing of the ancient Greek 
household). 
244.  See KATE MERTES, THE ENGLISH NOBLE HOUSEHOLD 1250-1600: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND 
POLITIC RULE 185-88 & app. C (1988); see also C.M. WOOLGAR, THE GREAT HOUSEHOLD IN 
LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 9-16, 39 (1999). 
245.  Yet even these huge households were far from autarkic. Their financial records reveal 
incessant purchases of wines, foodstuffs, and other supplies and services from outside 
vendors. See MERTES, supra note 244, at 102-20. 
246.  Id. at 185-87. Mertes also attributes the rise to a noble’s increased ability to administer a 
feudal domain from a central place and to statutory changes that made appointment to a 
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better at providing defense, adjudication, and other public goods. As England 
stabilized, noble householders were able to trade more easily with outsiders. 
Over the course of the next centuries, the scale and scope of earls’ household 
economies shrank steadily.247 
B. Adding Co-Owners 
Issues of the optimal scale of a dwelling’s ownership associations are 
distinct from the analogous issues for occupancy associations. An owner—that 
is, a provider of at-risk capital—can foresee both advantages and disadvantages 
to joining with other investors. Co-ownership facilitates the diversification of 
risk and the pooling of capital, perhaps enabling, for example, two young 
single professionals to purchase a dwelling unit in an expensive housing 
market.248 The primary downside of bringing in more co-owners, of course, is 
the escalation of transaction costs. The owners of a dwelling unit regularly 
confront decisions about matters such as repairs and improvements, dealings 
with tenants (paying or nonpaying), and payment of insurance and property 
tax bills, and they have an interest in being able to resolve them 
expeditiously.249 
For prospective owners, reducing the transaction costs associated with the 
ownership relationship typically dominates other concerns. Although a 
homebuyer theoretically could bring in an outside investor as a co-owner to 
raise funds for a down payment, in the United States, only 4% of owner-
occupants of dwellings choose to co-own with a nonoccupant.250 Even the 
largest of apartment complexes are more likely to be owned in partnership than 
 
position within the household a noble’s preferred method of compensating a loyal follower. 
Id. 
247.  See id. app. C. 
248.  See Jim Rendon, Splitting the Cost of Buying a House, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 11 (Real 
Estate), at 1. 
249.  On the headaches that can arise when two or more married couples share ownership of a 
vacation home, see Joanne Kaufman, A House Divided: Perils of Co-Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 9, 2002, at F1. 
250.  See supra text accompanying note 134. In over 80% of the instances in which some owners 
were not occupants, the absentee owners did not bear any ongoing ownership costs. 
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at 76. But cf. ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., 
HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A CROSSROADS (1997) (urging 
the sale of home equity to non-occupying limited partners). 
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in corporate form.251 In short, most owners, like most occupants, are hesitant to 
bring in more co-participants.252 
Ambient norms and small-bore legal rules may shape individuals’ decisions 
about how many co-owners to have. During the twentieth century, for 
example, the social norm governing how a married couple should take title to 
their marital home shifted away from the husband taking title solely in his 
name and toward both spouses taking title as co-owners.253 
C. Choosing Between Owning and Renting a Home 
Economists have amassed a large body of work on residential tenure 
choice.254 This literature identifies some advantages of renting. To begin with, 
occupants unable to raise funds for a down payment to purchase a dwelling 
have no other option.255 Occupants who do have sufficient savings nevertheless 
may still prefer to rent in order not to tie up a large chunk of their capital in an 
illiquid and undiversified investment.256 Also, because renting involves smaller 
stakes, occupants usually can both commence and terminate a home rental 
 
251.  See supra text accompanying note 132. 
252.  The popularity of timeshare projects, each of which can have myriad nominal owners, is 
puzzling. A well-marketed timeshare development taps into a buyer’s anticipated delight in 
feeling that he owns, or at least will be able to brag that he owns, a share of a dwelling unit in 
a prestigious location, even though the buyer can’t control the furnishing of that unit and 
will have a difficult time selling his interest in it. The administrative clumsiness of the 
timeshare form has provoked some critics to question its quality as an investment. See, e.g., 
J. Robert Taylor, Timeshare Ownership Equals Disaster, PALO ALTO WKLY. ONLINE EDITION, 
Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.paloaltoonline.com/weekly/morgue/2005/2005_11_11.taylor11. 
shtml; see also Stephen J. Nelson, Timesharing 101: A TUG Introduction to Timesharing 
(Nov. 2000), http://www.tug2.net/advice/TimeShare-101.htm#_The_resale_market (“As a 
rough guide, resale prices more closely reflect the cost of the unit absent the sales and 
marketing program, or roughly 50 percent of the new sales price.”). See generally Curtis J. 
Berger, Timesharing in the United States, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPPLEMENT) 131 (1990). 
253.  See supra text accompanying notes 126-127. 
254.  See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 165, at 30-39; J.V. Henderson & Y.M. Ioannides, A Model of 
Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (1983). 
255.  In one survey, 51% of renters stated that they were tenants primarily because they couldn’t 
afford to buy. David P. Varady & Barbara J. Lipman, What Are Renters Really Like? Results 
from a National Survey, 5 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 491, 501 (1994). 
256.  See HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 201-02; Mark A. Wolfson, Tax, Incentive, and Risk-Sharing 
Issues in the Allocation of Property Rights: The Generalized Lease-or-Buy Problem, 58 J. BUS. 159 
(1985). 
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more rapidly and cheaply than a home purchase.257 For those who put a high 
value on ease of residential mobility, this is a significant plus. 
Although housing historically has not been a source of abnormally high 
investment returns, buying a home certainly can be advantageous on 
balance.258 The Internal Revenue Code confers on homeowners a variety of 
significant income tax benefits.259 The main inherent advantage of 
homeownership, however, is that it greatly eases coordination of domestic life. 
An owner of land has plenary (although not unlimited) power to control, into 
the indefinite future, both the use of the property and who is present on it. A 
landlord, when entering into a lease with a residential tenant, retains a 
reversion that becomes possessory when the lease ends. As a result, absent rent 
controls, a tenant lacks security of tenure beyond the term of the lease. In 
addition, even during the rental period, the provisions of the lease are likely to 
limit a tenant’s control over both the physical condition of the premises and the 
identities of additional occupants. People who place a high value on long-term 
security of possession and on autonomy of control thus have good reason to 
own, not rent. 
Transaction costs underlie this key advantage of buying a home. If 
transaction costs were zero, an occupant, regardless of whether he started out 
as an owner or renter, would end up exercising an identical set of possessory 
entitlements. An occupant who started out with only a short-term lease, for 
example, would be able to continually renegotiate with the landlord to extend 
the term of possession as long as that occupant continued to be the person who 
valued possession of the premises most highly. When he ceased being the most 
highly valuing possessor, he would depart. This departure date would be 
identical to the departure date that he would have selected were he to have 
owned the premises from the outset. In a zero-transaction-cost world, in short, 
purchasing a home would not increase security of tenure. 
The economic literature on tenure choice recognizes, if indirectly, that a key 
advantage of homeownership is its capacity to reduce the transaction costs of 
coordinating domestic life.260 When a home is owner-occupied, there still is an 
 
257.  See Michael J. Lea & Michael J. Wasylenko, Tenure Choice and Condominium Conversion, 14 J. 
URB. ECON. 127, 135 (1983). 
258.  Investments in residential real estate generally do not generate exceptional returns. See 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 11-27 (2d ed. 2005) (asserting that U.S. home 
prices increased, in real terms, only 0.4% per annum between 1890 and 2004). 
259.  See sources cited supra note 165. These tax benefits may be partially capitalized into higher 
purchase prices. 
260.  See especially Henderson & Ioannides, supra note 254, at 99-102, discussing the 
“fundamental rental externality” that is rooted in a landlord’s difficulties in monitoring a 
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implicit landlord-tenant relationship between the owners and the occupants, 
but that relationship typically involves intimates.261 An arms-length landlord-
tenant relationship, by contrast, is apt to be far less trusting during midgame 
and is especially rife with possibilities for opportunism in endgame—a stage 
that many intimates anticipate never even reaching. In the real world, where 
the transaction costs of achieving mutually beneficial outcomes are positive, a 
tenancy between relative strangers is inherently messier than homeownership. 
An example helps clinch the point. Suppose that a sitting tenant wished 
both to extend the term of his lease and also to persuade the landlord to install 
new kitchen cabinets. The landlord and tenant would be situated as bilateral 
monopolists who could deal only with one another.262 If opportunistic, the 
landlord, aware that the tenant had put down roots and faced positive moving 
costs, might insist on extortionate terms. The two parties then might engage in 
protracted wrangling or fail to exploit their potential mutual gains from trade. 
These unlovely scenarios would be far less likely to play out in a relationship 
among intimates. 
The transaction cost advantages of eliminating the arms-length landlord-
tenant relationship have enhanced the popularity of condominium housing. 
Beginning in 1961, state legislatures explicitly validated the condominium 
form, thereby reassuring mortgage lenders and title insurers, two actors highly 
attentive to obscure provisions of small-bore private law. Congress also 
provided a boost by extending to condominium owners the standard tax 
advantages of homeownership. Condominium projects then blossomed.263 
Henry Hansmann, one of the most perceptive analysts of institutional forms, 
persuasively argues that a large association controlled by occupants typically is 
less adroit at governing the common elements of a multifamily structure than a 
landlord with hierarchical power.264 He concludes that the condominium form 
thus is inefficient for a large apartment building. In his view, developers choose 
this means of governance partly out of fear of rent control but mainly to enable 
 
tenant’s use and maintenance decisions. Later works that pursue this theme include Joseph 
T. Williams, Agency and Ownership of Housing, 7 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 83, 84, 90 (1993), 
which finds, as numerous others have, that owner-occupied houses are better maintained 
than rented houses, and Wolfson, supra note 256, at 163-65. 
261.  Owner-occupancy can be analogized to vertical integration within a firm. 
262.  HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 197-99. 
263.  The full history is narrated in Hansmann, supra note 165, at 28-30, 61-62. 
264.  See HANSMANN, supra note 86, at 195-223. Association members are more numerous, and 
they also have heterogeneous interests when the alteration of a specific common area would 
particularly affect adjacent units. 
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their purchasers to enjoy tax subsidies.265 This analysis, however, undervalues 
the transaction cost savings that the condominium form makes possible, 
namely, the elimination of the landlord-tenant relationship with regard to the 
interiors of individual condominium units.266 To return to the prior example, 
an owner-occupant of a condominium unit can arrange for the installation of 
custom-designed kitchen cabinets far more easily than can a residential tenant. 
In some contexts, these savings in internal governance costs could more than 
offset the transaction cost disadvantages that Hansmann associates with 
collective governance of a building’s common areas.267 
Although small-bore legal policies can modestly influence household 
sizes,268 the history of the condominium form illustrates that they can greatly 
influence residential tenure choices. The homeownership rate in Ireland (80%) 
is twice that in Sweden269 in part because of differences between the two 
nations’ legal policies.270 Legislative debates over bills that would affect 
 
265.  See Hansmann, supra note 165, at 56, 63, 67-68. 
266.  But cf. id. at 32-33 (discussing difficulties between landlords and tenants that might arise out 
of “lock-in” and “moral hazard”). A cooperative housing association, unlike a condominium 
association, typically takes out a loan secured by a blanket mortgage encumbering the 
interiors of members’ dwelling units. As a result, the governing board of a housing 
cooperative is apt to monitor changes in unit interiors, thereby increasing the transaction 
costs of building governance. This may partly explain why condominium units tend to 
command higher sales prices than co-op units do. See Allen C. Goodman & John L. 
Goodman, Jr., The Co-op Discount, 14 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 223, 232 (1997) (finding a 
condominium premium of 12%). 
267.  Commercial condominium complexes are far less common than residential ones. This 
suggests that federal income tax considerations, which favor the purchase of a residence and 
the rental of commercial space, typically outweigh the transaction cost considerations 
discussed in the text. In addition, commercial leases tend to have much longer terms than 
residential leases do. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 850 (5th ed. 2005) 
(indicating that many commercial leases have terms of from five to twenty-five years). A 
commercial tenant with a long-term lease and broad authority to install and remove trade 
fixtures may have little concern about possible entanglements with the landlord over 
improvements. Cf. Hansmann, supra note 165, at 64-67 (discussing reasons for the paucity 
of commercial condominiums). 
268.  For further elaboration, see supra text accompanying notes 161-165 and the text following 
note 196. 
269.  See supra note 136. 
270.  Between 1965 and 1974, the government of Sweden, a nation of roughly 4 million 
households, supervised the construction of 1 million housing units (the “Million 
Programme”), a majority of which were subsidized apartments. See Christopher Caldwell, 
Islam on the Outskirts of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 5, 2006, at 55, 56; 
Wikipedia, Million Programme, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Million_Programme (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2006). ANGEL, supra note 93, at 330-39, finds that a nation’s rate of 
homeownership is negatively correlated with the magnitude of its welfare expenditures. See 
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residential tenure choices tend to be politically charged because, after becoming 
a homeowner, a person’s politics tend to become somewhat more 
conservative.271 By 1979, Britain had built enough subsidized rental projects 
(“council housing”) to accommodate one-third of its population. To reverse 
this long tradition of government-encouraged renting, during the 1980s 
Margaret Thatcher and the Tories sold over one million of these individual 
units to their occupants.272 
vii. order without law in an ongoing household 
Participants in each of the three basic household relationships have an 
interest in coordinating their efforts to augment the surplus that is available for 
them to share. Co-occupants, for example, can benefit from improving their 
system of dividing up household chores; co-owners, their system for keeping 
the books; and landlords and tenants, their system for dealing with a leaky 
faucet. Even in the informal setting of the home, participants have rules—
commonly unwritten and even unarticulated—that govern the assignment of 
responsibilities for handling these sorts of tasks. In addition, participants can 
benefit from rules that restrain affirmative misconduct, such as carving one’s 
initials into the kitchen counter. Together, these rules, which may arise from a 
wide variety of sources, provide the backbone of everyday domestic life. 
As Lisa Bernstein has demonstrated in another context, participants during 
the midgame of their relationship may look to different rules than they would 
in endgame.273 In midgame, all participants in a household relationship by 
definition are currently satisfied with their shares of the surplus and anticipate 
that their relationship will continue. During this stage, they are likely to rely 
mostly on rules of their own making, such as household-specific customs and 
contracts, rather than on external rules provided by the legal system. Endgame 
commences when participants first anticipate that some or all of them soon will 
 
also Maria Concetta Chiuri & Tullio Jappelli, Financial Market Imperfections and Home 
Ownership: A Comparative Study, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 857 (2003) (stressing the influence of a 
nation’s system of mortgage finance). 
271.  For instance, homeowners tend to pay closer attention to property tax burdens and are more 
likely to oppose rent controls. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW 
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES 4, 81-82 (2001). But cf. PETER SAUNDERS, A NATION OF HOME OWNERS 29-41 
(1990) (offering a skeptical assessment of Marxist scholars’ assertions that capitalist regimes 
promote homeownership in order to dampen revolutionary sentiment). 
272.  See IAN COLE & ROBERT FURBEY, THE ECLIPSE OF COUNCIL HOUSING 172, 196-98 (1994). 
273.  Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent 
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-98 (1996). 
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terminate the relationship. In endgame, the rules of the legal system are more 
likely to become influential. This Part analyzes how participants in household 
relationships create or borrow the rules that govern their midgame affairs. The 
focus here is on midgame rules because legal scholars have devoted far more 
attention to endgame rules, and also because domestic life, especially among 
intimates, is mostly played out in midgame.274 
A. The Tendency Toward Welfare-Maximizing Substantive and Procedural 
Rules 
To enhance their shareable surplus, the participants in a household 
relationship can be expected to gravitate toward rules that serve to minimize 
the sum of (1) deadweight losses caused by failures to exploit potential gains 
from associating with each other, and (2) transaction costs.275 They are likely to 
do this even when their adoption of a particular rule would benefit some of 
them but work to the (lesser) detriment of others. When a household 
relationship is enduring and multi-stranded, as an intimate relationship 
typically is, participants often can easily compensate those who lose out in one 
aspect of the relationship by making offsetting adjustments in other strands. 
For example, if the duty of vacuuming the Sitcom House’s floors is regarded as 
burdensome, an informal rule that assigned that task to Dad could be 
counterbalanced by the assignment of other onerous chores to other occupants, 
such as window washing to Maureen. The power of each individual to exit 
unilaterally from a household relationship encourages participants to embrace 
this give-and-take approach. This method of interaction enables them to 
achieve long-run results that in the aggregate improve the situation of each of 
them (i.e., are Pareto superior).276 
 
274.  Although the legal rules that govern partition, eviction, and other endgame matters plainly 
are worthy of study, analysts may exaggerate the significance of these laws. Intimates 
involved in a household relationship are highly unlikely to structure their affairs “in the 
shadow of” these endgame laws because they anticipate that they will never reach endgame. 
275.  See supra text accompanying notes 209, 234. This prediction is consistent with the 
hypothesis of welfare-maximizing norms developed in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167-83 (1991). To apply a cost-benefit 
approach of this sort, participants must regard all varieties of costs and benefits to be 
commensurable and capable of being discounted to present value. Benefits from association, 
of course, include the pleasures of social interactions as well as receipt of more conventional 
goods and services. See Ellickson, supra note 32, at 1344-62 (discussing social aspects of land 
institutions). But cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 572-74 (sharply distinguishing between 
economic and social aspects of domestic life). 
276.  In the language of economics, the norms of a group of household intimates are likely to 
require a participant to assent to a low-level rule that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient for the group. 
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Like legal rules, some household rules are substantive, and others 
procedural.277 When choosing among rules of either type, members of a 
household can be predicted to take into account the same sorts of 
considerations that scholars address when evaluating the efficiency of a legal 
rule. 
Substantive rules. The basic substantive aim of household participants is to 
internalize externalities arising from behavior within their relationships. This is 
achieved when a participant’s own product from his actions or inactions is 
made to equal the product for all participants. Thus co-occupants and co-
owners should take account of the effects of their actions and inactions on their 
co-participants, and a tenant should treat the premises as he would treat them 
if he owned the landlord’s interest.278 Co-occupants’ customs, for example, are 
likely to call for the imposition of negative sanctions on an occupant who tracks 
dirt into the house or hogs the only television set, and for the conferral of 
informal rewards on an occupant who prepares an unusually splendid dessert. 
The substantive rules applicable to a household relationship also are likely 
to impose special duties on participants who have private information. 
Household rules thus generally should allocate losses from household 
accidents, for example, to the participant who has the best information about 
potential accident costs and accident prevention costs as well as the best ability 
to act on that information.279 When a participant is considering taking a 
significant action that would alter the status quo, household rules can be 
expected to require that participant to provide advance notice to the others in 
the relationship. Co-occupants’ norms thus are likely to require an occupant 
who intends to host a party to clear that idea with the other housemates. Co-
owners’ norms similarly are likely to require that one of them provide advance 
 
See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An 
Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1009-12 (1985) (reviewing the authors’ experimental 
findings that interacting parties strongly tend to choose outcomes that maximize their joint 
profits); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407 (1972) 
(arguing that individuals focus on the aggregate impact of bundles of decisions, not on the 
impact of an isolated decision). See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999). 
277.  For a richer taxonomy of rules, see ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 132-36. See also ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 52-54 (1990) (categorizing rules used by commoners). 
278.  Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.11, at 72-73 (6th ed. 2003) 
(proposing an analogous rule when ownership is divided between holders of present and 
future interests). 
279.  See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1060 (1972). For example, the risk of a roof leak that arises without any tenant 
involvement usually is best assigned to a landlord. See ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 278-79. 
ELLICKSON – PRE-OP 11/6/2006  5:37:59 PM 
the yale law journal  116:226   2006 
300 
 
notice to the others before making a capital improvement to the premises. 
Likewise, a tenant who plans to paint the interior walls typically must notify 
the landlord before proceeding. 
In addition, household participants often can augment their shareable 
surplus by obligating those who possess a comparative advantage in 
performing a task to take on that task.280 For example, household rules—
implicit or explicit—may require the occupant who is the best cook to do most 
of the cooking and the owner who is most skilled with heating systems to work 
on maintaining the furnace. Although these sorts of special duties impose 
special burdens, again, those burdens can be offset by adjustments of rights 
and duties in other strands of the same relationship. 
 Procedural rules: on the advantages of seeking consensus. Procedural rules 
govern how participants in a household relationship make collective 
decisions—for example, how they go about creating new rules, adjudicating the 
application of a rule to a given situation, or administering internal sanctions. 
Like substantive rules, procedural rules entail varying combinations of both 
benefits and transaction costs. It may be worthwhile for household members to 
go through a thorough but costly procedure, for example, when that approach 
would cool tempers and thus likely be, to borrow Bernstein’s useful phrase, 
“relationship-preserving.”281 One of the great advantages of a small and 
intimate relationship is that it enables participants to economize on transaction 
costs by using informal procedures. Debate around a dinner table need not 
proceed according to Robert’s Rules of Order. Unlike the dozens of owners of a 
co-housing community, three intimates who co-own residential real estate 
need not schedule regular weekly meetings, prepare formal agendas, or keep 
written minutes.282 Even in an absentee landlord-tenant relationship—typically 
the most distant of all domestic relationships—investigators have found that 
the participants are likely to achieve a comfortable mode of interaction.283 
When a group has three or more members, the decision rule that 
participants apply to determine when they have resolved a contentious issue is 
of great importance. Suppose ten graduate students co-occupying a house were 
considering whether or not to host a party at their abode. Possible decision 
rules include: (1) majority vote; (2) consensus—that is, debating the issue until 
no member objects to a particular proposed outcome; and (3) unanimous vote. 
 
280.  Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 162-64, 210-11, 224-29 (discussing norms when labor is 
specialized). 
281.  Bernstein, supra note 273, at 1796. 
282.  Cf. SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 25-29, 172, 269-70 (urging members 
of co-housing communities to comply with these formalities). 
283.  RAND CORP., supra note 139, at 55. 
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Superficially, consensus and unanimity appear to be identical decision rules, 
but they are not. The leader of a consensus-oriented group typically does not 
call for a formal vote on an issue (or conduct a straw poll), but instead declares, 
after open debate, that consensus on the issue appears to have been achieved.284 
If one or more members then publicly object, debate continues. In a group 
governed by consensus, the members of a frustrated majority are free to 
informally sanction, with negative gossip and the like, dissenters who have 
refused to go along with the decision for the greater good of the collective. A 
unanimity rule, by contrast, requires the taking of a formal vote and implies 
that a stance of uncompromising dissent is within the rules of the game; 
indeed, balloting may be secret and, when it is, a lone dissenter need not fear 
the sting of social ostracism. 
In their valuable article, Dagan and Heller urge lawmakers to declare that 
majority rule is the default decision rule for a group of “commoners.”285 When 
members number in the hundreds, as they do in most kibbutzim, majority rule 
indeed is a common practice.286 But a group of ten graduate students is highly 
unlikely to proceed in this fashion. When household participants are intimates 
and number no more than several dozen, a mountain of evidence indicates that 
they typically favor making decisions by consensus—a procedure, to repeat, 
that is distinct from seeking unanimity.287 A sampling of the self-reported 
procedures of secular intentional communities reveals that 85% of them use 
consensus as their only decision rule.288 The owner-occupants who govern co-
 
284.  See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 32-33 (1980); James H. Davis, 
Some Compelling Intuitions About Group Consensus Decisions, Theoretical and Empirical 
Research, and Interpersonal Aggregation Phenomena: Selected Examples, 1950-1990, 52 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 3, 26-27 (1992). 
285.  Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 590-95. Dagan and Heller note the advantages of 
consensual decision-making, see id. at 594, but regard majority rule and unanimity to be the 
main candidates for a default decision rule. They also recommend that lawmakers require 
commoners to unanimously approve some measures—for example, a program that would be 
purely redistributive. See id. at 592-93. 
286.  Many kibbutzim now authorize members to decide selected issues by referendum. See 
ELIEZER BEN-RAFAEL, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION: THE KIBBUTZ AT CENTURY’S END 58, 
89, 181 (1997). 
287.  Groups as diverse as tribes of foragers and corporate boards of directors similarly prefer to 
decide by consensus. See BOEHM, supra note 85, at 113-17; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a 
Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002). 
288.  Of the sixty-five secular communities in the IC Sample, supra note 121, fifty-five reported 
making all decisions “by consensus,” and six reported relying exclusively on majority rule. 
Zablocki’s survey in the 1970s of 120 intentional communities similarly found that 
occupants, numbering twenty-five on average, tended to be hostile to voting and to favor 
consensus-seeking. ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 200-01, 250-56. 
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housing developments also overwhelmingly prefer to wait until former 
dissenters have been persuaded to accede to a proposed course of action.289 
And there is some evidence that smaller groups of conventional co-owners also 
proceed in this fashion.290 
A quest for consensus can result in long and tedious meetings, the delay of 
valuable projects, and even stalemate. Nonetheless, the self-interested 
participants in an intimate household relationship have good reasons for 
proceeding in this fashion.291 The process of striving for consensus assures, 
better than majority rule (especially in its less participatory forms), that debate 
over a proposal will fully inform proponents about opponents’ concerns.292 To 
accomplish this end, experts advise the owner-occupants of a co-housing 
project not only to seek consensus at their meetings but also to make use of 
cards color-coded to indicate intensity of support or opposition to a measure.293 
When a process of decision-making accounts for intensities of preference, it is 
more likely to result in outcomes that enhance members’ overall welfare.294 In 
addition, when participants are intimate, their efforts at consensus-seeking are 
less likely to result in a costly impasse than if they were to seek unanimity. 
Those disadvantaged by a proposed measure can be predicted to go along with 
it, partly on account of social pressure, once they perceive that others strongly 
 
289.  Of the occupied communities on the Cohousing Community List, supra note 192, about 
two-thirds reported that they made decisions solely “[b]y consensus.” See also Fenster, supra 
note 187, at 13-14; Tom Moench, Decision Making, in THE COHOUSING HANDBOOK, supra 
note 87, at 30, 30-31. 
290.  See Lewis, supra note 127, at 388-89 (describing how three sisters who had inherited 
properties from their intestate mother made decisions). Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 615 
& nn.254-55, 616, usefully summarize the significant variations among the statutes of several 
industrialized nations that have attempted (not necessarily with success) to prescribe default 
decision rules for co-owners. 
291.  Governance by consensus may be inadvisable when participants are overly numerous or 
heterogeneous. Some co-housing communities follow a two-stage procedure. In the first 
stage of decision-making, members seek to reach consensus. Whenever that effort fails, they 
proceed to a second stage in which they apply a supermajoritarian decision rule. 
SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 176; Fenster, supra note 187, at 29-30, 34-
35, 42-43. 
292.  See the sources on civic republicanism cited in Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability—
Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 983 n.29 (1998). 
293.  SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 266-67; Tom Moench, Colors of 
Empowerment, in THE COHOUSING HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 26, 26-27. In practice, of 
course, participants may choose to use words, not colored cards, to communicate the depth 
of their sentiments. 
294.  On Condorcet’s and others’ insights into possible shortcomings of majoritarian procedures, 
see Block, supra note 292, at 981-84. See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 131-45 (1962) (critically examining the operation of majority voting). 
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favor it.295 And, as always when there are multi-stranded social relationships, a 
participant who relents for the overall good of the group can later be informally 
compensated when other decisions come before the house. Finally, unlike both 
unanimity-rule and majority-rule systems, a process of seeking consensus 
signals that participants are intimate and trustworthy. Those who engage in 
consensus-seeking thus are likely to derive more pleasure from their decision-
making process as such.296 
B. Sources of Household Rules: In General 
Participants in a household relationship can generate their own rules in a 
variety of ways and also can extract them from a variety of external sources. 
This Section offers a brief and generally abstract survey of these various 
sources of social control and sets the foundation for the three flesh-and-blood 
Sections that follow. Those Sections discuss the social control techniques of the 
participants in each of the basic household relationships. 
1. The Array of Potential Sources of Household Rules 
The overall system of social control is an amalgam of first-, second-, and 
third-party rules. First-party rules include internalized norms and personal 
ethics that an individual enforces upon himself.297 Second-party rules are those 
that participants in the governed relationship themselves generate. These rules 
include relationship-specific norms that evolve from participants’ practices over 
time, contracts among participants, and rules promulgated by formal 
 
295.  See Norbert L. Kerr, Group Decision Making at a Multialternative Task: Extremity, Interfaction 
Distance, Pluralities, and Issue Importance, 52 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 64, 
90-92 (1992). 
296.  For example, a sample document included in SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 
87, at 176, states: “In order to promote a feeling of community, caring and trust among all 
members of the group a consensus-seeking process will be used.” See also MANSBRIDGE, 
supra note 284, at 8-10, 252-60; cf. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity 
Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006) 
(finding that jurors operating under a unanimity requirement in fact try to achieve 
consensus and report greater satisfaction with their deliberations than jurors who decide by 
supermajority). 
297.  These self-restraints, while crucially important, operate within the household much as they 
do beyond it. For this reason, the analysis below rarely refers to this form of social control. 
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organizations that participants may establish.298 Third-party rules are 
produced by outsiders; these include ambient social norms generated by 
diffuse social forces and laws decreed by governments.299 
Two major themes are developed in the remainder of this Part. The first 
theme is that, the more intimate the participants in a household relationship 
are, the more likely they are to make use of second-party as opposed to third-
party rules. The second theme is that increasing intimacy among participants 
brings a particular type of second-party rule to the fore, namely the household-
specific norms that arise out of patterns of gift exchange. 
2. Internal (Second-Party) Sources of Rules: Of Gift-Exchange 
In a liberal society, participants in any sort of household relationship have 
substantial freedom to shape their own arrangements. This freedom is likely to 
incline them to develop their own rules rather than to borrow rules from 
external sources.300 
The relative merits of contracts and relationship-specific norms. To create their 
own rules, participants in a household relationship are likely to make some use 
of both contracts and relationship-specific norms. The latter require a few 
sentences of introduction. Relationship-specific norms are informal 
expectations about how each participant should behave in the future. They 
emerge from participants’ spontaneous (i.e., unnegotiated) successes at 
coordinating with one another.301 The standard label for these sorts of 
reciprocated acts of cooperation is “gift exchange,” a much-studied process of 
 
298.  Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 11-24 
(1985) (reviewing methods that parties may use, in the absence of a state, to make promises 
credible). 
299.  Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 123-36 (presenting a slightly different taxonomy). 
Commonly, the controller that makes a rule also is the agent that enforces it. For example, 
state bureaucracies may enforce law and an individual may enforce his own personal ethics 
on himself. But hybrid systems of social control also are common. Participants in a 
household relationship, for instance, can use an express contract to create a rule and then 
rely entirely on external controlling agents—perhaps neighborhood gossips or courts—to 
enforce that contract. See id. 
300.  See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (describing both 
individuals’ desires to customize domestic rules and legal systems’ increasing toleration of 
such efforts); supra text accompanying notes 48-52. 
301.  Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 53, at 1285-88 (discussing the evolution of norms between 
particular spouses). 
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low-level coordination.302 The particularized “customs of the household” that 
emerge from its history of cooperative practices are somewhat analogous to the 
varying “customs of the manor” that evolved in medieval English villages.303 
For a process of gift exchange to be mutually beneficial, each participant 
must keep a (preferably rough) mental account of who has contributed what 
and who has received what.304 Because domestic gift-giving can be fitful, 
temporary imbalances of trade are likely to arise. A participant who becomes 
convinced that she will obtain an insufficient flow of net benefits from the 
process can be expected to respond with escalating self-help measures. As her 
grievances deepen, her informal remedies might progress from gentle 
reminders, to more caustic comments, to conspicuous refusals to perform 
customary duties, to threats of exit, and perhaps even to actual exit from the 
household relationship.305 
In selected contexts, contracts between household participants are better 
than household-specific norms at inducing cooperative behavior. Contracts are 
particularly useful when participants face a discrete challenge that they haven’t 
 
302.  Gift exchange must be distinguished from purely altruistic gift-giving, which also is 
commonplace within households. See supra note 206. For a concise overview of alternative 
theories of gift exchange, see Jonathan P. Thomas & Timothy Worrall, Gift-Giving, Quasi-
Credit and Reciprocity, 14 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 308, 315-17 (2002). Valuable entryways into 
the vast literature on the subject include, in anthropology, MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE 
FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 
1990) (1925); in sociology, BLAU, supra note 80, and GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961); in economics, George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts 
as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1982), and Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness 
and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159; and in 
law, Benkler, supra note 65, Leslie, supra note 69, and Posner, supra note 69. 
303.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74-75. Contrary to Henry Maine’s renowned 
assertion of a trend from status to contract, see supra text accompanying note 35, when 
household-specific norms are the predominant form of coordination, household relations 
are determined neither by status nor by contract. 
304.  Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 55-56 (discussing the mental accounting of inter-neighbor 
debts). Excessively close mental accounting of the balance of informal trade, however, 
manifests distrust and, among married couples, is associated with a greater likelihood of 
divorce. See Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1981 (2000); 
see also Bernard I. Murstein et al., A Theory and Investigation of the Effect of Exchange-
Orientation on Marriage and Friendship, 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 543 (1977) (reporting data 
consistent with the hypothesis that an exchange-based orientation is generally inimical to 
the marriage relationship). But cf. Susan Sprecher, The Effect of Exchange Orientation on Close 
Relationships, 61 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 220 (1998) (reporting data inconsistent with the thesis 
that an exchange-orientation impairs a relationship). See generally REGAN, supra note 66, at 
41-42, 71-73 and sources cited therein. 
305.  See supra text accompanying note 59; cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 56-64 (discussing 
neighbors’ applications of escalating self-help sanctions to control deviants).  
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confronted before, when they anticipate that they may disagree on the values of 
certain outcomes, and when they are untrusting (as, for example, a tenant and 
absentee landlord may be).306 When participants in a household relationship 
do contract with one another, they commonly will regard an oral agreement to 
be sufficient. Reducing an agreement to writing, however, can help parties 
prove the substance of their agreement both to one another during midgame, 
and also to a third party in the event of an endgame dispute.307 
In many household contexts, however, especially when the participants are 
intimates, gift exchange is superior to bargained-for exchange. Consider, for 
example, the choices available to an unmarried but romantically involved 
young couple who are about to cohabit for the first time. With a view to 
enhancing the overall quality of their co-occupancy experience, the couple 
might contemplate, among others, the following four options: 
(1) the negotiation of a complete written contract specifying the two 
parties’ respective rights and duties in every aspect of their 
forthcoming co-occupancy relationship; 
(2) the negotiation of a bare-bones written agreement requiring one 
participant to provide “housekeeping services” (or some other 
vaguely defined bundle of duties), and requiring the other 
periodically to pay that provider a specified amount of money;  
(3) the negotiation of a bare-bones oral agreement requiring one 
participant to provide certain categories of services, say, “shopping 
and cooking,” and the second to provide other categories of 
services, say, “cleaning, laundry, and yard work”; and 
(4) muddling through, that is, relying primarily on gift exchange, 
whereby each participant would unilaterally perform most tasks 
without prior negotiation, in the hope of eventually receiving an 
adequate flow of return gifts.308  
 
306.  See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, 
PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 427-75 (2d ed. 2000) (insightfully exploring the role of express 
contracts in family settings); see also ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 246-48, 253, 274. 
307.  See Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-
Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (1996) (discussing when merchants choose to put 
their agreements in writing). 
308.  As just noted, those who opt to use gift exchange to resolve most issues would not 
necessarily be averse to using oral contracts to resolve some challenges, such as how to split 
the work of hosting an unusual event like a large dinner party. See also infra text 
accompanying notes 327-337. 
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Among trusting intimates, the gift exchange process, the last of these four 
alternatives, has as many as three potential advantages over the various forms 
of express contracting. The first advantage of gift exchange is—no surprise 
here—lower transaction costs.309 Participants who are confident that their 
spontaneous reciprocal exchanges will be mutually advantageous can avoid the 
hassle of negotiating, interpreting, and enforcing explicit terms of trade. The 
negotiation of a written contract covering all household contingencies would 
be impossibly expensive to draft. While a bare-bones contract (oral or written) 
could be negotiated in minutes, it is likely to be rife with ambiguity and to 
invite haggling over interpretation.310 Do “housekeeping services” include 
paying the bills? Are “cooking” obligations to be relaxed when the designated 
cook falls sick? How often should the person with “cleaning” responsibilities 
sweep out the garage? And so on. For the relationship to prosper, the two 
parties would have to be able to engage in an informal give-and-take to resolve 
these sorts of ambiguities. But if they could succeed at such a give-and-take, 
they likely also could succeed by muddling through without an overarching 
contract. Informal gift exchange of course entails transaction costs of its own, 
in part because co-occupants must keep rough mental accounts of how they 
stand with one another. But, among trusting intimates, these costs tend to be 
lower than the transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing an express 
contract, whatever its degree of complexity. 
A second advantage of gift exchange is that it can be kept money-free (in 
contrast to the hypothetical couple’s second option, the exchange of 
housekeeping services for a monthly wage). Because money is fungible, most 
outsiders that provide household services, such as commercial housecleaning 
firms, prefer cash transactions to barter transactions. Intimates, by contrast, 
typically have a strong aversion to engaging in monetized transactions with one 
another.311 Just as a well-socialized dinner guest arrives bearing as a gift a bottle 
 
309.  See Ben-Porath, supra note 1, at 5-8, 18 (implying that gift exchange among intimates is a 
relatively cheap mechanism). 
310.  When parties who are somewhat trusting negotiate a written contract, they commonly 
choose to keep many of its terms indefinite. See Scott, supra note 65. Labor contracts, for 
example, tend to be quite incomplete and, as a result, an employment relationship typically 
involves significant elements of gift exchange. See Akerlof, supra note 302. This occurs in 
part because a worker’s exact contributions may be too subtle to be objectively measured. 
See George Baker et al., Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts, 109 
Q.J. ECON. 1125 (1994). 
311.  See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); infra note 
327 and accompanying text; see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005) 
(discussing the use of money in intimate relationships of all sorts); cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 
275, at 61-62, 78, 234-36 (1991) (describing the preference of neighbors in rural Shasta 
County, California, to use in-kind gifts, not money, to compensate one another). But cf. 
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of wine and not a twenty-dollar bill, intimate housemates don’t pay wages to 
one another. Instead, by serially exchanging in-kind gifts, participants in a 
household relationship signal their mutual feelings of intimacy and trust.312 
This mode of exchange thus enhances prospects for cooperative interactions in 
the future. 
Third, recent research indicates that a process of reciprocal gift-giving, 
apart from other instrumental advantages, may intrinsically generate utility for 
its participants.313 There is neurological evidence, for example, that 
reciprocated acts of cooperation generate pleasure.314 And one team of 
experimenters found that individuals regarded the outcomes of informally 
reciprocated exchanges as fairer than the outcomes of negotiated exchanges, 
even when the material results were identical.315 In sum, intimates have many 
reasons to favor spontaneous gift exchange over express contracting.316 
Hierarchically organized household relationships. As participants become more 
numerous, the administrative costs of both contracting and gift exchange rise 
precipitously. Members of a twosome have a single one-on-one relationship to 
 
Schultz, supra note 196, at 1901-06 (contending that workers especially value paid work). 
See generally RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). In addition to the reasons provided in 
the text, participants in a household relationship in some nations conceivably might refrain 
from transferring cash in order to reduce the recipient’s income tax liabilities or to enhance 
the recipient’s eligibility for welfare benefits. 
312.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 234-35; supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
313.  See Joel Sobel, Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 392 (2005) 
(reviewing the literature). A kindred proposition holds that an actor who receives extrinsic 
rewards for an action derives less intrinsic satisfaction from performing that action. See, e.g., 
RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
(1971) (analyzing the motivations of blood donors); Sobel, supra, at 416-17. 
314.  Ernst Fehr et al., Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 346 (2005); see also Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory 
and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993) (arguing that individuals enjoy being nice to 
those who have been nice to them). 
315.  Linda D. Molm et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Procedural Justice in Social Exchange, 68 AM. 
SOC. REV. 128 (2003); cf. Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 16 
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 436, 
2003), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/436.pdf 
(reporting that about 60% of survey respondents regarded a request for a prenuptial 
agreement as a reason for raising their estimates of the probability of divorce). 
316.  But cf. Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work 
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 55-59 (1998) (urging a marrying 
couple to execute a written agreement); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of 
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 328-34 (1982) (urging married 
couples to make greater use of written contracts and also urging courts to enforce such 
contracts even when the marriage is ongoing). 
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keep in healthy balance. In a threesome, there are 3 of these one-on-one 
relationships. In an eightsome, there are 28. In a group of 50, there are 1225.317 
The relative efficiency of establishing a centralized hierarchy to coordinate 
actions thus grows markedly with group size. In addition, increased size tends 
to erode intimacy and trust, and with them the attractiveness of more 
decentralized systems of coordination. 
A co-occupant or co-owner group that includes dozens of participants 
therefore commonly creates a formal organization responsible for handling 
many of its coordination issues.318 A hierarchy, of course, is a mixed blessing. 
The formalization of governance gives rise to administrative costs and rigidities 
and opens up the possibility that unfaithful agents will seize the reins. For 
members of a small group, the creation of a governing body is, on balance, 
highly unlikely to be worth the bother. But for a large group, the existence of a 
permanent administrative structure supervised by specialized managers can 
give rise to significant efficiencies. A hierarchical solution is essential in, for 
example, a timeshare development, where owner-occupants rotate in 
possession as often as weekly and have virtually no face-to-face contact.319 
3. External (Third-Party) Sources of Rules 
Ambient social norms. Instead of developing their own rules, participants in 
a household relationship can adhere to the informal rules of appropriate 
behavior that are diffusely enforced by neighbors and members of other 
external social networks. A culture’s ambient norms can greatly influence 
domestic arrangements, particularly when participants in a household 
relationship have internalized these norms. 
In a liberal society devoted to freedom of contract, neighbors and other 
potential informal enforcers are likely to grant participants in a household 
relationship broad leeway to tailor internal rules.320 Like liberal lawmakers, 
 
317.  The formula is n(n – 1)/2, where n is the number in the group. 
318.  A foundational theoretical work on the role of hierarchies is OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). See also Henry 
E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 
1182-85 (2006) (offering diagrams that portray alternative forms of hierarchy). 
319.  A statute indeed may require the developer of a timeshare project to designate a 
management entity prior to marketing shares in the project. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 721.13(1)(a) (West 2000). On timeshare entities, see generally supra note 252. 
320.  See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 108-11, 129-31 (1998) (reporting the results of 
interviews in which most Americans expressed broad tolerance toward others’ modes of 
living). 
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liberal neighbors are most likely to enforce ambient norms applicable to the 
internal practices of a household when violation of those norms would harm 
either outsiders like themselves or helpless insiders.321 For example, if a group 
of co-occupants were to neglect maintenance of a house’s front-yard 
landscaping or were to abuse children inside the house, neighbors might 
respond with negative gossip or more severe sanctions. 
Legal rules. In a liberal society, the legal system performs a crucial role in 
helping to ensure basic individual entitlements such as private property, 
protection from interpersonal violence, and the right of unilateral exit from a 
household. These backdrop entitlements underpin all interactions among 
household members.322 Public law rules that govern relations between citizen 
and state, such as tax and welfare policies, also may significantly influence the 
housing stock, co-occupants’ rent-or-buy decisions, and perhaps the 
composition of co-occupant and co-owner groups.323 By contrast, the small-
bore private law rules that either legislatures or courts promulgate are not 
likely to have much influence on midgame household relations among 
intimates. A central finding of empirical legal scholars is that low-stakes 
disputes among individuals in a continuing relationship tend to be resolved 
beyond the shadow of the law, that is, without regard to nominally applicable 
legal rules.324 Although in some contexts this peripheral role of private law 
rules may be partly attributable to the participants’ lack of confidence in the 
legal system, in all situations a major factor is the participants’ desire to avoid 
the transaction costs involved in learning applicable law and pursuing legal 
remedies. Indeed, if an intimate were to seek to resolve a midgame domestic 
dispute by filing a lawsuit, the other participants typically would deem that 
legalizing step a grievous violation of the customs of the household.325 
C. Rules for Co-Occupants 
Drawing on the various sources just surveyed, co-occupants develop rules 
to resolve mundane issues such as how to assign the duty of vacuuming the 
floor and the power to control the television remote. As noted, intimate 
housemates are likely to rely mainly on an ongoing process of gift exchange to 
 
321.  See supra text accompanying notes 154-158. But cf. McAdams, supra note 76, at 412-19 
(discussing the possibility of “nosy norms”). 
322.  See supra Section I.B. 
323.  See supra text accompanying notes 161-165, 268-272. 
324.  See sources cited in ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 141-47, 256-57. 
325.  See id. at 250-52. 
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generate “customs of the household” that implicitly resolve many of their 
coordination issues.326 An intriguing empirical question is to what extent co-
occupants supplement these household-specific norms with other rules that 
they themselves more formally devise or that they import from lawmakers or 
other outsiders. 
1. Co-Occupant-Created Contracts and Hierarchies 
Oral contracts. New housemates commonly converse about how rooms are 
to be allocated, chores performed, and bills paid. Intimates are apt to structure 
these agreements, however, in a fashion that signals that they indeed are 
intimates. For example, a domestic oral contract is far more likely to call for, or 
presume, in-kind compensation as opposed to monetary compensation, such as 
the payment of wages.327 Moreover, because insistence on a written document 
 
326.  On the advantages that spouses may obtain by coordinating via gift exchange as opposed to 
express contract, see Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1373-79 (2001); and Pollak, supra note 1, at 595-97. 
Critics of the gift exchange process among housemates assert that it systematically 
advantages the powerful, in particular men over women. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 196, at 
1899-1902 (applauding the trend of contracting out household work on the ground that 
outside workers are less likely than occupants to be exploited); see also Mary Becker, 
Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21 
(characterizing our social structure as overly patriarchal and critiquing liberal models of 
social interactions). These critics do not accept, at least in the context of inter-gender 
relations, the premise that background legal and social conditions in the United States are 
liberal—that is, that occupants can use either voice or exit to avoid exploitation within the 
home. 
The results of empirical studies of interspousal relations are mixed. Wives in good 
marriages tend to be happier, and wives in bad marriages tend to be unhappier, than 
unmarried women. See sources cited in Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, 
Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403, 432-33 (2004); see 
also Gary R. Lee et al., Marital Status and Personal Happiness: An Analysis of Trend Data, 53 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 839 (1991). A large majority of wives report that they regard the division 
of labor within their homes to be fair. See Mary Clare Lennon & Sarah Rosenfield, Relative 
Fairness and the Division of Housework: The Importance of Options, 100 AM. J. SOC. 506, 507 
(1994); sources cited in Nock, supra note 304, at 1977. But cf. JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE 
OF MARRIAGE 27-28, tbls.10 & 14-16 (2d ed. 1982) (asserting that marriage tends to be 
detrimental to a woman’s health). 
327.  See supra text accompanying note 311. On the role of money within the marriage relationship 
specifically, see generally BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 51-111; and JAN PAHL, 
MONEY AND MARRIAGE (1989), which analyzes spousal practices in the United Kingdom. 
Feminist scholars who urge monetary compensation for household work implicitly 
recognize the symbolic disadvantages of spouse-to-spouse payments for the performance of 
discrete domestic tasks. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A 
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signals distrust, intimates are likely to prefer an oral deal to a written one.328 
Even when participants regard their oral promises to be informally binding, 
they are likely to avoid saying anything to imply that these obligations would 
be legally enforceable; in an intimate relationship, the keeping of a promise is 
likely to do more to enhance the relationship when participants perceive that 
performance was in no way legally coerced.329 
Written contracts. A number of commercial firms sell sample contractual 
forms designed to help housemates structure their relationships. These forms 
tend to be aimed at helping an unmarried couple resolve, in midgame, the 
sharing of operating expenses owed to outsiders and, in endgame, the 
disentangling of personal property and financial accounts (and, if relevant, 
post-separation obligations of partner and child support).330 The forms in 
Nolo’s Living Together: A Legal Guide for Unmarried Couples, now in its twelfth 
edition, focus almost entirely on these issues, as opposed to the allocation of 
 
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 31-54, 284-91 (2004) (urging governments to compensate 
caregivers within households); accord NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS 
AND FAMILY VALUES 49-51, 109-13 (2001); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE 
FAMILY 180-81 (1989) (opposing cash compensation for particular household tasks, but 
advocating that each spouse receive half of any paycheck earned for work performed outside 
the household); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 63-80 (1989) (reviewing, mostly from a Marxian perspective, arguments for and 
against the payment of wages for housework); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY 
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 129-31 (2000) (urging legal rules 
that would divide equally, after divorce, former spouses’ assets and future incomes). Many 
parents pay children for performing extra chores, in part to prepare them for employment 
relations outside the household. See Pamela M. Warton & Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Money 
and Children’s Household Jobs: Parents’ Views of Their Interconnections, 18 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 
335, 343 (1995) (also reporting that parents tend to feel ambivalent about making these 
payments). 
328.  See infra notes 330-337 and accompanying text. 
329.  See Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
473, 490-93 (2001); see also supra text accompanying notes 313-314. But cf. Anthony J. Bellia 
Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25 (2002) (critiquing Kimel’s 
behavioral assumptions). 
330.  See, e.g., 9B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Husband & Wife §§ 139:135-:159 (2002 rev.); IHARA 
ET AL., supra note 88; DORIAN SOLOT & MARSHALL MILLER, UNMARRIED TO EACH OTHER 137-
41 (2002). In endgame, courts are more likely to enforce an obligation that has been reduced 
to writing. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2002) (stating that a court is to 
enforce a cohabitation agreement between an unmarried man and woman only if it is in 
writing and only after termination of their relationship); cf. Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 
1154 (N.Y. 1980) (allowing an ex-cohabitant to pursue recovery based on an oral contract, 
but not on an implied contract theory). But see Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) 
(permitting an ex-cohabitant to proceed on both oral-contract and implied-contract 
theories). See generally infra text accompanying notes 368-370. 
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physical spaces, the assignment of household chores, and the articulation of 
rules of deportment. As the authors put it: 
The contracts included in this chapter [on “living together 
agreements”] pertain only to property and finances. They do not cover 
the day-to-day details of your relationship, such as who will do the 
dishes, who will walk the dog, how many overnight guests you’ll allow, 
and whose art goes in the living room. A court won’t—and shouldn’t be 
asked to—enforce these kinds of personal agreements. If your 
agreement includes personal as well as financial clauses, a court might 
declare the entire contract illegal or frivolous and refuse to enforce any 
of it—including the more important financial clauses. Obviously, you 
need to be clear with your partner on things such as house-cleaning and 
cooking. Just don’t mix up these day-to-day issues with the bigger legal 
issues of living together.331 
One of Living Together’s co-authors, Frederick Hertz, an Oakland attorney who 
has long urged unmarried cohabiting couples, both straight and gay, to 
negotiate written agreements, has admitted that only a “miniscule fraction” of 
them in fact choose to do so.332 
A few commentators even advise co-occupants who are not romantically 
involved, and whose prospective relationships thus are far simpler, to negotiate 
written contracts.333 These “roommate agreements” may be sensible when 
housemates are particularly untrusting, for example, after a Manhattan real 
estate agency has brought together utter strangers who share only an interest 
in splitting rental costs.334 Co-occupants also conceivably might benefit from a 
 
331.  IHARA ET AL., supra note 88, at 3/3; see also KATHERINE E. STONER & SHAE IRVING, 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 2/7 (2004) (“[A] prenup isn’t the best place to address lifestyle 
agreements—that is, matters such as who’s responsible for taking out the garbage and what 
kind of schedule you will keep . . . .”). But cf. IHARA ET AL., supra note 88, at 3/20 (providing 
a sample agreement that requires the breadwinner to pay a weekly salary to the 
homemaker). 
332.  Ellman, supra note 326, at 1367 n.17 (reporting Hertz’s admission that co-occupants who 
request that documents be drafted typically end up not signing them). But see Posik v. 
Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (enforcing, after a breakup, the terms of a 
lesbian couple’s written cohabitation agreement that had required one partner to do the 
cooking, housework, and yard work). 
333.  Sources advocating, and offering examples of, written roommate agreements include JANET 
PORTMAN & MARCIA STEWART, RENTERS’ RIGHTS: THE BASICS 6/6-/9 (4th ed. 2005), and 
Abby Ellin, Taming Roommate Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, § 3 (Business), at 9. 
334.  In neighborhoods of New York City where apartments are unusually expensive, about two 
dozen companies, some of them less than reputable, advertise that they specialize in helping 
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written agreement when their stakes are unusually high, perhaps because their 
lease has a term of several years or because they live in a rent control 
jurisdiction.335 
Some colleges and universities encourage students who are roommates to 
negotiate detailed written contracts to govern behavior within their shared 
space.336 These contracts make the most sense, if they ever do, when 
roommates are total strangers, such as entering freshmen.337 Many students, 
who likely have a better sense than university administrators of the optimal 
amount of formalization of living arrangements, resist drafting roommate 
agreements and instead prefer to talk a few things through and otherwise rely 
on unstructured give-and-take. 
Formal organizations of co-occupants. An intentional community that includes 
at least several dozen residents usually has some sort of formal central 
authority, both to handle internal matters and also to enter into contracts with 
outsiders. These institutions vary widely in form. When the owners of an 
intentional community also all reside there, the governance of both co-owner 
and co-occupant affairs may be consolidated in a single central authority. As a 
matter of ideology, members of most secular communes are likely to prefer a 
highly participatory form of governance involving frequent group-wide 
meetings.338 As the number of residents grows, however, this arrangement 
becomes less practicable. Thus, while a small co-housing community may 
make its decisions in group-wide sessions, a larger one is likely to rely 
significantly on representative democracy, such as governance by an elected 
 
total strangers arrange for co-rentals. See Dennis Hevesi, Making Roommates of Perfect 
Strangers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, § 11 (Real Estate), at 1. 
335.  An example of how rent control raises stakes is Ganson v. Goldfader, 561 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. 
Ct. 1990), a battle among a series of contract-writing occupants of a rent-stabilized 
Manhattan apartment over which of them was entitled to buy the unit at the insider price 
when the building was converted to a cooperative. 
336.  See, e.g., Swarthmore Coll. Hous., RA Resources, http://www.swarthmore.edu/Admin/ 
housing/raresource/roommate.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); Univ. of Iowa Tenant 
Landlord Ass’n, Roommate Issues, http://www.uiowa.edu/~tla/tenant/roommate.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
337.  See, e.g., UMass Amherst, Housing and Residence Life, http://www.housing.umass.edu/ 
announce/state_of_housing.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006) (encouraging freshmen at 
UMass Amherst to sign roommate agreements). But cf. Tamar Lewin, First Test for 
Freshmen: Picking Roommates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A1 (reporting that some 
universities encourage entering students to use an online matchmaking service to find 
roommates). 
338.  See ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 250-55; supra note 288. 
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board of directors.339 Large intentional communities typically become more 
hierarchical as time passes.340 For example, kibbutzim, which have about 400 
residents on average,341 have been shifting governance responsibilities away 
from their general assemblies and toward boards of directors, elected councils, 
and designated officers.342 Perhaps to avoid this level of bureaucratization, the 
residents of newly founded intentional communities now tend to keep the 
number of adult occupants down to two dozen or so.343 
Some intentional communities opt for a more autocratic form of 
governance that places authority over co-occupant affairs in the hands of a 
leader or small leadership group that the occupants cannot unseat. In these 
instances, the implicit or explicit leases between the household’s owner and the 
occupants require occupants to obey this designated executive (who usually is 
either the owner or the owner’s agent). Many religion-based intentional 
communities, such as those of the Hutterites, are organized in this fashion.344 
Historically, many large family-based households have been headed by 
hierarchs, who typically obtained sole ownership through inheritance, usually 
according to rules that favored senior males.345 Surveying practices in the 
Classical period in ancient Greece, Aristotle asserted in The Politics that “every 
household is monarchically governed by the eldest of the kin.”346 In a 
 
339.  See SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 267-69; Fenster, supra note 187, at 13-
14. The occupants of a voluntary group quarters, such as a retirement home or college 
dormitory, similarly may elect an advisory governing board. 
340.  See ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 46-47 (discussing the tendency of communes to drift toward 
charismatic authoritarian leadership). 
341.  This average is derived from figures provided in Avraham Pavin, The Kibbutz Movement: 
Facts & Figures 2003, 48 KIBBUTZ TRENDS 57, 57 (2003). 
342.  See BEN-RAFAEL, supra note 286, at 107-11, 181, 184. But cf. supra note 286 (noting that some 
kibbutzim make use of referenda). 
343.  See SCOTTHANSON & SCOTTHANSON, supra note 87, at 128 (advocating communities of 
between twelve and thirty-six dwelling units); ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 43, 83 (asserting 
that the average number of residents of a U.S. commune fell from over 100 before 1820 to 
about twenty-five in 1965-1975); supra note 121. Because privacy and autonomy are superior 
goods, see supra text accompanying note 239, a society’s intentional communities are likely 
to be become smaller as its wealth increases. 
344.  Hutterite communities historically have been governed by six designated male elders. 
PETER, supra note 222, at 61, 81. Members of the Oneida community conferred absolute 
power on their theocratic leader, John Noyes. See CARDEN, supra note 175, at 85-88. A 
majority of the religious communities in the IC Sample, supra note 121, reported that a 
leader or leadership core group had special decision-making power. 
345.  See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 99, at 355-57 (discussing hierarchically organized 
households in the earliest historical periods). 
346.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 9. 
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gargantuan medieval English noble household, the earl or other owner issued 
“ordinances” to govern the conduct of the co-occupants and hired stewards to 
supervise internal affairs.347 
These hierarchically organized households were descendants of the ancient 
paterfamilias form, exemplified by the Homeric extended family household.348 
The paterfamilias model has been particularly prominent in societies that deny 
the basic liberal rights of self-ownership and free exit to slaves—and often to 
wives and some adult children as well. Despite these unsavory aspects, the 
paterfamilias form enabled significant reductions in the transaction costs of 
organizing family and household affairs, an advantage that has undoubtedly 
contributed to its prevalence in nonliberal societies. Although the selection of a 
single household owner according to mechanical inheritance rules may devolve 
leadership into the hands of an incompetent, this system at least reduces the 
amount of energy younger family members waste in currying favor with their 
elders.349 More important, by vesting controlling powers in a single person, the 
paterfamilias form enables some centralized structuring of the affairs of dozens 
or even hundreds of co-occupants. By identifying a single authoritative 
household leader, it also expedites dealings with outsiders such as neighboring 
households. Even in the nonliberal settings where the paterfamilias form 
flowered, ambient norms commonly evolved to temper abuses by the 
household head. Social norms, for example, directed the law-giver (kurios) in a 
Homeric household to promote a shared sense of affectionate belonging 
(philia).350 In addition, a paterfamilias or feudal lord commonly was unable to 
sell the household premises and pocket the proceeds. Instead, he was under 
some obligation to give other family members access to it and, upon his death, 
to pass it on according to the same mechanical rules of succession by which he 
had obtained it. 
Although the paterfamilias form can enable transaction cost savings, the 
form conflicts with central liberal values. It is no surprise then that with the 
spread of liberalism and the rise in wealth in recent centuries, the paterfamilias 
 
347.  See MERTES, supra note 244, at 6-7, 17-18, 22, 25, 177-80. 
348.  See supra text accompanying notes 102-106. 
349.  See generally James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of 
Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71, 78-79 (1983) (identifying some advantages of mechanical 
rules of inheritance). 
350.  See BOOTH, supra note 27, at 17-21, 38-39. A Roman paterfamilias was similarly constrained 
by a duty of pietas. See RICHARD P. SALLER, PATRIARCHY, PROPERTY AND DEATH IN THE 
ROMAN FAMILY 105-14 (1994). 
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form of governing co-occupant affairs—while showing some staying power in 
China, India, the Arab world, and elsewhere—generally has been in decline.351 
2. Co-Occupant Adherence to Ambient Norms and Laws 
Ambient social norms. Widely honored customs can greatly influence the 
composition of co-occupant groups and also the practices within households. 
In many societies, adult children have been expected to live with or near their 
aging parents. Ambient norms concerning gender roles, particularly if they 
have been internalized, are likely to strongly influence the allocation of co-
occupants’ tasks.352 By looking to customary gender roles for guidance about 
what gifts of labor to make, co-occupants can reduce their transaction costs of 
coordination.353 If widely embraced, however, ambient norms that pressure 
women into disproportionately performing certain domestic tasks may impair 
women’s shares of household surplus.354 
Legal rules. Except when the welfare of outsiders or helpless insiders is at 
stake, liberal lawmakers usually are reluctant to intervene in housemates’ 
internal affairs.355 Indeed, the Supreme Court has struck down, on 
constitutional grounds, a number of state attempts to regulate home behavior 
and the composition of co-occupant groups.356 
 
351.  See supra notes 112-114. 
352.  See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 
1914-16 (2000). On the inclinations of most men and women to adhere to traditional gender 
roles within a household setting, see SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: 
THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 164-65, 201-11 (1985); and 
STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 37-62 (1998). 
353.  See Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 59, at 993-94. Adherence to traditional gender roles was 
customary at Woodstock-era communes nominally committed to gender equality. 
ZABLOCKI, supra note 23, at 318-20. 
354.  See Gillian K. Hadfield, A Coordination Model of the Sexual Division of Labor, 40 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 125 (1999). 
355.  See supra text accompanying notes 154-160. But cf. Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic 
Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1646 
(2001) (“Government does have an interest in who does the dishes . . . .”). See generally D. 
Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006) (reviewing 
ways in which the law is more protective of the home than of other types of property); Lee 
E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (reviewing the history 
of government involvement in family arrangements). 
356.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a statute criminalizing the 
consensual act of sodomy within the privacy of the home violated substantive due process); 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting a 
grandmother from living with two grandsons who were not brothers violated substantive 
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Judges similarly are unlikely to be willing to hear a common law claim 
between current housemates. Suppose a graduate student filed in small claims 
court an action for damages against a current housemate whom she accuses of 
having failed to carry out agreed-to household chores. A judge almost certainly 
would dismiss the complaint, and for good reason.357 If a party enmeshed in a 
multi-stranded relationship were ordered by a court to render compensation 
for inappropriate behavior in a single strand, he might respond by making 
offsetting countermoves in other strands—for example, by being surlier at the 
dinner table. A court that recognized the likely necessity of continuing judicial 
oversight of a complex web of intimate relations understandably would refuse 
to get involved in midgame affairs in the first place.358 This would not, 
however, leave the victim without recourse. The cohabitation relationship 
would likely provide her with numerous opportunities to employ self-help to 
discipline the offender, and she also could exit from the relationship (and, after 
exit, conceivably initiate an endgame legal action). 
Even if judges were willing to apply small-bore private law rules to resolve 
midgame disputes between housemates, most competent adults would ignore 
those rules and legal opportunities and instead rely on cheaper nonlegal means 
of controlling one another. In a well-known study, Vilhelm Aubert found that 
no lawsuits had been brought under the Norwegian Housemaid Law of 1948 
during its first two years because, to curb employer abuse, housemaids 
 
due process). But cf. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding, against 
wide-ranging constitutional attack, an ordinance that limited the composition of non-family 
households to a maximum of two adults). For criticism of Belle Terre, see Karst, supra note 
50, at 686-89. Some states, however, have been more protective of domestic freedom. See, 
e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980) (striking down, as a 
violation of a state constitutional provision, an ordinance that restricted the creation of 
households of more than five unrelated persons). Arguments for favoring family households 
over non-family households are arrayed in Haddock & Polsby, supra note 1. 
357.  See supra text accompanying note 331 (identifying the risk that a court would deem such a 
complaint legally frivolous). 
358.  Most courts decline to reach the merits of a civil complaint filed by one spouse against the 
other prior to endgame, that is, before the two have either initiated a divorce proceeding or 
begun to live apart. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 66, at 499-507; Shultz, supra note 316, at 
232-37. Defenders of this tradition of judicial noninvolvement in ongoing marriages include 
Levmore, supra note 41, at 244-48, and Scott & Scott, supra note 53, at 1294-95. See also Lloyd 
Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 267, 300-02 (1987) (discussing the futility of specifically enforcing intimate 
obligations). Among those urging greater judicial oversight are Frances E. Olsen, The Myth 
of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985), and Eric Rasmusen & 
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. 
L.J. 453, 481-89 (1998). 
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continued to rely entirely on their ability to exit from the household.359 Partly 
because resort to law is so expensive and partly because judges resist getting 
involved, any sort of midgame lawsuit between the co-occupants of a 
household is highly exceptional, absent the prospect of collecting from a 
liability insurance company or other third party.360 
3. Two Specific Substantive Challenges for Co-Occupants 
The extent of privatization of household spaces. Besides developing rules to 
govern behavior in their common spaces, co-occupants have another major 
option: the privatization of selected parts of their joint domain.361 The public 
spaces of a household are a form of commons, vulnerable to classic abuses such 
as overuse and inadequate maintenance.362 One of the standard antidotes to a 
potentially tragic commons is the transfer of particular spaces and objects from 
common to individual ownership. By awarding a particular housemate 
virtually complete control over a particular bedroom, for example, a group of 
co-occupants can internalize to that person most of the costs and benefits of the 
maintenance decisions involving that room.363 The fine-grained rules of a 
household similarly may grant a particular occupant special rights to use a 
certain chair, television set, or parking space (although perhaps only at special 
times).364 Privatization measures of this sort can not only reduce the 
transaction costs of coordination, but can also create individual zones of 
 
359.  Vilhelm Aubert, Some Social Functions of Legislation, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 98 (1967).  
360.  See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 10.1-10.2 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing possibilities of tort litigation between family 
members).  
361.  See Lauren Lipton, The His-and-Hers House: With More Space, Couples Build in Separate 
Lairs; A ‘Gentlemen’s Room,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at W1. 
362.  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Paul Seabright, 
Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1993, at 
113. 
363.  See Seabright, supra note 362, at 124-29. Virginia Woolf contended that “a woman must have 
money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction.” VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S 
OWN 4 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1957) (1929). She also observed, however, that Jane 
Austen wrote her novels in her house’s common sitting room. Id. at 70. But cf. DAPHNE 
SPAIN, GENDERED SPACES (1992) (asserting that the specialization of household spaces tends 
to disadvantage women). 
364.  Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS 
AND OTHER INMATES 243-49 (1961) (discussing the informal privatization of common spaces 
within asylums). A space that is privatized only during limited time periods is a 
“semicommons,” a particularly complex ownership regime. See Henry E. Smith, 
Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
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autonomy and privacy within the larger domain. Privatization also has 
disadvantages, of course, chief among them the elimination of the other 
housemates’ privileges to use the privatized space.365 
Co-occupant decisions to privatize need not be explicit. A particular 
housemate’s repeated and exclusive use of a space may give rise to an informal 
entitlement. However, privatizations of larger spaces, such as entire bedrooms, 
have major domestic repercussions; even intimate co-occupants thus may 
resort to oral contracts, perhaps prior to moving in, to achieve these outcomes. 
In less intimate environments such as co-housing communities, owner-
occupants routinely enter into written contracts that precisely identify their 
shared and unshared spaces. 
Privatization practices vary widely in intentional communities. Leaders of 
many religion-based settlements such as those of the Benedictines and the 
Hutterites are ideologically committed to sharing and thus resistant to the 
inevitable pressures toward greater privatization of space.366 Secular 
communities, by contrast, commonly are significantly privatized; as noted, in 
kibbutzim and co-housing developments, private dwelling units with full 
kitchens have become virtually universal.367 
When co-occupants anticipate periods of grossly unbalanced labor contributions. 
Co-occupants contribute labor—an input typically more fine-grained than 
capital—to their household’s economy. In many households, the fine 
granularity of labor readily enables housemates to keep their rough 
interpersonal accounts in balance. In some situations, however, one housemate 
may ask another to render for many years, without prompt recompense, a 
valuable flow of domestic services and speak of eventually correcting the 
imbalance by bestowing major rewards in the distant future. Two classic 
scenarios are these: A co-occupying adult cares for an aging relative, expects to 
be appropriately awarded in the relative’s will, but is not.368 An unmarried 
homemaker provides a valuable flow of domestic services to a cohabiting 
 
365.  Privatization also may entail the sacrifice of other benefits of sharing, such as risk-spreading, 
exploitation of scale economies in production and consumption, and the social pleasures of 
communal interactions. Ellickson, supra note 32, at 1332-62. 
366.  Even in Hutterite settlements, however, families have separate bedrooms and at least semi-
private sitting rooms. See PETER, supra note 222, at 178, 202-03. 
367.  See supra text accompanying notes 185-186, 189-191. 
368.  Compare Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller, 413 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1967) (ordering an executor to 
honor a written contract between the decedent and a caregiver that called for the devise of 
the decedent’s farm to the caregiver), with Feigenspan v. Pence, 168 S.W.2d 1074 (Mo. 1943) 
(declining to order specific performance of an oral contract with allegedly similar terms). 
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breadwinner who does little in return except to vaguely promise major future 
rewards; after the couple separates, the breadwinner fails to deliver.369 
How might vulnerable gift-givers protect themselves in such situations? 
One option is to insist, early in the housemate relationship, on a written 
contract that specifically spells out the gift-giver’s entitlements to future 
compensation. If the co-occupants were intimates at the time, however, 
insistence on a written contract would send a strong and potentially damaging 
signal of distrust.370 The vulnerable party’s better option therefore may be to 
make clear that she will reduce her levels of gifts and perhaps even consider 
exiting from the household unless the recipient starts providing, now rather 
than later, a more adequate flow of return gifts. 
These gripping scenarios frequently give rise to litigation in endgame. 
Lawmakers in most states have not been sympathetic to a plaintiff who is 
unable to ground her claim for compensation on a written contract. This stance 
may be attributable to the difficulties a court typically has in determining both 
the oral promises that were made and also the gifts that actually were 
exchanged while the relationship was ongoing. More fundamentally, a judge 
might decide to reject a claim of this sort on the ground that the claimant had 
contributed to the problem by failing to insist on either a written contract or 
more prompt recompense. 
D. Rules for Co-Owners  
The co-ownership of residential property typically commences when a 
transferor executes a deed that vests title in two or more concurrent owners.371 
Surveys indicate that intimate couples, typically spouses, are the exclusive co-
owners of a large majority of the co-owned housing units in the United 
States.372 Although a co-ownership relationship, as such, is unlikely to be as 
multi-stranded as a co-occupant relationship, co-owners inevitably have 
numerous issues to resolve among themselves. Serious conflicts among co-
owners may arise over whether an occupying co-owner owes rent to a 
nonoccupying co-owner, under what circumstances a co-owner who has 
 
369.  Cf. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
370.  See supra text accompanying notes 327-337. 
371.  Co-ownership interests also can be created by other means, such as inheritance, see supra 
note 162 and accompanying text, the voluntary fractionalization of shares, and adverse 
possession.  
372.  These couples typically own either as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety, forms that 
confer full ownership on the surviving spouse. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying 
text. 
ELLICKSON – PRE-OP 11/6/2006  5:37:59 PM 
the yale law journal  116:226   2006 
322 
 
unilaterally borne the cost of an improvement is entitled to compel the other 
co-owners to share that expense, the possible limitations on the rights of a 
single co-owner to initiate a partition action, and other such issues. In the 
event of litigation among co-owners, a liberal legal system stands ready to 
apply a complex set of small-bore private law rules to resolve these sorts of 
issues.373 Because disputes among co-owners potentially involve significant 
stakes, individuals about to jointly acquire residential property might be 
expected to hire attorneys to learn about the default legal rules and to tailor a 
written agreement that modifies some of them.374 
There appear to have been no surveys of how frequently co-owners, prior 
to endgame, seek the advice of attorneys or enter into written contracts with 
one another. Various scraps of evidence, however, strongly suggest that most 
intimate co-owners strive to manage their midgame affairs without the counsel 
of lawyers and also without fleshing out their mutual obligations in writing. 
One team of investigators found that most home co-purchasers receive no legal 
advice even about whether to take title as joint tenants with a right of 
survivorship or in some other form.375 Evelyn Lewis, the author of one of the 
most searching studies of co-ownership, asserts that written agreements 
among co-owners are unusual.376 Two leading legal publishers each offer no 
more than a few legal forms to govern co-owner relations, in sharp contrast, 
for example, to the hundreds of pages of forms they each offer to govern 
landlord-tenant relations.377 Midgame litigation between individual co-owners 
of residential real estate appears to be rare. In almost 90% of a sample of 
reported judicial decisions on co-owner disputes, the co-owners had turned to 
 
373.  See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 40, §§ 5.7-.13, at 201-24. 
374.  Although most of these legal rules are defaults, some co-owner exit rights are immutable. 
See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
375.  Michael Braunstein & Hazel Genn, Odd Man Out: Preliminary Findings Concerning the 
Diminishing Role of Lawyers in the Home-Buying Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 476 n.30 (1991) 
(reporting that 58% of surveyed homebuyers had not been asked by any intermediary who 
had helped them close the transaction whether they wanted to hold title as joint tenants or 
in some other form). 
376.  Lewis, supra note 127, at 409 (“[T]he contractual aspects of the [co-ownership] relationship 
are rarely formalized by written agreement.”). 
377.  Compare the relative brevity of 7 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership 
§ 75:1-:49 (2006), and 14 id. Partition §§ 193:54-:56, with 11, 11A & 11B id. Leases of Real 
Property §§ 161:1-:1275, nearly three full volumes on leases of real property. Similarly, 
compare the spareness of 5A NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS ANNOTATED § 5.2834-
.2836 (rev. ed. 2001), discussing joint tenants and tenants in common, and 6D id. § 6.7535 
(rev. ed. 1992), discussing partition, with 5B id. pts. 1 & 2 (rev. ed. 2002), two entire books 
on leases.  
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the courts only after they had entered endgame—for example, after they had 
become embroiled in a partition, divorce, or probate action.378 
Like intimate co-occupants, most intimate co-owners correctly anticipate 
that they will be able to use gift exchange and discrete oral contracts to resolve 
any issues that they may confront while their relationship remains healthy.379 
During midgame, most intimate co-ownership relationships thus are 
structured not in the shadow of the small-bore private law of co-ownership, 
but beyond that shadow.380 
E. Rules To Govern the Landlord-Tenant Relationship 
By consorting with intimates, most participants keep their owner-occupant 
relationships sunny. Roughly one-fourth of these relationships in the United 
States, however, involve parties at arm’s length.381 Of all household 
relationships, these non-intimate leaseholds pose the greatest risks of 
 
378.  In both midgame and endgame a co-owner is entitled to petition for a judicial accounting. 
See, e.g., STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 5.9, at 209. To obtain evidence of when 
co-owners actually initiate accounting actions against one another, on April 20, 2006, an 
examination was made of the 100 most recent reported state appellate cases involving real 
estate and bearing West Keycite 373k37 (“Tenancy in Common; Mutual Rights, Duties, and 
Liabilities of Cotenants; Accounting”). Of these 100, forty-two cases were excluded because 
they involved either a corporate entity as a named party, a dispute involving the ownership 
of a mineral interest, or a title dispute (implying that the parties did not even know whether 
they were involved in a “game” at all). In at least fifty-one of the remaining fifty-eight cases 
(88%), the appellate decision indicated that the plaintiff had initiated the accounting action 
in endgame, most commonly incident to a partition action. But cf. Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 
54 P.2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (involving a midgame action by a wife against her husband 
to cancel the husband’s lease of his interest in real estate that the couple jointly owned and 
occupied). 
379.  When the members of a group of co-owners are either numerous or non-intimate, however, 
they indeed may hire an attorney to draft written documents formalizing portions of their 
relationship. For example, multiple absentee owners of a large residential complex are likely 
to be organized as a corporation, partnership, or trust. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
In England, a trust is the standard institution for the governance of co-owned property, 
even among intimates. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 620 n.282. 
380.  Even in endgame, co-owners are relatively unlikely to become embroiled in litigation. While 
there are many contemporary treatises exclusively on landlord-tenant law, see infra note 388, 
treatises on concurrent ownership are few and mostly dated, see, e.g., A.C. FREEMAN, 
COTENANCY AND PARTITION (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney 1886). 
381.  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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estrangement and are the ones most likely to give rise to both written contracts 
and litigation in endgame.382 
1. When Landlords Also Are Occupants 
By becoming homeowners, occupants eliminate the need to deal with a 
distant landlord. In many owner-occupied households, however, there also are 
non-owning occupants—commonly children or other relatives of one or more 
of the owners. In these instances, relations between owners and non-owning 
occupants are likely to be warm. An owner is not likely to charge a co-
occupying relative rent, and is even less likely to insist on the execution of a 
written lease. Parents exasperated with the sloth of a stay-at-home adult child, 
however, ultimately may decide to charge him rent and formally assign him 
domestic duties. A wake-up call of this sort teaches the child that, among 
competent adults, a flow of gifts cannot go entirely unreciprocated. Elderly 
live-in relatives, by contrast, are likely to understand the implicit duty to return 
gifts and therefore, when able, are apt to contribute money and services to 
support ongoing household operations.383 Intimates, however, would be 
unlikely to refer to a senior’s contributions as “rent,” an alienating term that 
connotes social distance.384 
An owner-occupied household also may include occupants—such as 
boarders and live-in domestic workers—who are not relatives of the owners. 
According to Census data, roughly three-quarters of unrelated adults of this 
sort do not pay rent to the owners with whom they live.385 Instead, they may 
help maintain their welcome by providing money for selected household 
operations or by rendering valuable domestic services, such as childcare or yard 
 
382.  Individuals who think of themselves as voluntary members of an in-group are especially 
likely to trust one another. See Blair & Stout, supra note 69, at 1770-72 and sources cited 
therein. Of all the principal relationships in a household setting, that between a tenant and a 
landlord at arm’s length is the one least likely to give rise to this shared perception. 
383.  See George Hemmens & Charles Hoch, Shared Housing in Low Income Households, in UNDER 
ONE ROOF: ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN SHARED HOUSING 17, 23-25 (George C. Hemmens et 
al. eds., 1996) (reporting that in Chicago in the 1980s, adults residing in low-income 
households, especially ones lacking a conjugal unit, tended to contribute both money and 
services to the household economy). 
384.  See id. at 23 (stating that kinfolk tended to be taken in “at nominal or no rent”). 
385.  The American Housing Survey defines a “lodger” as someone who pays rent to another 
household occupant. AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY: 1999, supra note 90, at A-17. In 1999, the 
heads of owner-occupied households reported the presence of 2.2 million unrelated adults 
and 0.6 million lodgers. Id. at 64. 
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work.386 An owner may prefer to have a written contract with a nonrelative 
who is socially distant—for example, an au pair brought in from abroad. 
Because contracts are inevitably incomplete, however, even under those 
circumstances a formal arrangement may not be worth the candle.387 
2. When Landlords Are Not Occupants 
Arms-length residential tenancies can give rise to a host of substantive and 
procedural disputes that are complex enough and litigated frequently enough 
to have inspired the authorship of numerous legal treatises.388 Especially in 
rural areas and small cities, however, landlords’ and tenants’ interests in 
maintaining good local reputations can give rise to a surprisingly high level of 
trust.389 For example, in the less expensive segments of the rental housing 
market, a lease between a tenant and an absentee landlord traditionally has 
been oral.390 Purveyors of legal forms nevertheless do offer many versions of 
written residential leases, and many landlords prefer a more formalized 
 
386.  In a household without a married couple, and in a black or Hispanic household, a 
nonnuclear household occupant is particularly likely to provide monetary support for 
household operations. See Angel & Tienda, supra note 112, at 1379-80. 
387.  In practice, a firm that specializes in the placement of au pairs is likely to be involved in any 
contracting between an au pair and the host family. See, e.g., Oxman v. Amoroso, 659 
N.Y.S.2d 963 (Yonkers City Ct. 1997). 
388.  General treatises include MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES (Patrick A. Randolph 
Jr. ed., 5th rev. ed. 2006), and ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND 
TENANT (1980). There also are state-specific treatises, especially in jurisdictions with a 
tradition of rent control. See, e.g., ROBERT F. DOLAN, RASCH’S LANDLORD & TENANT (4th ed. 
1998) (New York); STUART J. FABER, HANDBOOK OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAW (1978) 
(California); RAYMOND I. KORONA, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW (5th ed. 2001) (New 
Jersey). 
389.  Some landlords prefer to rent to tenants who can provide positive references from former 
landlords, a practice that helps deter tenant opportunism in all settings. 
390.  In the 1970s in Brown County, Wisconsin, only 10-12% of residential tenants had a written 
lease at the outset of their tenure, and only 30% of landlords reported that they required a 
security deposit. RAND CORP., supra note 139, at 53, 55. Written residential leases 
undoubtedly have become more common in some jurisdictions. See Steven M. Shepard, 
Withholding Rent in Connecticut 71 n.259 (Dec. 21, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) (citing interviews with landlord-tenant law specialists about the nature of New 
Haven leases). In the case of poor tenants, the increasing formality of apartment leases likely 
is partly attributable to the maturation of legal services programs and to the advent of the 
Section 8 housing voucher program, which requires a participating landlord to employ a 
one-year written lease. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(i) (West 2003). 
ELLICKSON – PRE-OP 11/6/2006  5:37:59 PM 
the yale law journal  116:226   2006 
326 
 
relationship that includes, for example, a security deposit.391 Written leases are 
likely to be especially common when stakes are high (e.g., the dwelling unit is 
relatively expensive) and when the parties anticipate remaining socially distant 
(e.g., the landlord is a corporation or other institution). 
Once a tenant and absentee landlord reach endgame, they are unlikely to 
have any compunction against turning to attorneys and courts to help resolve 
their disputes. In midgame, however, even an absentee landlord and a tenant 
gain by being able to resolve their differences in a more informal fashion. By 
applying lease provisions and ambient norms to resolve midgame disputes, 
they can save the expense of learning and applying small-bore landlord-tenant 
law.392 
Rent controls and project-based housing subsidy programs spawn some of 
the most legalized of midgame relationships between landlords and tenants. 
Even if they have come to hate one another, a landlord and tenant governed by 
one of these programs have difficulty severing their relationship. Special legal 
provisions sharply limit a landlord’s power to end a tenant’s stay, and a 
disgruntled tenant may not want to leave if that would entail losing an 
attractively priced abode. Anticipating the risk of especially frosty midgame 
relations in these contexts, a landlord is likely to insist in advance on a detailed 
lease. When exasperated by an unresponsive landlord, a tenant is likely to 
prefer to hire an attorney (or, if eligible, to seek free help from a legal services 
office) rather than to exit and give up the subsidy. Thus in New York City, 
where rent controls have a long history and subsidized housing projects are 
especially prevalent, residential landlords and tenants are uncommonly likely 
to turn to lawyers and courts to resolve spats arising out of ongoing leases.393  
 
391.  See, e.g., 11 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Leases of Real Property §§ 161:34-:42, :49 (2006 rev.) 
(offering ten lengthy form leases for residential property). 
392.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 275, at 275-79. 
393.  Since 1984, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) has 
administered the rent control and rent stabilization programs in New York City (and a few 
other localities). These programs generate much litigation. On June 21, 2006, a search of the 
Westlaw database of New York cases (ny-cs), using the search terms “dhcr /10 rent & da(aft 
1999),” resulted in a list of 292 decisions dated 2000 or thereafter. There also is a special 
court exclusively devoted to residential landlord-tenant litigation in the city. This court has 
50 judges, over 1000 nonjudicial employees, and handles over 350,000 cases per year, 
making it “one of the busiest courts in the world.” N.Y. City Civil Court, Housing Part, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/housing/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). On 
the perversities of the city’s approach, see generally PETER D. SALINS & GERARD C.S. 
MILDNER, SCARCITY BY DESIGN: THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING POLICIES 
(1992); and Tammie X. Simmons-Mosley & Stephen Malpezzi, Household Mobility in New 
York City’s Regulated Rental Housing Market, 15 J. HOUSING ECON. 38, 40-42 (2006) 
(reviewing the literature). 
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Charles Fourier, the early-nineteenth-century French social critic, urged the 
creation of large planned communities—Phalanxes—whose members would 
apply “industrial principles” to domestic life. In 1844, George Ripley and the 
other leaders of the ongoing intentional community of Brook Farm embraced 
Fourierism and set about constructing a Phalanstery building containing nearly 
100 small dwelling rooms and a dining hall capable of seating over 300 
persons. Like the other two dozen efforts in the 1840s and 1850s to create 
Fourierist communities in the United States, the Brook Farm endeavor soon 
fizzled out.394 The author of the leading history of Brook Farm puzzlingly 
attributes its demise to the personal shortcomings of the community’s leaders 
and financial backers.395 Brook Farm’s basic problem in fact was a built-in and 
utterly mundane flaw in the Fourierist conception—the unacceptably high 
transaction costs, particularly in the absence of a powerful unifying ideology, of 
coordinating domestic activity within a Phalanstery building. 
As this example illustrates, much scholarly work on both conventional and 
exotic household institutions has been undertheorized. Having striven to bring 
theory to the topic, I conclude with some thoughts about opportunities for 
future work. Transaction cost economics and the theory of the firm can enrich 
the work of demographers, social historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and 
family law specialists, many of whom have paid too little attention to the roles 
of owners in the governance of domestic spaces. Conversely, scholars who 
study the structure of business and governmental organizations can learn from 
Aristotle’s basic insight that social arrangements that succeed within the 
household commonly inspire creators of more complex human institutions. 
According to one estimate, family-controlled enterprises, broadly defined, are 
responsible for a majority of U.S. business activity conducted outside the 
household.396 Organizers of business firms, like organizers of households, see 
 
394.  A fire totally destroyed Brook Farm’s Phalanstery prior to the building’s completion. See 
DELANO, supra note 181, at 254-57. No effort ever was made to reconstruct it. Brook Farm, in 
all its incarnations, lasted from 1841 to 1847. On the Fourierist movement in the United 
States, see id.; and GUARNERI, supra note 222. 
395.  DELANO, supra note 181, at 323 (“Fourierism itself was not one of the major causes of Brook 
Farm’s eventual failure.”); see also id. at xiv-xv, 319-24.  
396.  See Joseph H. Astrachan & Melissa Carey Shanker, Family Businesses’ Contribution to the U.S. 
Economy: A Closer Look, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 211, 217 (2003) (asserting that family businesses, 
narrowly defined, accounted for 29% of U.S. GDP in 2000, and, broadly defined, accounted 
for 64%); see also Hansmann et al., supra note 41, at 1357-60, 1365-66 (describing family and 
household enterprises in ancient Rome and medieval Italy); Pollak, supra note 1, at 591-93 
(identifying advantages of family-governed firms). 
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advantages in consorting with intimates and undoubtedly apply to the 
workplace some of the lessons that they learned at home. 
The role of law—especially of background legal principles—in shaping 
household institutions has been inadequately appreciated. When a traditional 
society first embraces the basic liberal principles of private property, freedom 
of exit, and freedom of contract, it transforms its dynamics of household 
formation. In addition, by establishing the rule of law a society makes it easier 
for household members to trade with outsiders, a development that reduces the 
scope of internal household production. 
The household is an especially fruitful setting for empirical work on 
systems of social control within small groups—a topic of interest to, among 
others, game theorists, sociologists, and legal scholars. How commonly do 
participants in a household relationship employ tit-for-tat sanctions, pay 
money to one another, or enter into written contracts? When do co-occupants 
informally privatize particular spaces within their abodes? How do the 
founding members of an intentional community raise capital, confer 
ownership, and make collective decisions? 
Finally, study of the household promises to illuminate central positive and 
normative questions about the role of small-bore private law. Legal centralists 
assume that private law influences events not only after things go wrong, but 
also before they do—that is, when people prepare for that possibility. One of 
my central factual premises, by contrast, has been that most people, wishing to 
minimize involvement with lawyers, structure their household arrangements 
beyond the shadow of private law. Some legal commentators, on the other 
hand, have urged participants in household relationships to enter into more 
written contracts with one another.397 In a few domestic situations, this indeed 
is wise counsel.398 When the participants are intimates enmeshed in what is 
likely to be a long-lived relationship, however, formalization usually is a 
mistake. Attorneys who contribute to the legalization of home relations 
typically not only waste the fees that their clients pay them, but also debase the 
quality of life around the hearth. 
 
397.  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 316, 333, 336. But cf. DAHLIA LITHWICK & BRANDT 
GOLDSTEIN, ME V. EVERYBODY: ABSURD CONTRACTS FOR AN ABSURD WORLD (2003) 
(offering a collection of tongue-in-cheek contracts to govern aspects of intimate 
relationships). 
398.  See supra text accompanying notes 306-316, 330-337. 
